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Abstract 
This thesis consists of three theoretical chapters, all related to the response of unemployment to 
shocks and the role of active and passive labour market policies. Throughout the thesis, 
unemployment is assumed to evolve as a result of the uncoordinated nature of the labour market 
along the lines outlined in the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides equilibrium search and matching 
model.  
Chapter 2 examines the effects of employment policies on vacancy creation and 
allocation decisions of firms and unemployment across workers with different skills. We develop 
a partial equilibrium model with heterogeneous high- and low-tech jobs and with skilled and 
unskilled workers, which we motivate by the stark evidence on the incidence of cross-skill 
employment (which crowds out unskilled workers, e.g. evidence for the US, the UK and the EU 
put these at 58%, 32%, and 35%, respectively). We show that certain employment protection 
policies could, in fact, lead to a reduction in job creation and might alter the allocation of 
vacancies across low- and high-tech job type. We find that: (i) skilled workers benefit while 
unskilled workers experience high jobless rate; (ii) policy effects differ when they are skill-
specific; (ii) stricter policies can have more severe consequences; and (iv) vacancy creation 
subsidy can play a key role in reducing unemployment across worker type as well as alleviating 
the cross-skill crowding out of jobs. Against conventional wisdom, we demonstrate that 
severance compensation can have a ‘real’ effect on job creation decision, provided there is some 
degree of strictness in its enforcement. 
Motivated by the extensive use of fiscal stimulus policies and labour market reforms 
during the last economic crisis, in Chapter 3 we study the implications of labour market 
regulations in driving the sensitivity of an economy to fiscal spending shocks, in a Dynamic 
Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) model with job search frictions. We demonstrate that 
less rigidity in the labour market reduces the impact of fiscal demand shock on job creation and 
employment, both at extensive and intensive margins, whereas higher rigidity amplifies it. We 
also establish that the extent to which government spending promotes economic activity, job 
creation and employment depends on the degree of substitutability between private and public 
consumption. Higher substitutability dampens economic activity and reduces the sizes of output 
and employment multipliers. Labour market-oriented fiscal spending is found to be the most 
potent policy instruments for promoting employment – especially in the presence of high labour 
market rigidities. 
Finally, in Chapter 4, we study how openness to international trade and capital mobility 
and their interactions with labour market policies affect the behaviour of an economy, in 
particular with respect to its unemployment level. We show that the degree of openness to 
international capital flow is crucial for understanding the response of unemployment to different 
shocks. In isolation, by raising the incentive to invest, a reduction in capital mobility barriers 
leads to lower unemployment, both in the long-run and the dynamic short-run. With limited 
restrictions to capital movement, unemployment responds faster and with greater magnitude to 
a domestic productivity shock, and this is further enhanced the more the economy is open to 
x 
international trade. A striking finding of this study is that while a higher degree of capital 
mobility enhances the adjustment of unemployment in response to a domestic productivity 
shock, it dampens its adjustment to a foreign demand shock. By contrast, higher openness to 
international trade enhances the adjustment effects of both shocks on unemployment. Finally, 
we find that heterogeneity in the welfare state systems in the EU can generate substantial 
differentials in the adjustment of unemployment to various shocks. 
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Chapter 1. Introduction 
This thesis consists of three theoretical chapters broadly motivated by the labour market effects, 
especially unemployment effects, of the global economic crisis that began in 2007, as well as the 
role of active and passive labour market policies in shaping these effects. More generally, we 
contribute to a deeper understanding of the behaviour of unemployment in the presence of labour 
market frictions. Below, we provide a summary of the motivation for each chapter, and the 
research questions addressed, the modelling strategy, main findings, and the structure of the 
thesis. 
1.1 Motivation 
Despite growing concerns about the high unemployment rates in many countries, research within 
policy and academic environments has paid less attention to how labour market policies drive 
these rates in the presence of competition for jobs. According to the OECD (2013a), Education 
at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators, the average unemployment rate of workers with tertiary 
education (skilled workers) stood at 4.8 percent while that of workers without secondary 
education (unskilled workers) was as high as 12.6 percent at the end of 2011 across the OECD 
countries. These rates represent an increase of about 1.5 and 3.8 percentage points from their 
respective levels in 2008. While different explanations are offered in the literature for the high 
jobless rate, especially among the unskilled, the most widely-held view is that labour market 
rigidities prevent firms from adequately adjusting to accommodate new economic conditions 
(Bertola, Blau, & Kahn, 2001; OECD, 2004; Siebert, 1997). Thus, labour market policies aimed 
at promoting job creation and increasing labour market flexibility have become an important part 
of labour market reforms in most OECD countries (Stiglbauer, 2006). 
In principle, labour market policies such as hiring or employment subsidies are thought 
to be the right incentives for job creation and employment, while employment protection 
legislations (EPL) are established to discourage inflows into unemployment by imposing 
statutory costs on firms anytime a worker is dismissed. The latter, which aims to protect workers 
and increase job stability, also serves as a disincentive for job creation, given that it lowers the 
expected gain from a job match. While the literature on labour market policies has focused on 
the effects of the fixed firing cost (‘tax’) component of EPL, that caused by severance 
compensation has received almost no attention, especially since the seminal work of Lazear 
(1990). Based on Lazear’s theoretical prediction, the justification for this is that the effects of 
severance on job creation can be undone via wage reduction, especially if wages are flexible. 
Lazear, in that study, however, empirically showed that severance lowers employment. 
Severance transfer remains one of the obvious manifestations of EPL, especially in the EU. As 
documented by Chen and Funke (2009), the standard severance compensation paid to workers 
for dismissal in the EU ranges from 16.0 weekly wages in The Netherlands, to 33.5 and 66.7 
weekly wages in the UK and Germany respectively, to 0.00 in the US. Garibaldi and Violante 
2 
(2000) also show that severance payment constitutes approximately 90 and 88 percent of total 
firing costs in the UK and Italy, respectively. 
 A potential consequence of intense job competition characterising the modern labour 
market is the crowding out of unskilled workers. Earlier studies (for example, Dolado, 
Felgueroso, & Jimeno, 2000; Teulings & Koopmanschap, 1989) argue that job competition could 
result in skilled workers undertaking jobs with low skill requirements as a way to temporarily 
avoid unemployment. This, in turn, reduces the employment opportunities of the unskilled 
(Belan et al., 2010). In the literature, evidence of over-education – considered to be directly 
related to the displacement of unskilled workers by skilled ones – abounds. Hartog (2000) shows 
that over-education in the EU ranges between 10 and 35 percent, while in the UK and the US, 
Belfield (2010) and Fabel and Pascalau (2013) report it to be approximately 32 and 58 percent, 
respectively.1 
In light of the above, we argue that a proper evaluation of the labour market effects of 
EPL requires a framework that takes into account the effects of job competition resulting from 
cross-skill matching, considering its role in driving the unemployment rate across skills. Thus, 
in Chapter 2, we study the implications of the specific aspects of active and passive labour market 
policies that consist of targeted severance compensation, fixed firing cost and recruitment 
subsidy (which are widely used in EU countries) 2  for labour market outcomes. We are 
particularly interested in assessing how these policies affect the vacancy creation and allocation 
decisions of firms, and unemployment rates across workers with different skills. 
The recent global economic crisis has attracted considerable debate in the literature, both 
because of the suddenness in output collapse and the consequent rise in unemployment rate 
across countries and because of the governments’ aggressive fiscal response to the crisis to 
stimulate aggregate demand and foster job creation. At the same time, several labour market 
reforms (encompassing active and passive labour market policies) have been implemented across 
different countries. While many recent studies have examined the effects of fiscal policies on 
economic outcomes, there remains little consensus on their effectiveness. This is in part due to 
the difficulty in isolating the direct effects of fiscal stimuli on economic variables (Batini, 
Eyraud, Forni, & Weber, 2014).  
Empirical studies suggest that the degree of impact of fiscal spending depends on several 
factors (Blanchard & Leigh, 2013; Kwan, 2007, among others). For example, Blanchard and 
Leigh find that the initial level of household debt, among other variables, can significantly affect 
the outcomes of fiscal spending, arguing that the forecast errors at the early stage of the crisis 
were primarily due to poor estimation of fiscal multipliers. Kwan finds that the degree of 
substitutability between public and private consumptions also affects the effectiveness of 
                                                             
1 More recently, ILO (2014) placed the incidence of over-education between 11.8 and 60.6 percent in Germany, 58 
percent in Austria, and 28 percent in France. 
2 For instance, see Blanchard, Jaumotte, and Loungani (2013), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Campolmi et al., 
(2011a) and Garibaldi and Violante (2000, 2005). 
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government consumption expenditure. Labour market rigidities have also been identified as 
determining the size of fiscal multipliers (Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2013; Batini et al., 2014). 
Given that most studies have focused on the output effects of fiscal policies, motivated 
by the above, Chapter 3 of this thesis sets out to examine the labour market effects of fiscal 
policies. In particular, we investigate how labour market institutions alter the structure of the 
economy and the channels through which this affects the transmission of fiscal policies. In 
contrast with many existing studies, we distinguish between traditional government consumption 
(which we consider to be utility-enhancing as opposed to wasteful) and labour market-oriented 
spending. The latter consists of job creation and employment tax subsidies (active labour market 
policy (ALMP) measures taken during the crisis period). A further analysis of the nature of fiscal 
financing instrument sheds light on the effectiveness of various fiscal stimulus policies. 
Chapter 4 is motivated by increasing concerns about the effects of globalisation on the 
labour market (Eurofound, 2007; European Commission, 2010). A recent paper by Chowla, 
Quaglietti, and Rachel (2014) argues that approximately two-third of the decrease in the UK’s 
GDP – which dropped by 7.2 percent between 2007 and 2009 – is traceable to global shock. This 
contraction in GDP led to the deterioration of labour market conditions, as the vacancy creation 
rate dropped by approximately 6 percent between the first and second quarter of 2008, and a 
further 22 percent by the first quarter of 2009. The unemployment rate in the UK also increased 
by 1.3 percentage points between the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter of 2009 (Clancy, 
2009).3 
Given that the degree of economic openness differs for individual countries, the response 
of each to global developments – including those emanating from within – is likely to depend on 
the country’s degree of openness. Gamberoni, Uexkull, and Weber (2010) showed empirically 
that the contractionary effect of the last economic crisis on unemployment was higher in 
countries with greater openness to international trade. Also, using a panel of 20 OECD countries 
over a 30-year period, Vallanti (2015) found that higher openness to international capital 
mobility increases the responsiveness of unemployment to aggregate shock. 
The literature on the labour market effects of globalisation has concentrated mostly on 
the consequences of the ‘process’ of economic openness (liberalisation), paying little or no 
attention to how the actual degree of openness of an economy shapes its reaction to global and 
domestic events (e.g., Cosar, Guner, & Tybout, 2016; Du, Nie, & Wei, 2015; Felbermayr, Prat, 
& Schmerer, 2011; Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010). Additionally, these studies tend to separate the 
effects of international trade and capital mobility on the labour market, which is not warranted 
when both are key drivers of globalisation (Greenaway & Nelson, 2001; Helpman & Itskhoki, 
2010), important sources of heterogeneity across countries (Antràs & Caballero, 2009), and 
channels through which global shocks can be transmitted to the domestic economy (Chowla et 
                                                             
3 Salgado et al. (2014) provide further evidence of the variations in the labour market responses to the recent 
economic crisis. 
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al., 2014; Rodrik, 1998). Antràs and Caballero show that in the presence of international capital 
mobility, trade liberalisation leads to capital outflow which, as emphasised by Azariadis and 
Pissarides (2007), can potentially result in higher unemployment volatility. Egger, Greenaway, 
and Seidel (2011) also argue that while strict labour market policies lead to higher unemployment 
and suppress trade flow, allowing for international capital mobility can reverse these effects. 
In Chapter 4, we attempt to address the following specific questions: first, what are the 
individual and combined effects of changes in the degree of openness to international trade and 
capital mobility on labour market outcomes, especially unemployment? Second, how does the 
degree of openness shape the transition path of unemployment in response to, for example, 
domestic productivity and foreign demand shocks? Third, what are the individual and joint 
effects of labour market reforms and economic openness on the labour market, and what role do 
labour market reforms and ALMPs play in determining the response of unemployment to the 
process of liberalisation?  
1.2 Modelling Strategy 
To unpack the issues addressed in this thesis, the labour market is modelled along the line 
outlined by the Diamond-Mortensen-Pissarides search and matching model. Credited to the early 
work of Diamond (1981, 1982), Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1984, 1985), and further 
advanced by Mortensen and Pissarides (1994), the search and matching model has become a 
central tool for the analysis of contemporary labour market issues. Unlike the standard 
neoclassical framework, with perfect information and no involuntary unemployment, this model 
focuses on market frictions and provides a basis to drive the understanding of key labour market 
outcomes – for example, the co-existence of vacancies and unemployment. An underlying 
assumption of the search and matching model is that the labour market is characterised by 
matching frictions, resulting from the existence of heterogeneities and imperfect information 
about potential ‘trading partners’. Heterogeneity may arise due to the specific skills workers 
possess and those required by firms. Thus, unemployed workers and firms with vacancies must 
engage in a costly and time-consuming search process to establish employment relationships. 
Even when workers are identical and firms create vacancies with similar skill requirements, the 
absence of perfect information, e.g., about the existence and location of trading partners, implies 
that search must take place for employment to occur.  
 At any given time, the transition out of unemployment requires that a firm with a vacancy 
and a job seeker meet and agree to form a productive match. The meeting process is summarised 
by a matching function which maps the number of vacancies  v  and unemployed workers  u  
into the number of employment relationships (matches) formed at any given time. A match is 
consummated if the gains from switching labour market states, thus forming a productive match, 
are at least greater than the values each agent would fall back to if they were to continue 
unmatched. Hence, job matches produce economic rents (match surplus), which are shared 
5 
between firms and workers. The standard sharing rule for this rent is determined by a generalised 
Nash bargaining solution, which, in turn, defines the wage rate for each job. Once an employment 
relationship is established and the wage rate is agreed upon, production commences until the 
match is destroyed. Throughout this thesis, we assume that job matches are destroyed at an 
exogenous rate, as in Gertler, Sala, and Trigari (2008), Blanchard and Gali (2010), and 
Monacelli, Perotti, and Trigari (2010). 
The search and matching framework has been criticised, in particular by Shimer (2005) 
who argued that the model lacks an internal amplification mechanism required to generate the 
empirically observed fluctuations in vacancy-unemployment  v u  ratio  – the so-called Shimer 
puzzle. Shimer shows that for a given labour productivity shock of a plausible magnitude, the 
model produces less than 10 percent of the business-cycle-frequency fluctuations in v u  ratio, 
because wages absorb most of the increases in labour productivity, thus reducing the 
procyclicality of the firm’s share of the match surplus and implying lower incentive for vacancy 
creation. The lack of internal propagation mechanism is attributed to the surplus sharing rule 
implied by the Nash bargaining solution, which assigns a constant share of the match surplus to 
each party of a job match. 
Shimer’s (2005) finding has drawn significant interest in the literature, and the studies 
that followed proposed alternative solutions to the amplification problem. For example, Hall 
(2005) introduced an ad-hoc wage rigidity, where the rigidity is induced by social conventions 
(norm) that constrain wage adjustment for existing and newly-hired workers in response to 
productivity shocks, showing that this can improve the sensitivity of market variables. A Calvo-
type wage stickiness was proposed by Gertler and Trigari (2008). Here, only a fraction of firms 
are allowed to adjust their wage in response to a positive productivity shock, while the remaining 
fraction pays the wage rate of the previous period. The main motivation behind this approach is 
that less adjustment in wage rate can increase firms’ willingness to create more vacancies. 
However, as argued by Pissarides (2009), the wage prediction of the model matches empirical 
fact; instead, he shows that introducing, for instance, a fixed hiring cost can solve the Shimer 
puzzle. Costain and Reiter (2008) and Hagedorn and Manovskii (2008) argue that an alternative 
calibration to the standard model can also deliver large fluctuations in labour market variables 
while retaining the Nash bargaining solution.  
It is worth also emphasising that the search and matching model has externalities 
associated with job search activities. In particular, an additional job searching unemployed 
worker creates positive externalises for firms with vacancies and negative externalities for other 
job searching workers, since it increases the vacancy filling rate of firms and reduces the rate at 
which workers find jobs. An additional vacancy created will have an analogous effect. As 
stressed by Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (2000), both the job seekers and firms ignore these 
externalities created by their actions, giving rise to inefficiency search. Hosios, however, showed 
that by equating each party’s share of the joint surplus of a job match to their respective 
6 
contributions to the matching is a sufficient condition under which the two opposite externalities 
can offset each other. This condition, which is now referred to as the Hosios (1990) condition, 
has proven to be widely applicable under different modifications to the standard search and 
matching model (for more discussion, see Pissarides, 2000, ch. 8). 
Despite the above, the relevance and application of the search and matching have 
continued to grow over the past two decades – particularly in the area of addressing various 
labour market and macroeconomic policy questions. For instance, Cahuc and Le Barbanchon 
(2010) assessed the implications of counselling on the employability of unemployment workers. 
Belan, Carré, and Gregoir (2010) studied the effects of targeted subsidies on the employment 
rate of the unskilled workers. Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2005) and Mortensen and Pissarides 
(2003), among many others, have examined the effects of EPL within search and matching 
framework with heterogeneous agents. The model has also been a key element of the modern 
monetary and real business cycle dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models. Using 
a closed economy DSGE framework with search and matching frictions, Campolmi, Faia, and 
Winkler (2011a) and Monacelli et al. (2010), etc. investigated the effectiveness of fiscal policies. 
In the context of an open economy framework, Cacciatore (2014), Felbermayr, Prat, and 
Schmerer, (2011), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Montagna, Molana, and Onwordi (2016), 
among others, examined the interactions of frictional labour market and international economic 
openness in driving the dynamics of unemployment.4 
Chapter 2 of this thesis builds on the Albrecht and Vroman (2002) version of search and 
matching model with job-worker heterogeneity, which we use to study the implications of 
employment policies in the presence of cross-skill matching. In this model, workers are either 
skilled or unskilled, and firms create vacancies with high skill (high-tech) or low skill (low-tech) 
requirement. Vacancy creation and their allocation into low- and high-tech job types are 
endogenously determined, but the distribution of workers’ skills is exogenous. A central 
assumption of this model is that while unskilled workers possess the minimum skill required to 
undertake only low-tech jobs, their skilled counterparts can undertake any of the two job types. 
This leaves the unskilled workers competing for low-tech jobs with the skilled ones. Job creation 
occurs when an unemployed worker meets a firm with vacancy and they both agree to a wage. 
In the first part of our analysis, we assume that wages are determined through Nash bargaining 
solution in which both parties to a given job match maximise the joint product of the match 
surplus (the flexible wage bargaining). In the second part, this assumption is relaxed for an 
alternative setting where wages are taken as given when employment decisions are made (fixed 
wage). Thus, we are able to uncover the implications of various policies under the two wage 
scenarios, reflecting existing debates about the role of wage setting mechanism for the effects of 
labour market policies, especially those of severance compensation (Ahrens & Wesselbaum, 
                                                             
4 See Pissarides, (2000) for the details of the equilibrium search theory; Rogerson, Shimer, and Wright (2005) for 
the review of search theoretic models; and Yashiv, (2007) for a recent review of the labour market search and 
matching theory and its applications. 
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2009; Garibaldi & Violante, 2000, 2005). We assess the implications of the model using both 
analytical and numerical solutions. 
Chapters 3 and 4 develop real business cycle (RBC) DSGE models, enhanced with search 
and matching frictions. The DSGE models, in its modern form, evolved from the seminal paper 
of Kydland and Prescott (1982) who argue that an understanding of aggregate fluctuations 
requires the use of dynamic general equilibrium model. Concentrating on technology shock, the 
authors show that such dynamic model can be used to explain stylised business cycle facts. 
Mainly in the last two decades, accompanied by theoretical developments and computing power, 
DSGE models have witnessed substantial improvement and now serve as powerful tools for 
modern macroeconomics. The models provide a coherent platform for evaluating various 
questions relating to monetary and fiscal policy problems, international economics, etc., (Flotho, 
2009; Negro & Schorfheide, 2013; Tovar, 2009). 
The DSGE models build on microeconomic fundamentals and are dynamic in the sense 
that the current decisions of economic agents shape future outcomes (Sbordone, Tambalotti, Rao, 
& Walsh, 2010). The decision rules for these agents are derived from the assumptions about 
preferences, technologies and the prevailing economic policies by solving intertemporal 
optimisation problems. The idea of general equilibrium is based on the fact that an economy’s 
equilibrium results from the interaction of all economic agents. In addition, the economy is 
modelled as being subject to exogenous shocks, such as fiscal policy, productivity, foreign 
demand and trade shocks – which are often assumed to follow a first-order autoregressive 
process (Tovar, 2009). In response to these shocks, agents optimally adjust their actions. Thus, 
economic fluctuations at any given point reflect the optimal reactions of economic agents. The 
impacts of shocks on the economy may differ, and so do their durations, depending on the long 
run economic structure, the source and the persistence of each shock (Wickens, 2008).  
In the closed economy framework developed in Chapter 3, we assume the model consists 
of four economic agents: a representative household, two vertically integrated production sectors 
(an intermediate and final good sector) and a government. The household makes own 
consumption and capital accumulation decisions and supplies labour to the intermediate sector 
that uses both labour and capital as factor inputs in the production process. The intermediate 
sector is characterised by a monopolistically competitive structure in its product market and 
search and matching frictions in its hiring activities. To reduce the complexity of the model, we 
relax the assumption of job-worker heterogeneity developed in Chapter 2 and model a labour 
market with identical workers and firms as in Pissarides (2000). At any given time, firms create 
vacancies at a fixed sunk cost in order to hire workers. We assume full labour market 
participation, so that those who lose their jobs in any given period immediately resumes search 
activities for new jobs within the same period (Blanchard & Gali, 2010), rather than wait until 
the following period (Dabusinskas, Konya, & Millard, 2016). The final good sector operates 
within a perfectly competitive market and produces a final output that is used by the household 
and the government. The government sets rules regarding employment and has to satisfy a 
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balanced budget. On the expenditure side, it spends on own consumptions, active labour market 
policies (ALMPs) and the provision of social protections for the unemployed through 
unemployment benefits insurance. These are, in turn, financed by revenues raised through taxes 
levied on labour and other household incomes and the penalties imposed on firms upon job 
separations. Employment is modelled to adjust along two margins, intensive (hours worked per 
worker) and extensive (number of workers employed), to allow for a more in-depth evaluation 
of the effects of government spending policies on the labour market (Yuan & Li, 2000). We also 
consider the possibility that the household can directly derive utility from government 
consumption spending as proposed by, e.g., Aschauer (1985) and Molana and Zhang (2001). 
Chapter 4 considers the interactions of labour market friction and international economic 
openness in driving the dynamics of unemployment (Cacciatore, 2014; Felbermayr, Prat, & 
Schmerer, 2011; Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010; Montagna, et al., 2016). To this end, we construct 
a ‘small’ open economy DSGE model, in which the activities of the domestic agents do not 
influence those in the rest of the world such as the price imported varieties, foreign demand and 
interest rate (McCandless, 2008). Here, the setup of the domestic economy is somewhat similar 
to the closed economy framework in Chapter 3: the household supplies labour, consumes final 
good and invests in capital stock which also serves the dual function of as a productive factor 
and as a store of wealth. A key departure is that capital is now assumed to be internationally 
mobile. Also, we model a sector that acts as an intermediary between the household that supplies 
labour and the intermediate sector that uses the services of labour (similar to Christoffel, Kuester, 
& Linzert, 2009; de Walque, Pierrard, Sneessens, & Wouters, 2009). This sector is established 
by the government and its sole function is to hire and train unemployed workers and then sell 
the services of these workers as trained man-hours.5  Exporting activities take place in the 
intermediate sector that produces horizontally differentiated varieties which are also sold in the 
domestic economy. These varieties are produced using, as factor inputs, labour services and 
capital. A non-traded final good is produced by the final good sector, using both imported and 
domestic varieties as inputs. This sector operates under a perfectly competitive structure. Both 
import and export are subject to an iceberg trade cost which determines the degree of openness 
to international trade. Capital mobility is modelled along the line proposed by Rodrik (1998). 
Due to the complexity of DSGE models, which makes it difficult to obtain a closed-form 
solution (Fernandez-Villaverde, Rubio-Ramırez, & Schorfheide, 2016; Flotho, 2009), the 
analyses in both chapters 3 and 4 are based on numerical solutions. 
                                                             
5 A recent evaluation of private vs public recruitment agencies in the EU show that the former provides a much 
more effective service delivery in terms of number of workers who exit unemployment (Behaghel, Crépon, & 
Gurgand, 2014). Additionally, there is marked difference between the percentage of unemployed job seekers who 
use private and public recruitment agencies within the EU. As suggested by the European Labour Market Survey 
data, provided by the Eurostat, these differences ranges from approximately 25 percent and 53 percent in the UK to 
8 percent and 70 percent in Sweden for private and public recruitment agencies respectively, between the first 
quarter of 2008 and third quarter of 2016. (The EU-27 average over this period is reported to be 22 percent and 53 
percent.)  
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1.3 Main Findings 
In Chapter 2, we show that employment policies have different equilibrium effects on the labour 
market, depending on whether they are targeted towards a specific job type or are common to all 
jobs. Our results show that when directed towards low-tech jobs, severance compensation leads 
to a greater deterioration of labour market outcomes: vacancy creation rate reduces and, given 
its negative effect on the payoffs of low-tech jobs, existing vacancies are allocated towards the 
high-tech job type. In this case, the unskilled are worse off. Our numerical exercises show that 
in all cases, the percentage increase in the unemployment rate of the unskilled (in response to 
such policy change) is at least three times higher than the increase in the unemployment rate of 
their skilled counterparts. By contrast, severance policy directed towards high-tech jobs poses 
less harmful effects: they mainly influence the allocation of existing vacancies, but do not 
necessarily affect vacancy creation decision. Instead, an increase in such cost shifts vacancy 
allocation in favour of low-tech jobs due to the drop in expected gains from high-tech jobs. As a 
result, the unemployment rate of unskilled workers tends to reduce. Skilled workers’ 
unemployment rate, however, remains unaffected, implying crowding out issues, since they 
qualify to work in any job. Fixed firing cost (assumed to be common to all job types) also 
adversely affects vacancy creation decision and allocation of jobs in the direction of low-tech 
job type. However, unlike targeted low-tech job severance compensation, the effect on the 
unemployment rate of the unskilled is less, even though this category of workers remains worse 
off compared to skilled workers. Our model predicts that vacancy creation subsidy, by reducing 
labour market frictions, can minimise skill crowding out in the market. We show that when 
wages are rigid, the sensitivity of firms to changes in labour market policies rises dramatically 
compared to the flexible wage case. This is because wages do not adjust to partly absorb the 
impact of these policies. Qualitatively, however, the results under the two wage setting 
framework remain the same. Finally, we establish theoretically, against conventional wisdom, 
that severance compensation has a ‘real’ impact on labour market outcomes, even when wages 
are flexible, as long as there is strict enforcement.  
In Chapter 3, we examine the long-run implications of individual policy instruments to 
identify the channels through which they affect an economy. We find that through their effects 
on hiring cost, ALMPs improve economic activity, whereas higher labour market rigidities (in 
the form of unemployment insurance benefits, distortionary labour tax and firing penalty that 
incorporates a fixed firing cost and severance transfer to workers) reduce it. We also find that 
the effectiveness of government consumption spending depends on the degree of substitutability 
between private and government consumption. Specifically, when associated with a higher 
weight in the household utility, the impact of a rise in government consumption spending on 
aggregate demand and job creation reduces. This is because, by raising private utility, the 
household spend less on consumption as government spending rises. Thus, the increase in the 
latter is partly offset by the decrease in the former, reducing the impact on aggregate demand as 
well as the incentives for hiring. 
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We argue that if labour market institutions are rigid, the incentives to create vacancies 
and supply more hours to work per employee are enhanced in response to government 
consumption expansion. The key mechanism underlying this result is the effects of these 
institutions on the long-run sizes of the match surplus and the household disposable income 
(HDI). By raising labour cost, rigid labour market regulations reduce match value and, by 
subsequently reducing employment and productivity they, lead to a lower HDI in the long-run, 
making both firms and households more sensitive to shocks. The influence of match surplus on 
the dynamics of job creation has been emphasised by a number of studies in the literature in the 
context of productivity shock (Hagedorn & Manovskii, 2008; Hornstein, Krusell, & Violante, 
2005; Shimer, 2005). We find a similar mechanism at work in the case of government 
consumption spending shock. The intuition is that, when the size of match surplus is small, a 
positive shock, which raises productivity, leads to a larger percentage increase in the values of a 
match. Therefore, firms adjust to shocks through rapid vacancy creation, which translates into a 
stronger response in employment at the extensive margin. For the household, the anticipation of 
further tax obligations resulting from increased government consumption spending leads to a 
greater downward adjustment in private consumption. This, in turn, induces a stronger increase 
in the supply of hours of work per employed worker. In this case – even though the response of 
capital is dampened – output level is sustained by stronger aggregate hours response.  
Finally, given that the nature of fiscal offsetting instruments plays a key role in 
determining the effectiveness of fiscal stimulus spending (Baxter & King, 1993), we examine 
the effects of lump-sum tax vs. distortionary tax financing options. Our result suggests that only 
labour market-oriented fiscal policies remain effective in generating more jobs, regardless of the 
financing option. Government consumption spending produces negative output and employment 
responses when financed by a distortionary tax, resulting in negative multiplier effects. We find 
that even when the offsetting instrument is the traditional lump-sum tax, the computed output 
and employment multipliers of government demand stimulus remain largely less than one (as 
has been observed by, e.g., Campolmi et al., 2011a; Cantore, Levine, & Melina, 2014). The 
multiplier effects produced by employment tax subsidy are also small, but unlike the demand 
stimulus, the effects on job creation and employment are positive when it is distortionary tax-
financed. Only the recruitment subsidy is able to generate a positive output and employment 
multipliers that are above one in the presence of labour market rigidities and irrespective of the 
financing instrument.  
 In Chapter 4, we demonstrate the importance of openness to international capital mobility 
and trade on the dynamics of unemployment. We find that, by raising the incentive for 
investment, a reduction in capital mobility barrier leads to a lower unemployment, both in the 
long-run and the dynamic short-run. Two driving forces are identified: the first is what we refer 
to as the domestic demand effect, and the second, the wealth effect, through HDI. We argue that 
provided capital is accumulated in the domestic economy, an increase in investment resulting 
from a sudden increase in openness to capital mobility will lead to higher domestic demand for 
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intermediate products. This, in turn, raises labour productivity and leads to higher recruitment  
and lower unemployment. In the second case, as the domestic capital accumulation rises, the 
incipient decrease in the domestic interest rate forces the household to invest excess capital 
abroad. The receipt on net capital flow, therefore, boosts the household’s wealth, thereby 
encouraging further investment and consumption. As for the effects of international trade 
openness, we find that, by increasing foreign demand for domestic varieties, and consequently 
labour productivity, a reduction in trade barrier leads to lower unemployment. Our model 
predicts that, compared to the individual cases, a joint reduction in international capital mobility 
and trade barriers can deliver greater benefits in terms of increased hiring activities and lower 
unemployment. 
 Regarding the effects of degree of openness on the response of unemployment to shocks, 
we find that a higher degree of openness to international capital mobility leads to an enhanced 
adjustment in unemployment in response to domestic productivity shock, resonating with the 
empirical findings obtained by Vallanti (2015). Azariadis and Pissarides (2007) have also shown, 
using a one-sector equilibrium life-cycle framework characterised by search and matching 
frictions and international capital mobility, that this result holds theoretically. Our model, 
however, predicts that an increase in the degree of trade openness can further enhance the 
adjustment of unemployment in terms of the peak effects. A compelling result from our 
numerical evaluations is that shocks originating from different sources are likely to lead to 
different dynamics in the adjustment of unemployment, depending (especially) on the initial 
degree of access to the international capital market. In particular, we find that while a higher 
capital mobility enhances the response of unemployment to a positive domestic productivity 
shock, it weakens the response to a positive foreign demand shock. By contrast, a lower barrier 
to trade magnifies the effect of both shocks on unemployment: both the speed of initial 
adjustment and the peak effects are enhanced. 
 Finally, this chapter also shows the relevance of labour market reforms and ALMPs on 
the dynamic response of unemployment. Individually, each labour market reform (a reduction in 
firing penalty or unemployment benefits) and ALMP (job creation or training subsidy) results in 
a lower unemployment by encouraging more recruitment activities. However, when 
accompanied by a higher degree of openness to foreign trade or capital mobility, the combined 
effects deliver larger benefits to the economy in terms of lower unemployment than when 
implemented individually in the steady state. We further examine the dynamic adjustment of 
unemployment under different labour market reforms packages, which we calibrated to reflect 
the labour market features of three known welfare systems in the EU countries: the flexicurity, 
liberal and Mediterranean welfare systems. Our results show that heterogeneity in the welfare 
systems can generate substantial differentials in the adjustment of unemployment to various 
shocks. Whilst the welfare systems characterised by greater flexibility in hiring and firing rules 
(the flexicurity and liberal systems) tend to exhibit larger unemployment fluctuations, those with 
stricter employment rules (the Mediterranean system) tend to experience slower and protracted 
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response in unemployment to shocks. 
1.4 The Structure of this Thesis 
The remainder of this thesis is organised into four chapters and is presented such that Chapters 
2, 3 and 4 can each be read independently if desired without any serious loss of continuity.  
Chapter 2 (Job Competition, Vacancy Creation and Labour Market Policies) considers 
an extended version of the Albrecht and Vroman (2002) search and matching model. In this 
chapter, we study the behaviour of the labour market, concentrating on how labour market 
policies shape firms’ vacancy creation and allocation decisions as well as affect unemployment 
rates of skilled and unskilled workers.  
Chapter 3 (Fiscal and Labour Market Policies in a General Equilibrium Model with 
Search and Matching) develops a closed economy DSGE model to examine the effects of fiscal 
stimuli on the labour market. We consider the influence of labour market rigidities in shaping 
the propagation mechanisms of fiscal shocks as well as the effects of alternative forms of fiscal 
stimulus policies on the dynamics of the labour market. 
Chapter 4 (Unemployment Dynamics and Economic Openness to International Trade and 
Capital Mobility) constructs a small open economy DSGE model, where the economy is assumed 
to interact with the rest of the world through trade in intermediate goods and capital mobility. 
Here, we study the effects of economic openness on unemployment dynamics. We also consider 
the possible labour market effects of the current reform drive towards a flexicurity welfare system 
in the EU in the presence of economic openness. 
Chapter 5 (Conclusion) summarises and concludes the thesis by recapitulating the 
research strategy and main findings from each chapter. Research limitations and areas for 
possible extensions are discussed here. 
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Chapter 2. Job Competition, Vacancy Creation and Labour Market Policies 
2.1 Introduction 
Despite growing concerns about the high unemployment rates in many countries, research within 
policy and academic environments has paid less attention to how labour market policies drive 
these rates in the presence of competition for jobs. According to the OECD (2013a), Education 
at a Glance 2013: OECD Indicators, the average unemployment rate of workers with tertiary 
education (skilled workers) stood at 4.8 percent while that of workers without secondary 
education (unskilled workers) was as high as 12.6 percent at the end of 2011 across OECD 
countries. These rates represent a rise of about 1.5 and 3.8 percentage points from their respective 
levels in 2008. Equally striking is that between 2008 and 2013 the percentage increase in the 
unemployment rate of the unskilled was roughly four times greater than the  increase of the 
skilled workers’ unemployment rate, within the EU countries (Bjørsted, 2014). While different 
explanations are offered in the literature for the existence of the high jobless rate, especially 
among the unskilled, the most widely-held view is that labour market rigidities prevent firms 
from adequately adjusting to accommodate new economic conditions (Bertola et al., 2001; 
OECD, 2004; Siebert, 1997). Thus, policies aimed at eliminating firing restrictions (Employment 
Protection Legislations (EPL)), introducing active labour market policies such as recruitment 
and training subsidies, reducing unemployment benefit insurance, etc., have been high points of 
the recent reform agenda towards improving the functioning of the labour market in most 
countries, especially those within the OECD/EU (Stiglbauer, 2006). 
In principle, labour market policies such as recruitment subsidies are thought to be the 
right incentive for job creation and employment, while EPL is established to discourage inflows 
into unemployment by imposing statutory costs on firms anytime a worker is dismissed. The 
latter, which aims to protect workers and increase job stability, also serves as a disincentive for 
job creation, given that it lowers the expected gain from a job match. While the literature on 
labour market policies has focused on the effects of the fixed firing cost (‘tax’) component of 
EPL, that caused by severance compensation has received almost no attention, especially since 
the seminal work of Lazear (1990). Based on Lazear’s theoretical prediction, the justification for 
this is that the effects of severance can be undone via wage reduction, especially if wages are 
flexible, and thus, its impact on firms’ vacancy creation decision is neutral. However, in that 
study, Lazear empirically show that severance lowers employment. Severance transfer remains 
one of the obvious manifestations of EPL, especially in the EU. As documented by Chen and 
Funke (2009), the standard severance compensation paid to workers upon dismissal in the EU 
range from 16.0 weekly wages in The Netherlands, to 33.5 and 66.7 weekly wages in the UK 
and Germany respectively, to 0.00 in the US. Even more striking is the fact that severance 
payment constitutes a large proportion of firms’ total firing costs in most EU countries; 
approximately 90 and 88 percent in the UK and Italy, respectively (Garibaldi & Violante, 2000). 
Goerke and Pannenberg (2010) also suggest that severance payment to workers induces 
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additional burden to the firing firm. For instance, a firm may incur additional legal cost in the 
course of implementing or negotiating the final value of severance compensation with the worker. 
In this chapter, we study the labour market effects of specific aspects of active and 
passive labour market policies that consist of targeted severance compensation, fixed firing cost 
and recruitment subsidy (which are widely used in EU countries).1 In particular, we argue that a 
proper evaluation of the effects of these policies on the labour market requires a framework 
which takes cross-skill matching into account, considering its role in driving the employment 
outcome of different categories of workers.2 A potential consequence of intense job competition 
characterising the modern labour market is the crowding out of the unskilled workers, i.e., a 
situation where skilled workers undertake jobs with low skill requirements, thus weakening the 
employment opportunities of unskilled workers (Belan et al., 2010). This phenomenon is mostly 
associated with job competition between workers with various skill levels and is often a 
consequence of high unemployment. As documented by Dolado et al. (2000) and Teulings and 
Koopmanschap (1989), the higher the proportion of skilled workers searching for jobs or the 
intensity of job competition at any given time, the higher the number of such workers who end 
up in low-tech jobs. Dolado et al. (2000, 2009) further argue that this phenomenon is often the 
best way for skilled workers who temporarily want to exit unemployment and then search for a 
better paying job in the future. 
Evidence of over-education, assumed to be directly related to the displacement of 
unskilled workers by skilled ones or skill mismatch, abounds.3 Among other studies, Hartog 
(2000) reports the evidence of over-education in the EU to be in the range between 10 and 35 
percent, while in the US and the UK, Fabel and Pascalau (2013) and Belfield (2010) report it to 
be approximately 58 and 32 percent, respectively. Accounting for the possibility of 
mismatch/cross-skill matching is important, especially when evaluating the implications of 
targeted labour market policies/reforms. As stressed by Belan et al. (2010), reforms aimed at 
reducing the unemployment rate of unskilled workers may be undermined if the targeted group 
of workers is crowded out by another group of workers. For instance, if the government reduces 
the statutory compensation on jobs with low skill requirement in order to improve the 
employment outcome of unskilled workers, the existence of unemployed skilled workers who 
are willing to undertake such jobs could crowd out the unskilled workers due to job competition. 
Even when policies are common to jobs (irrespective of their skill requirement), the possibility 
of cross skill-matching implies that such policies are likely to have different implications 
                                                             
1 See Blanchard, Jaumotte, and Loungani (2013), Blanchard and Wolfers (2000), Campolmi, Faia, and Winkler 
(2011) and Garibaldi and Violante (2000, 2005). 
2 Cahuc and Barbanchon (2010) show that policy evaluations neglecting the spill-over effects on non-targeted 
individuals and other equilibrium outcomes can lead to erroneous policy design.  
3 See, for example, Belan et al. (2010), ILO (2014) and McGuinness (2006). Other examples include Dolado et al. 
(2000, 2009), who document evidence of over-education and crowding out in Spain, and Dolton and Vignoles (2000) 
and Dekker, de Grip, and Heijke (2002) for the evidence in the UK and Belgium respectively. ILO (2014) also has 
a recent report of the incidences over-education as a percentage of employment across EU countries. 
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(quantitatively) on vacancy creation and employment outcomes of skilled and unskilled workers.  
A number of theoretical papers have examined the effects of different aspects of labour 
market regulations using heterogeneous agents’ framework in the spirit of the Diamond (1982), 
Mortensen (1982) and Pissarides (1985) search and matching model. This is driven by the fact 
that, compared to the homogenous agent framework, models with heterogeneous agents more 
realistically capture empirical stylised facts about the labour market. Acemoglu (2001) 
investigate the effects of unemployment benefits and minimum wage regulations on vacancy 
creation decisions of firms in a model with heterogeneous high- and low-tech jobs4 The author 
shows that, by raising their outside option (reservation wage), unemployment benefits make 
workers less willing to accept low-tech jobs, given that such jobs pay lower wage rate, thus 
forcing firms to create more high-tech vacancies. Also, by making low-tech jobs less profitable, 
minimum wage regulations have a similar effect on vacancy allocation decisions of firms. The 
key drawback of this framework, however, is the assumption of homogeneity in workers’ skills, 
which ignores the equilibrium effects of workforce skill composition on firms’ vacancy 
allocation decision. Dolado, Jansen, and Jimeno (2005) introduce worker-side heterogeneity to 
examine the labour market effects of targeted firing cost policy but assumes identical firms, 
which is somewhat unappealing since all workers are suitable for the same job, irrespective of 
their skills. A two-sided heterogeneous search and matching framework was considered by 
Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) in their study which looks at the labour market implications of 
taxes and subsidies. In that model, the labour market is completely segmented in the sense that 
unskilled workers match only with low-tech jobs, while their skilled counterparts match only 
with high-tech jobs. Thus, except for their connection through government budget constraint, the 
employment outcomes of skilled and unskilled workers are independent of each other, given 
directed job search activities and the absence of cross-skill matching. 
This chapter contributes the literature by examining the influence of labour market 
policies on vacancy creation and allocation decisions of firms, and unemployment rate across 
workers with different skills. Different from the above studies, we build on the Albrecht and 
Vroman's (2002) (henceforth, AV-02) search and matching model with two-sided heterogeneity 
as well as cross-skill matching, which captures the effects of crowding and job competition. In 
this framework, workers differ with respect to their skills (skilled and unskilled), and the 
distribution of these skills is exogenous. Firms create vacancies with either low skill (low-tech) 
or high skill (high-tech) requirements. A fundamental assumption of this model is that skilled 
workers can undertake both high- and low-tech jobs, but unskilled workers can undertake only 
low-tech jobs. Thus, the labour market is such that unskilled workers compete for low-tech 
vacancies with the skilled ones, capturing empirical stylised facts, for example, Abrassart (2015). 
As in the standard model, each employment relationship creates economic rent, which is divided 
via Nash bargaining rule between the worker and the employer, and breaks up exogenously. We 
                                                             
4 Note that the author refers to this as ‘good’ and ‘bad’ jobs. 
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assume that each firm faces a firing cost, which (in order to account for a comprehensive form 
of EPL measure) is modelled to consist of procedural costs – such as notice period requirements, 
administrative and legal expenses – and severance payment costs. The latter is assumed to be job 
specific; this way, we are able to associate each job type with different level of firing cost. We 
also assume that firms receive subsidy aimed at reducing friction introduced by job creation cost 
We demonstrate that employment policies have different equilibrium effects on the 
labour market, depending on whether they are targeted towards a specific job type or common 
to all jobs. We also show, against conventional wisdom, that severance compensation has a real 
impact on labour market outcomes, even when wages are determined via Nash bargaining, as 
long as there is strict enforcement. In particular, our results indicate that when directed towards 
low-tech jobs, severance compensation leads to a greater deterioration of labour market 
outcomes: vacancy creation rate reduces and, given its negative effect on the payoffs of low-tech 
jobs, allocation of vacancies are shifted towards the high-tech jobs and away from low-tech jobs. 
In this case, the unskilled are worse off: their job finding rate drops significantly, leading to a 
rise in the unemployment rate. Our numerical exercises show that in all instances, the percentage 
increase in the unemployment rate of the unskilled (in response to such policy change) is at least 
three times more than the increase in the unemployment rate of their skilled counterparts.5 By 
contrast, when directed towards high-tech jobs, severance compensation has less harmful effects, 
mainly influencing the allocation of vacancies. Specifically, an increase in such costs shifts 
vacancy allocation in the direction of low-tech job type because the profitability of high-skill 
jobs is reduced. As a consequence, the unemployment rate of unskilled workers tends to reduce, 
whereas that of skilled workers remain stable since they qualify to work in any job type. Thus, 
rather than have a much more favourable impact in lowering unskilled workers’ unemployment 
rate, this result suggests some crowding out issues in the presence of cross-skill matching, 
resonating with the empirical findings documented by Abrassart (2015) and Pollmann-Schult 
(2005).  
Furthermore, we find that fixed firing cost, assumed to be common to all job types, also 
adversely affects vacancy creation activities and the allocation of vacancies towards low-tech 
job type. However, unlike targeted low-tech job severance compensation, the effect on the 
unemployment rate of the unskilled is less, although this category of workers remains worse off 
compared to skilled workers. Our model predicts that vacancy creation subsidy can be an 
effective way of reducing unemployment problems. The immediate impact of an increase in 
subsidy is to reduce the cost of vacancy creation and increase the market tightness. In terms of 
its effect on the allocation of vacancies, we find that the subsidy leads to the allocation of 
vacancies away from low- towards high-tech vacancies, since all else equal, the latter is more 
                                                             
5 The fact that policies directed towards low-tech jobs play a crucial role is instructive considering that small 
businesses play a crucial role in the area of job creation and accounts for a large proportion of the firms in many 
countries. For instance, in the OCED, the Small and Medium-sized businesses account for about 60 to 95 percent 
of firms and provides approximately 70 percent of total employment in the labour force (OECD, 2000, 2013b).  
17 
profitable. However, given that an increase in the fraction of high-tech vacancies raises the 
arrival rate of such vacancies to skilled workers, vacancy creation subsidy leads to a reduction 
in the competition for low-tech vacancies; consequently, reducing the unemployment rates 
across skills, due to the ease of finding jobs.  
Finally, given that the above results are obtained in a system where wages are bargained 
between agents to the job match, we compare the effects of the same set of policies with the case 
where the wages are predetermined (rigid). As documented by Garibaldi and Violante (2000), 
severance neutrality effect fails to hold if firms are unable to transfer (or share) the cost imposed 
by severance compensation to the workers through wage cut. This implies that severance cost 
itself has a real effect on firms’ vacancy creation and allocation decisions, which in turn affects 
unemployment rate and other labour market indices. Our simulations suggest that firms become 
much more sensitive when wages are predetermined than when they are allowed to negotiate 
with workers; even a small change in policy can trigger a dramatic adjustment in vacancy 
creation activities. 
This study closely relates to Burda (1992) and Millard and Mortensen (1997) in terms of 
severance policy consideration. In particular, Burda assumes that a worker receives severance 
compensation upon dismissal, while the firm incurs a fixed firing cost. In that study, severance 
compensation per se has no influence on labour market outcomes; rather, it is the difference 
between a firm’s fixed firing cost and the severance compensation that drives the behaviour of 
firms and the resultant effects on the overall market. He shows that when the difference is 
positive, an increase in job destruction rate leads to an increase in unemployment and a decrease 
in market tightness (the vacancy-unemployment ratio). The opposite holds when the difference 
is negative. In other words, when the fixed firing cost and severance are equal, the unemployment 
rate and the degree of market tightness are unaffected. By contrast, Millard and Mortensen 
demonstrate that severance compensation directly weakens the firm’s bargaining position, which 
in turn increases the wage rate paid to workers. The resultant increase in wage rate then induces 
firms to scale back vacancy posting. Though these authors evaluated firing costs and vacancy 
creation subsidy as we do, both studies are developed in identical worker-firm framework. 
By considering heterogeneity in workers’ skill and firing costs, this study also relates to 
Mortensen and Pissarides (2003) and Dolado et al. (2005). However, as suggested above, these 
studies do not incorporate the severance transfer component of firing cost. Moreover, the 
presence of cross-skill employment differentiates this study from theirs. In terms of framework, 
this paper complements Belan et al. (2010), but the objective of that paper differs from ours; 
specifically, the authors concentrate on the effects of targeted low-tech job subsidies. 
Furthermore, their model assumes that low-tech jobs pay minimum wage, whereas we allow for 
bargained wage.  
The rest of this chapter is organised as follows: Section 2.2 sets out the model and 
discusses the conditions necessary for the existence of cross skill matching equilibrium. Section 
2.3 examines the qualitative implications of policies. In Section 2.4 we evaluate the model 
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quantitatively. The calibration strategy and the numerical solutions are discussed in this section. 
Section 2.5 considers the framework with predetermined wage and compares its outcomes with 
those obtained from flexible wage model. Finally, in sections 2.6 and 2.7, we respectively carry 
out robustness checks of the model's results and conclude the chapter by providing a summary 
of the model and the main findings. 
2.2 The Model  
This section sets up the AV-02 partial equilibrium search and matching framework with 
heterogeneous jobs and workers, extended to account for the effects of labour market policies. 
The labour force is normalised to one, and workers are either skilled or unskilled with the 
distribution of these skills exogenously determined. Firms create vacancies with high skill (high-
tech) or low skill (low-tech) requirements. The model is specified in continuous time, and job 
search is assumed to be undirected.6 The latter implies that both skilled and unskilled workers 
can encounter any of the two vacancy types offered in the market. However, due to the minimum 
skill requirement for high-tech vacancies, an encounter with an unskilled worker cannot 
crystallise into a productive match. A skilled worker, however, can be matched with any job type, 
provided it is beneficial to do so. A job match is established when a firm with a vacancy meet 
with an unemployed worker, and both agree to a wage rate, determined through Nash Bargaining 
solution. Matches are dissolved at an exogenous rate, and each firm is subject to a firing cost 
consisting of a fixed separation cost and severance compensation, but receives a subsidy towards 
vacancy creation. In what follows we consider the setup environment which characterises search 
and matching frictions. 
2.2.1 The Set-up Environment 
Consider a labour market that is populated by a continuum of heterogeneous workers with 
measure normalised to one and a large continuum of identical firms. For tractability, and in line 
with AV-02, all agents are assumed to be infinitely-lived,7 risk-neutral and to discount their 
future at a common risk-free interest rate, 𝑟 > 0.8  Workers are either skilled (ℎ) or unskilled 
(𝑙). The fraction of the unskilled in the labour force is denoted by 𝑝 ∈ (0,1), while the remaining 
fraction, 1–𝑝, are skilled workers. The distribution of these skills is assumed to be exogenous. 
                                                             
6 Models with directed search (competitive search equilibrium), pioneered by Moen (1997), have to some extent 
also received attention in the literature. The key difference between the undirected and directed search models is 
that the latter assumes that wages are posted by market markers operating within submarkets and agents direct their 
search activities to the markets which offers the best payoffs. However, as highlighted earlier, the wage setting 
mechanism in the latter via a decentralised Nash bargaining. 
7 The assumption of infinitely lived agents is useful for simplifying analyses because it avoids having to treat each 
generation of workers and firms differently. In most economic models, this assumption is frequently justified based 
on altruistic reasons, as reflecting the fact that agents care about future generations. As pointed out by Herzberg 
(2015, p. 25), the main drawbacks associated with finite time horizon models is that solutions to such models depend 
on the assumed terminal date, which is often unrealistic. Moreover, it can be shown (e.g. Krusell, 2014, p. 50) that 
if a terminal date is long enough, solutions to finite time horizon converge to those of infinite time models.  
8 For a model with risk-averse agents see, e.g., Acemoglu and Shimer (1999). 
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We abstract from flow into and out of the labour force, and instead assume that workers are 
either employed or unemployed.  
Jobs are either filled or vacant and are differentiated by their own skill requirements: high 
skill (high-tech) or low skill (low-tech) jobs. We use the index 𝑗, 𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑠, to distinguish the two 
types of jobs: low-tech (𝑛) and high-tech (𝑠). A key assumption in this model is that skilled 
workers can undertake either of the two job types, whereas unskilled workers are only suitable 
for low-tech jobs. We also abstract from on-the-job search, implying that a skilled worker 
employed on a low-tech job (mismatched worker) cannot search on-the-job for high-tech jobs. 
As in Dolado et al. (2009) and AV-02, all workers employed on low-tech jobs produce the same 
amount of output, irrespective of their skill level, but skilled workers produce a higher output 
when matched with high-tech vacancies.9  
More formally, let 𝑥𝑖
𝑗
= 𝑦𝑗 denote the output of a job match between a worker of type 
𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝑙, ℎ and a job of type 𝑗, 𝑗 =  𝑛, 𝑠, the specific match productivity can be summarised (as 
shown in Table 2.1 in Appendix 2) as follows. A match between an unskilled worker (type 𝑙) 
and a low-tech job (type 𝑛) produces a flow output, 𝑦𝑛 . Due to the assumption above, a skilled 
worker (type ℎ) who matches with a low-tech (type 𝑛) also produces a similar flow output, 𝑦𝑛, 
as their unskilled counterpart. However, when matched with a high-tech (type 𝑠) job, a skilled 
worker produces 𝑦𝑠 . Since unskilled workers do not have the relevant skills required to 
undertake high-tech jobs, 𝑥𝑙
𝑠 = 0. Consequently, 𝑦𝑠 > 𝑦𝑛 > 0.  
Labour market frictions imply that both unemployed workers and firms with vacancies 
must engage in a time-consuming and costly search process in order to establish employment 
relationships. Job search is undirected, which implies that an unskilled worker can encounter 
either a low- or high-tech vacancy, but only a meeting with the former can translate into a 
productive match. A skilled worker, however, can become matched with any job type. The 
aggregate matching rate per unit of time is governed by a matching function, given by 𝑚(𝑢, 𝑣), 
where 𝑢 and 𝑣 respectively denote unemployment rate and a measure of vacancies. The function 
𝑚(. , . )  is conventionally assumed to be concave, increasing in each argument and to be 
homogenous of degree one (Yashiv, 2007).10 Defining 𝜃 = 𝑣/𝑢 as a measure of the degree of 
labour market tightness, the homogeneity assumption of the matching function implies that a 
firm’s vacancy filling rate can be defined as 𝑞(𝜃) ≡
𝑚(𝑢,𝑣)
𝑣
= 𝑚(𝜃−1, 1). The corresponding rate 
at which an unemployed worker meets with a firm with a vacancy, the job finding rate, is given 
                                                             
9 As pointed out by Dolado et al. (2009), one of the main reasons that a mismatch of this form can occur is that 
skilled workers may want to temporarily exit unemployment by accepting low-tech job and then search on the job. 
For simplicity, however, we do not consider this option. Additionally, in the one-sided heterogeneous workers’ 
model developed by Dolado et al. (2005), workers are assumed to have different productivity levels on the same. 
The technology assumed in our model is such that the outputs of workers do not differ when hired on the same job.  
10 Note that essentiality condition is assumed in the sense that a strictly positive amount of each input is required 
for a job match to occur 𝑚(0,0) = 𝑚(0, 𝑣) = 𝑚(𝑢, 𝑣) = 0. 
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by 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) ≡
𝑣
𝑢
𝑚(𝑢,𝑣)
𝑣
. The standard Inada-type condition is assumed so that lim𝜃→∞ 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) =
lim𝜃→0 𝑞(𝜃) = ∞  and lim𝜃→0 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) = lim𝜃→∞ 𝑞(𝜃) = 0. Given the constant search intensity 
implied by the matching function11 and the fact that not all job search encounter result into a 
productive match, it is useful to define the following effective meeting rates. Let 𝜙 denote the 
fraction of low-tech vacancies and 1 − 𝜙 the fraction of high-tech vacancies, the effective job 
finding rate for an unskilled unemployed worker is given by 𝜙𝜃𝑞(𝜃). In a similar fashion, let 
the fraction of unemployed skilled workers be denoted by 1 − 𝛾, where 𝛾 denotes the share of 
unskilled workers in the pool of unemployed. The effective rate at which a firm with high-tech 
vacancy meets a skilled worker is given by (1 − 𝛾)𝑞(𝜃).12 
2.2.2 Match Surplus and Value Functions 
Job matches between unemployed workers and firms with vacancies are consummated whenever 
the surplus associated with the match is nonnegative. This requires that the respective gains from 
switching labour market state must at least greater than what each party to the job match would 
gain if they were to continue unmatched. Let 𝑈𝑖  and 𝑊𝑖
𝑗
 denote the respective value of 
unemployment and employment to a worker of type 𝑖, 𝑖 = 𝑙, ℎ, when unemployed and when 
matched with a vacancy of type 𝑗, 𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑠. Similarly, let the value of a vacancy of job type 𝑗 be 
denoted by 𝑉𝑗, and the corresponding value of having that vacancy filled with a worker of type 
𝑖 be given by 𝐽𝑖
𝑗
. The necessary condition for the realisation of a job match is  
𝑆𝑖
𝑗
≡ (𝐽𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑉𝑗) + (𝑊𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑈𝑖) ≥ 0; 𝑖 = 𝑙, ℎ; 𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑠,                                                           (1) 
where 𝑆𝑖
𝑗
 represents the surplus of a job match, given by the sum of the respective capital gains 
accrued to the firm and to the worker for switching labour market state; i.e. 𝐽𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑉𝑗  and 𝑊𝑖
𝑗
−
𝑈𝑖.
13  
 When unemployed and searching for a job, a worker enjoys an instantaneous value of 
leisure, 𝑏 > 0 . 𝑏  can be thought as unemployment insurance benefits or value of home 
production. Following Gautier (2002) and Mortensen and Pissarides (2003), we assume 𝑏 is 
exogenously determined and common to all unemployed workers, irrespective of their skill type. 
                                                             
11 Note that with search intensity, 𝑠, the matching function can be modelled as 𝑚(𝑠𝑢, 𝑣) – see, Yashiv (2007). For 
simplicity, we assume 𝑠 = 1. 
12 In order to maintain a consistent presentation style (similar to those found in Pissarides, 2000) throughout this 
thesis, we differ slightly from those used in AV-02. The properties of the matching function, job finding and vacancy 
filling rates are, however, the same. 
13 This expression follows many of the conventions in search-matching model, for instance, Burda (1992), Millard 
and Mortensen (1997), Pissarides (2000), Mortensen and Pissarides (2003), Dolado et al. (2005) and Boeri (2011). 
The current specification resembles that of Burda (1992) in the sense that we do not include any of the policy 
instrument in the surplus equation. Generally, the inclusion of a policy instrument, such as the firing costs, in the 
surplus equation means that the burden of such cost is shared directly by both workers and firms whether or not 
matches are eventually consummated (Dolado et al., 2005; Ljungqvist & Sargent, 2016). 
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The flow values of unemployment of an unskilled and a skilled worker satisfy the following 
Bellman equations, 
𝑟𝑈𝑙 = 𝑏 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙(𝑊𝑙
𝑛 − 𝑈𝑙)                                                                                                  (2) 
and 
𝑟𝑈ℎ = 𝑏 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃){𝜙 max(𝑊ℎ
𝑛 − 𝑈ℎ , 0) + (1 − 𝜙)(𝑊ℎ
𝑠 − 𝑈ℎ)}.                                     (3) 
For an unskilled worker, equation (2), the flow value of unemployment equals the unemployment 
benefits, 𝑏, plus the expected capital gain associated with becoming matched with a low-tech 
job, which is realised at an effective rate 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙. A skilled worker also enjoys the value of 
unemployment benefit and the expected capital gains resulting from a match with either of the 
two job types: with an effective rate of 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙, a skilled worker contacts a low-tech vacancy 
and realises a capital gain (𝑊ℎ
𝑛 − 𝑈ℎ) and with an effective rate 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝜙) he or she meets 
a high-tech job and realises (𝑊ℎ
𝑠 − 𝑈ℎ)  capital gains. Note that the term max[𝑊ℎ
𝑛 − 𝑈ℎ , 0] 
captures the fact that it may not be worthwhile for a skilled worker to match with a low-tech 
vacancy. However, given our interest in cross-skill matching, we have assumed that the 
parameter values of the model are so that it is optimal for a skilled unemployed worker to accept 
either of the two job types. (The requirements for the existence of a unique cross-skill matching 
equilibrium are discussed later in this chapter.) 
 The corresponding flow value of employment to a worker of type 𝑖 in a job of type 𝑗 
satisfies the Bellman equation, 
𝑟𝑊𝑖
𝑗
= 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
− 𝛿(𝑊𝑖
𝑗
− 𝐵𝑗 − 𝑈𝑖),                                                                                             (4) 
where 𝛿 > 0 is an exogenous job destruction rate (Gertler et al., 2008; Hall, 2005), which is 
assumed to apply to all match relationships. 14  Equation (4) shows that the flow value of 
employment consists of a worker’s wage 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
 less the expected capital loss associated with job 
separation. At a rate 𝛿, the worker loses the value 𝑊𝑖
𝑗
 of being in employment and becomes 
unemployed with a value 𝑈𝑖. We assume that severance compensation (𝐵
𝑗) is received by each 
worker upon match separation, depending on the job types and not the worker’s skill. The latter 
is motivated by the fact that workers on the same job produce an equal amount of output, 
irrespective of their skill type. Hence, we let 𝐵𝑠 > 𝐵𝑛 on the grounds that workers employed in 
high-tech jobs type generate greater output than those employed in low-tech jobs. 
 From firms’ perspective, the value of a filled job of type 𝑗 with a worker of type 𝑖 satisfies 
the Bellman equation, 
𝑟𝐽𝑖
𝑗
= 𝑦𝑗 − 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
− 𝛿(𝐽𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑉𝑗 + 𝐹𝑗),                                                                                         (5) 
where 𝐹𝑗 denotes a firm’s total firing costs per worker, which consists of procedural cost (𝑃𝐶) 
                                                             
14 Using the data on Danish and Norwegian workers, Bagger and Henningsen (2008) estimate the monthly job 
hazard function for different education groups and find that workers with lower education level have higher hazard 
rates during the first few years of work but the difference with the hazard rate of the educated workers closes up 
after five years of tenure. Thus, it is plausible to assume common job destruction rate in the current model. 
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and severance compensation (𝐵) , i.e. 𝐹𝑗 = 𝑃𝐶𝑗 + 𝐵𝑗 . 15  The former is further assumed to 
consist of two ingredients: (i) a fixed separation cost – including administrative procedures and 
advance notice period requirements for termination of a job match – which is independent on the 
job type and (ii), a cost whose amount depends on severance compensation 𝐵𝑗 and in our model 
captures the situation in which a firm’s legal expenses is proportional to the amount it ought to 
pay the worker being fired.16 Thus, we define 𝑃𝐶𝑗 = 𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑗 , 𝛼 > 0, 0 < 𝜂 < 1. The flow 
value a filled job is thus given by the worker’s net contribution to the match, 𝑦𝑗 − 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
, where 𝑦𝑗 
is the output of the job match and 𝑤𝑖
𝑗
 is the labour cost, and the expected capital loss when the 
match is destroyed, 𝛿(𝐽𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑉𝑗 + 𝐹𝑗), which is increasing in firing cost 𝐹𝑗. 
The respective flow values of low-tech and high-tech vacancies satisfy Bellman 
equations, 
𝑟𝑉𝑛 = −(1 − 𝜁)𝑐 + 𝑞(𝜃){𝛾(𝐽𝑙
𝑛 − 𝑉𝑛) + (1 − 𝛾) max(𝐽ℎ
𝑛 − 𝑉𝑛 , 0)}                              (6) 
and 
𝑟𝑉𝑠 = −(1 − 𝜁)𝑐 + 𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛾)(𝐽ℎ
𝑠 − 𝑉𝑠),                                                                          (7) 
where 𝑐 > 0  denote the flow cost of maintaining a vacancy. Equation (6) captures the 
assumption that a low-tech vacancy can be filled either by a skilled or an unskilled worker. In 
particular, it must be worthwhile for a firm with a low-tech vacancy to match with a skilled 
worker and this requires that the resulting match surplus must be nonnegative, 𝐽ℎ
𝑛 − 𝑉𝑛 ≥ 0. 
Similarly, equation (7) reflects the fact that only skilled workers can be matched with high-tech 
jobs, at an effective rate 𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛾). The cost, 𝑐, of maintaining each vacancy (which can be 
thought as reflecting the cost of recruiting workers or creating a vacancy, as in the literature) 
reduces the respective flow values; thus, we assume that each firm receives a subsidy, 𝜁, per 
vacancy created. 
2.2.3 Wage Determination 
As already indicated, the wage rate for each job match is bargained between the worker and the 
firm through Nash bargaining solution. In particular, Nash bargaining requires that the wage rate 
for a job match should be such that maximises the weighted product of the firm’s and the 
worker’s respective surpluses from the job match, defined by (𝐽𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑉𝑗)
1−𝛽
(𝑊𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑈𝑖)
𝛽
 , subject 
to (4) and (5). The parameter 0 < 𝛽 < 1 is a measure of a worker’s relative bargaining power 
                                                             
15 As stressed by, e.g., Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Garibaldi and Violante (2000), a typical firm’s total firing 
cost consists of procedural costs, advanced notice requirements, legal costs, court penalties and severance transfer. 
Here we distinguish between two main components: severance transfer and procedural cost, where the latter is 
assumed to capture other elements of firing costs other than the severance component.  
16 Belgium is an example of a country with unified notice period status. Specifically, effective from January 2014, 
the Belgian authority introduced a law which requires employers to take into account only the employees’ period 
of service rather than the workers’ skills (blue- and white-collar workers). Available at 
http://www.freshfields.com/uploadedFiles/Locations/Global/EPB_Webinars/PG_EPB_Changes%20in%20Belgia
n%20Dismissal_V3.pdf. 
23 
taken to be exogenously given (Pissarides, 2000). The first order condition with respect to (w.r.t) 
𝑤𝑖
𝑗
 yields 
(1 − 𝛽)
𝜕𝐽𝑖
𝑗
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝑗
 
(𝑊𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑈𝑖) = 𝛽
𝜕𝑊𝑖
𝑗
𝜕𝑤𝑖
𝑗
 
(𝐽𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑉𝑗),                                                                     (8) 
which gives rise to the following surplus sharing rule: 
(𝑊𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑈𝑖) = 𝛽𝑆𝑖
𝑗
                                                                                                                        (9) 
and 
(𝐽𝑖
𝑗
− 𝑉𝑗) = (1 − 𝛽)𝑆𝑖
𝑗
.                                                                                                           (10) 
The above implies that a worker receives share 𝛽 of the sum of the match surplus, 𝑆𝑖
𝑗
, 
while the remaining share, (1 − 𝛽), goes to the firm. In the symmetric case considered by 
Pissarides (2000, ch. 1), both the worker and the firm receive an equal share of the match surplus, 
i.e. 𝛽 = 1/2. Setting 𝑉𝑗 = 0 (free-entry condition, defined later) and substituting the values of 
employment, 𝑊𝑖
𝑗
, and that of a filled job, 𝐽𝑖
𝑗
, in equations (4) and (5), into (1), the expression for 
the surplus of a job match can be obtained as 
𝑆𝑖
𝑗
=
𝑦𝑗  − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑗) − 𝑟𝑈𝑖
𝑟 + 𝛿
≥  0; 𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑠;   𝑖 = 𝑙, ℎ.                                                    (11)  
Since 𝑦𝑠 > 𝑦𝑛  and 𝑟𝑈ℎ > 𝑟𝑈𝑙 , it follows that 𝑆ℎ
𝑠 > 𝑆𝑙
𝑛 > 𝑆ℎ
𝑛 .17  In a policy-free 
environment, 𝛼 = 𝐵𝑗 = 𝜂 = 0;  𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑠 , the above equation collapses to the match surplus 
implied by AV-02, where the only important factor determining the surplus of a job match is the 
individual worker’s flow value of unemployment, 𝑟𝑈𝑖, which must be less that match output, 
𝑦𝑗; i.e. 𝑦𝑗 > 𝑟𝑈𝑖. However, equation (11) shows that the match surplus also crucially depends 
on the expected costs of firing the worker, with 𝜕𝑆𝑖
𝑗
𝜕𝛼⁄ < 0 and 𝜕𝑆𝑖
𝑗
𝜕𝐵𝑗⁄ < 0; the latter, as 
long as 𝜂 > 0 . The direct effects of severance compensation on equilibrium match surplus 
vanishes due to the surplus sharing rule, which resonates with Lazear’s (1990) neutrality effect 
under a flexible wage system. The intuition follows from the fact that under a flexible wage 
setting a firm is able to transfer the burden of severance compensation to the workers through an 
appropriate wage cut. To see this, substitute equation (11) into (9) to obtain the wage equation,  
𝑤𝑖
𝑗
= 𝑟𝑈𝑖 + 𝛽{𝑦
𝑗 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑗) − 𝑟𝑈𝑖} − 𝛿𝐵
𝑗 .                                                            (12) 
The above equation (12) reveals that each employed worker receives a wage rate that is 
equal to the flow value of unemployment (or equivalently their reservation value as noted by 
Pissarides, 2000) plus the share 𝛽 of the rent created by a job match. Clearly, as implied by 
equation (12), a firm succeeds in shifting the burden of severance compensation through wage 
reduction, which is applied over the period 1/𝛿 that a job subsists, as captured by the last term 
                                                             
17 This suggests, from the argument, that firms would deem it less beneficial to experience mismatch. However, 
given that it may take time to find an unskilled worker to fill a low-tech vacancy, a firm with such vacancy would 
prefer to match with a skilled worker rather than leave the vacancy unfilled and incur further vacancy maintenance 
cost. 
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on the right-hand-side (Garibaldi & Violante, 2000). However, the additional burden associated 
with firing a worker is split between the firm and the worker, depending on the value of 𝛽, the 
relative bargaining strength of each worker. 
2.2.4 Labour Market Equilibrium 
Two main types of equilibria can emerge from this model, depending on the model’s parameters. 
The first is the ‘cross-skill matching equilibrium’ in which it is beneficial for skilled workers to 
accept both high-tech jobs and low-tech jobs. The second is the equilibrium with ‘ex-post 
segmentation’ where it is optimal for skilled workers to accept only high-tech jobs. In the latter, 
equilibrium results in a perfect match between jobs’ skill requirements and those possessed by 
workers – analogous to Mortensen and Pissarides (2003). We focus on the first equilibrium with 
cross-skill matching since it is the configuration that is consistent with skill mismatch and allows 
for competition for low-tech vacancies between skilled and unskilled workers. The parameter 
configurations required for the existence of a unique equilibrium with cross-skill matching are 
discussed latr. 
 The equilibrium with cross-skill matching is a vector of endogenous variables {𝜙, 𝛾, 𝜃, 𝑢} 
satisfying: (i) two steady state flow conditions and (ii) two free-entry conditions, 𝑉𝑗 = 0. Note 
also that, in equilibrium, it must be the case that all matches are mutually beneficial in the sense 
that the surplus arising from each must be positive: 𝑆ℎ
𝑠 > 0, 𝑆ℎ
𝑛 > 0 and 𝑆𝑙
𝑛 > 0. We describe 
these conditions characterising the equilibrium in what follows. 
2.2.4.1 Steady State Flow Conditions 
The two steady state conditions require that the flow out of unemployment must be equals flow 
into unemployment for unskilled and skilled workers, and these are respectively given by 
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛾𝑢 = 𝛿(𝑝 − 𝛾𝑢)                                                                                                         (13) 
and 
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛾)𝑢 = 𝛿{1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 𝛾)𝑢}.                                                                             (14) 
For unskilled workers, equation (13), the flow out of unemployment is given 𝜙𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾𝑢, 
where 𝜙𝜃𝑞(𝜃) denotes an unskilled worker’s effective rate of contacting a low-tech vacancy and 
𝛾𝑢 is the measure of this category of workers who are unemployed. The corresponding flow 
back into unemployment is 𝛿(𝑝 − 𝛾𝑢), where 𝑝 − 𝛾𝑢  is a measure of unskilled workers in 
employment and 𝛿, as before, is the exogenous rate of job destruction. Similarly, for skilled 
workers (equation (14)), the flows out of unemployment for is 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛾)𝑢, where (1 − 𝛾)𝑢 
and 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) represent the measure of skilled workers who are unemployed and their job finding 
rate, respectively. The corresponding flow back into unemployment for this category of workers 
is 𝛿{1 − 𝑝 − (1 − 𝛾)𝑢}, where 1 – p is the fraction of skilled workers in the labour force and 
(1 − 𝛾)𝑢 is the measure the unemployed among them. 
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 Solving the two steady state conditions (13) and (14), we obtain the equilibrium 
equations for the share of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙, and the unemployment rate, 𝑢, as 
𝜙 =
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛾)𝑝 + 𝛿(𝑝 − 𝛾)
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾(1 − 𝑝)
                                                                                           (15) 
and 
𝑢 =
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿](1 − 𝛾)
.                                                                                                        (16) 
The share of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙, and the unemployment rate, 𝑢 – in equations (15) 
and (16) – are expressed as functions of 𝜃 and 𝛾 and the other exogenous parameters 𝑝 and 𝛿. It 
is easy to show that 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
< 0  and, conditional on 𝛾 > 𝑝 , 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃
> 0 . 18  By contrast, 𝑢  is 
unambiguously increasing in 𝛾 and decreasing in 𝜃 – as illustrated by equations (A16) and (A17) 
in Appendix 2. 
2.2.4.2 Free-entry Conditions:  
Free-entry conditions imply that firms post vacancies until the profit opportunities for new jobs 
are exploited, driving rents from vacancies to zero: 𝑉𝑛 = 0 and 𝑉𝑠 = 0. Making use of value 
equations (6) and (7), these conditions yield 
(1 − 𝛽){𝛾𝑆𝑙
𝑛 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑆ℎ
𝑛} =
(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
                                                                              (17) 
and 
(1 − 𝛽)(1 − 𝛾)𝑆ℎ
𝑠 =
(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
.                                                                                              (18) 
Note that equation (17) assumes that it is beneficial for a firm with a low-tech vacancy 
to match with either a skilled or an unskilled worker, given that we focus on cross skill matching 
equilibrium. However, rather than use conditions (17) and (18) to fully characterise the 
equilibrium, we impose the equal-value condition 𝑉𝑛 = 𝑉𝑠 as in AV-02.19 Thus, subtracting (17) 
from (18) yields,  
𝛾𝑆𝑙
𝑛 = (1 − 𝛾){𝑆ℎ
𝑠 − 𝑆ℎ
𝑛}.                                                                                                        (19) 
In what follows, we derive the expressions for the flow values of unemployment, 𝑟𝑈𝑙 
and 𝑟𝑈ℎ, in order to characterise equation (19) and the subsequent equations. Using equations 
(10) and (11), the value equations, (2) and (3), for unskilled and skilled workers can be rewritten 
as 
𝑟𝑈𝑙 =
(𝑟+𝛿)𝑏+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽{𝑦𝑛−𝛿(𝛼+𝜂𝐵𝑛)}
𝑟+𝛿+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽
                                                                                      (20)  
and 
                                                             
18 Specifically, 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
= −
𝑝(𝜃𝑞(𝜃)+𝛿)
(1−𝑝)𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾2
< 0  and 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃
=
𝛿(𝛾−𝑝)(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))′
𝛾(1−𝑝)[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]2
> 0, as long as 𝛾 > 𝑝. 
19 In section 2.5 below, we show a case where conditions similar to (17) and (18) can be used for joint determination 
of the market tightness and share of unemployed unskilled workers in the labours force. 
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 𝑟𝑈ℎ =
(𝑟+𝛿)𝑏+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽{𝜙[𝑦𝑛−𝛿(𝛼+𝜂𝐵𝑛)]+(1−𝜙)[𝑦𝑠−𝜂𝐵𝑠]}
𝑟+𝛿+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽
.                                                        (21) 
Equations (20) and (21) imply that the equilibrium flow values of unemployment for 
skilled and unskilled workers consist of the weighted averages of their non-labour income and 
expected net contribution to employment. Clearly, both equations show that labour market 
policies also have implications for unemployment flow values of the two types of workers to the 
extent that they affect their expected net contributions to employment. In particular, whilst the 
flow value 𝑟𝑈𝑙 is influenced only by the policies directed towards low-tech jobs, 𝑟𝑈ℎ is affected 
by the policies associated the two job types, given cross-skill matching. In both equations, 𝑟𝑈𝑙 
and 𝑟𝑈ℎ are decreasing in fixed separation cost, 𝛼, because both low- and high-tech jobs are 
affected. However, while 𝑟𝑈ℎ is decreasing in both 𝐵
𝑠 and 𝐵𝑛, 𝑟𝑈𝑙 is decreasing only in 𝐵
𝑛. In 
general, because these policies affect the availability of vacancies and, consequently, the 
duration of unemployment spell (given by the inverse of workers’ job finding rates), both 
workers are willing to lower their unemployment value (reservation wage) in order to increase 
their chances of employment. 
Using equations (11) and (20), the expression for the equal-value condition (19) can be 
rewritten as 
(1 − 𝛾){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛} =  𝛾
(𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽
.                    (22) 
The above represents the third equation characterising the cross-skill matching equilibrium. The 
final equation can be derived using equation (22) together with the free-entry condition, 𝑉𝑠 = 0, 
equation (18), after some manipulations, as20 
(1 − 𝛽){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽
=
(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
.                                                                     (23) 
For given values of exogenous parameters and policy instruments, equation (23) yields a 
unique solution for the market tightness, 𝜃, which reflects vacancy creation activities. In fact, 
equation (23) corresponds to the standard job creation condition in the literature (e.g., Pissarides, 
2000; Yashiv, 2007) and shows that the present discounted profit of a filled job must be equal to 
the average cost of creating a vacancy. Any changes in the average cost of creating a vacancy 
(the right-hand-side of (23)) relative to the expected gain (the left-hand-side, or vice versa, must 
be met through a direct policy intervention (e.g. subsidy) or by adjustment in vacancy creation 
rate to restore the equality condition. The latter occurs through 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) and 𝑞(𝜃). 
2.2.5 Cross-Skill Matching Equilibrium – Summary 
For convenience, we repeat the equations which characterise the steady state equilibrium with 
cross skill matching as follows: 
                                                             
20 See sub-section 2A.1 in Appendix 2 for the derivation.  
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𝜙 =
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛾)𝑝 + 𝛿(𝑝 − 𝛾)
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾(1 − 𝑝)
,                                                                                          (15) 
𝑢 =
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿](1 − 𝛾)
,                                                                                                        (16) 
(1 − 𝛾){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛} =  𝛾
(𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽
,                     (22) 
(1 − 𝛽){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽
=
(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
.                                                                     (23) 
The model is fully characterized by 8 structural parameters: 𝑦𝑠, 𝑦𝑛 , 𝛿, 𝑟, 𝑏, 𝑝, 𝑐 and 𝛽; 5 
policy instruments: 𝐵𝑠, 𝐵𝑛 , 𝛼, 𝜂  and 𝜁 ; and 4 unknowns: 𝜃, 𝛾, 𝜙  and 𝑢 , whose solutions are 
determined by the 4 equations given above. The solution to the equilibrium system is recursive: 
for given values of exogenous parameters, equation (23) uniquely solves 𝜃. With knowledge of 
𝜃 , equations (15) and (22) are solved for 𝜙 and 𝛾. Finally, given 𝜃  and 𝛾 , 𝑢 is solved using 
equation (16). 
2.2.6 Existence of Equilibrium with Cross-Skill Matching  
Before proceeding to the evaluation of the model, we first discuss the two conditions required 
for the existence of a cross-skill matching equilibrium. First, as noted by AV-02 (p. 294) and 
Dolado et al. (2009, p. 210), a key condition for the existence of a cross-skill equilibrium is that 
the surplus of a job match between a low-tech vacancy and a skilled worker must be nonnegative, 
which requires that  𝑦𝑛 − 𝑟𝑈ℎ ≥ 0 . Without policies, it can be shown that the parameter 
configuration that satisfies this condition is given by 
(𝑟 + 𝛿)(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑏) ≥ 𝛽𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝜙)(𝑦𝑠 − 𝑦𝑛).                                                                 (24) 
Second, there is a possibility that a corner solution may emerge, i.e. a situation where 
firms end up posting only one type of vacancy in the equilibrium. In particular, if 𝑝, the fraction 
of unskilled workers in the labour force, is sufficiently large and/or the difference in the 
productivity of the two job types, 𝑦𝑠 − 𝑦𝑛, is sufficiently small, firms may end up posting only 
low-tech vacancies such that 𝜙 = 1. Suppose 𝜙 = 1, in a policy-free equilibrium, this implies 
that 
𝑟𝑈ℎ = 𝑟𝑈𝑙 = 𝑟𝑈 =
(𝑟 + 𝛿)𝑏 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽𝑦𝑛
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽
.                                                                       (25) 
The above shows that when firms choose to post only low-tech vacancies, the flow values 
of unemployment for skilled and unskilled workers will be equal. Thus, the solution for 𝑟𝑈ℎ  in 
(21) reduces to (20), with 𝜙 = 1. Accordingly, the value of a filled low-tech job becomes the 
same regardless of the worker type employed, i.e., 𝐽𝑙
𝑛 = 𝐽ℎ
𝑛. To rule out the possibility of a corner 
solution, a sufficient condition is that any deviant firm that chooses to post a high-tech vacancy 
when 𝜙 = 1 must make a negative profit. This requires that that (𝑦𝑛 − 𝑟𝑈) > (1 − 𝑝)(𝑦𝑠 −
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𝑟𝑈). Using equation (25), this condition can be rewritten as21  
𝑦𝑛 − 𝑏 > (1 − 𝑝)(𝑦𝑠 − 𝑏 +
𝛽𝜃∗𝑞(𝜃∗)(𝑦𝑠 − 𝑦𝑛)
𝑟 + 𝛿
),                                                       (26) 
where 𝜃∗ represents the equilibrium market tightness that solves equation (23).22 Condition (26) 
shows that the higher fraction of unskilled workers in the labour force, p, the higher the incentive 
to post low-tech vacancies. More so, the smaller is 𝑦𝑠 − 𝑦𝑛, for a given 𝑝 value, the lower the 
incentive to post high-tech vacancies. It follows that, in addition to having more skilled workers 
in the labour force, the output of high-tech jobs must also be reasonably high in order to attract 
firms to post high-tech vacancies and to avoid equilibrium where firms allocate all vacancies 
towards low-tech job type. 
2.3 Comparative Statics (Qualitative Evaluation) 
We now turn to evaluate the qualitative effects of the policy instruments on the endogenous 
variables. Consider a sudden increase in severance compensation 𝐵𝑛 . 23  As equation (23) 
uniquely determines 𝜃, the initial impact of this is to induce additional match separation cost – 
the extent of which is determined by 𝜂 , the measure of EPL strictness. To see this, we 
differentiate equation (23) w.r.t 𝐵𝑛, considering 𝜃 as a function of 𝐵𝑛. This yields, as shown in 
equation (A7) in Appendix 2, 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
= −
(1 − 𝛽)𝛿𝜂𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽 + 𝜇(𝑟 + 𝛿)](1 − 𝜁)𝑐
< 0.                                                                             
Thus, contrary to the conventional wisdom, as long as 𝜂 > 0, the partial effect of 𝐵𝑛 on 𝜃 is 
unambiguously negative. The fixed separation, 𝛼, also has an unambiguous negative effect on 
market tightness via the reduction in vacancy creation. The intuition is that as 𝛼  rises the 
expected gain from posting vacancies reduces, inducing firms to scale back on vacancy creation 
in order to stimulate job competition among the unemployed. This, in turn, leads to higher 
vacancy filling rate (since 𝑞′(𝜃) < 0) and lower the average cost of posting vacancies.  
Recruitment subsidy, in contrast, has an opposite effect on job creation. It can be shown 
that the partial derivative of 𝜃 w.r.t 𝜁 also yields, equation (A9) in Appendix 2, 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
(1 − 𝛽){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽 + 𝜇(𝑟 + 𝛿)](1 − 𝜁)2𝑐
).                                   
The above shows that subsidy unambiguously increases market tightness (
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0) as 
long as the expected profit from a filled job is positive, which requires that 𝑦𝑛 > 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) +
                                                             
21 See Appendix 2 for the derivation. Note that with policies (24) and (26) become 𝑦𝑛 +
𝛽𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛿(𝛼+𝜂𝐵𝑛)
𝑟+𝛿
− 𝑏 ≥
𝛽𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1−𝜙)(𝑦𝑠−𝜂𝐵𝑠−𝑦𝑛)
𝑟+𝛿
 and 𝑦𝑛 − 𝑏 +
𝛿(𝛼+𝜂𝐵𝑛)
𝑟+𝛿
> (1 − 𝑝) (𝑦𝑠 − 𝑏 +
𝛽𝜃∗𝑞(𝜃∗)[𝑦𝑠−(𝑦𝑛−𝛿(𝛼+𝜂𝐵𝑛))]
𝑟+𝛿
), respectively. 
22 Another way to know when a cross-skill equilibrium exist is that 𝛾 > 𝑝. This is based on the fact that the fraction 
of high-tech jobs must be positive, i.e., (1 − 𝜙) =
(𝛾−𝑝)(𝜃𝑞(𝜃)+𝛿)
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾(1−𝑝)
> 0. 
23 See Appendix 2 for the details of the comparative statics used in this subsection. 
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𝑏. Intuitively, a firm must be able to generate a nonnegative profit from a job in order for the 
subsidy to be effective. 
An increase in severance compensation, 𝐵𝑠 , on high-tech job has no direct effect on 
equilibrium job creation condition (23), but alters the allocation of vacancies to each job type. 
As established in equations (A11) and (A13) in Appendix 2, an increase in 𝐵𝑠 unambiguously 
increases the share of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙, and decreases the fraction of unskilled unemployed 
workers, 𝛾. The intuition is that a higher 𝐵𝑠 imposes higher separation costs on firms with high-
tech jobs, leading to allocation of vacancies towards low-tech job type. Increase in the share of 
low-tech vacancies raises the labour market prospect for the unskilled – in terms of higher job 
finding rate – thus, leading to a lower fraction of unskilled seeking for jobs. 
The increases in 𝐵𝑛 and 𝛼 also affect the share of unskilled workers in unemployment, 
𝛾, as well as the fraction of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙. Holding 𝜃 constant so that 𝑑𝜃 = 0, it can be 
shown that an increase in either 𝐵𝑛 or 𝛼 leads to a higher 𝛾 and a lower 𝜙. Intuitively, because 
the gains associated with low-tech job drops as either 𝐵𝑛 or 𝛼 rises, the incentive to allocate 
vacancies towards low-tech job type reduces, and so 𝜙 drops. Assuming we relax the initial 
assumption and allow market tightness to reflect the changes in these policy instruments, i.e., 
𝑑𝜃 ≠ 0, then the effects of the two policy instruments (𝐵𝑛 and 𝛼) on the share of unemployed 
unskilled workers, 𝛾, and the fraction of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙, become ambiguous. Using the 
block (15), (22) and (23) we have the following partial effect (see equation (A12) in Appendix 
2) 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝐵𝑛
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
[(𝑟 + 𝛿) + (1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽]𝛿𝜂  +   
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛 (  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃 𝜆2  +   
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾 𝜆3 )
|𝐴|1
  ), 
where |𝐴|1 =
𝜆1((𝑟+𝛿+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)  −  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
𝛾(1−𝛾) 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽)
(1−𝛾)(𝑟+𝛿+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
, 𝜆2 =
(𝑟+𝛿){𝑦𝑛−𝛿(𝛼+𝜂𝐵𝑛)−𝑏}
(1−𝛾)
 and 𝜆3 = (1 −
𝛾){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛}(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
𝜙𝛽 . Note that 𝜆2 > 0  and 𝜆3 > 0  based on the 
assumption above and by virtue of (22), respectively. As the denominator of the above is positive, 
|𝐴|1 > 0, the sign of the above derivation depends on the numerator. However, given that,  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃
>
0, 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
< 0, then 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝐵𝑛
 is somewhat ambiguous. In the next section, we use numerical 
solutions to resolve this ambiguity.  
The recruitment subsidy has a well-defined positive effect on the share of unemployed 
unskilled workers, 𝛾, but with an ambiguous effect on the fraction of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙. As 
derived in Appendix 2 (equation (A14)) the partial derivative 
𝜕γ
𝜕𝜁
 gives, 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕γ
𝜕𝜁
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁 [
(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
𝜙𝛽 +  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃 𝜃𝑞
(𝜃)𝛽] 𝛾𝜆1
|𝐴|1(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
),                                
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where 𝜆1 = (𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦
𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}. Thus, provided 𝜆1 > 0, which is conditional on 
𝑦𝑛 > 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) + 𝑏 as above (also see Burda, 1990), and |𝐴|1 > 0, we have 
𝜕𝛾 
𝜕𝜁
> 0, since as 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0 and 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃
> 0, conditional on 𝛾 > 𝑝 as in AV-02 and Blázquez and Jansen (2008). Below 
we examine how specific unemployment rates react to policy instruments. 
 To demonstrate the impacts of the above policy instruments on unemployment rate we 
resort to equation (16), which implies 𝑢 = 𝑢[𝜃(𝐵𝑛 , 𝜁, 𝛼, 𝑋𝑖), 𝛾(𝐵
𝑛 , 𝐵𝑠, 𝜁, 𝛼, 𝑋𝑖)], where 𝜃 and 
𝛾 are two intermediate variables directly determining 𝑢, but dependent on policy instruments as 
well as other exogenous parameters, denoted by 𝑋𝑖. Thus, we evaluate each policy instrument at 
a time, setting all variations in 𝑋𝑖 = 0 and noting that 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝛾
> 0 and 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜃
< 0. Suppose there is an 
increase in the separation cost induced by a change in 𝐵𝑠. As 𝐵𝑠 has no direct effect on the 
market tightness, 𝜃 , vacancy creation rate remains unaffected in equilibrium, all else equal. 
However, as we have already established, an increase in 𝐵𝑠 raises the availability of low-tech 
vacancies,  𝜙 , and reduces the share of unskilled workers,  𝛾 . Thus, we expect a decrease 
unemployment rate, given that 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝛾
> 0. The effects of 𝐵𝑛 and 𝛼 are somewhat ambiguous: a rise 
in either 𝐵𝑛 or 𝛼 reduces 𝜃, but with ambiguous effects on 𝛾. Therefore, their overall impact on 
unemployment is qualitatively unclear. 
Next, we evaluate the effect of policy instruments on the specific unemployment rate for 
each worker type. Using equation (13), as in Dolado et al. (2009), we can define the 
unemployment rate of unskilled workers as the ratio of unskilled unemployed workers, measured 
by 𝛾𝑢 , to the share of unskilled workers in the labour force, 𝑝; i.e., 𝑢𝑙 ≡
𝛾𝑢
𝑝
=
𝛿
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙+𝛿]
. 
Similarly, from equation (14) the unemployment rate of skilled workers can be defined as 𝑢ℎ ≡
(1−𝛾)𝑢
1−𝑝
=
𝛿
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)+𝛿]
, where (1 − 𝛾)𝑢 is a measure of skilled unemployed workers and 1 − 𝑝 is the 
share of skilled workers in the labour force. It is immediate to see that 
𝜕𝑢𝑙
𝜕𝜃
< 0,
𝜕𝑢𝑙
𝜕𝜙
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑢ℎ
𝜕𝜃
< 0. It follows that changes in 𝐵𝑛  and 𝛼 both have ambiguous effects on 𝑢𝑙  due to the 
ambiguous impacts of both policies on the share of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙. However, for the 
workers who are skilled, the rise in 𝐵𝑛 and 𝛼 unambiguously increase their unemployment rate, 
𝑢ℎ, since it is driven mainly by market tightness, 𝜃.  
An increase in subsidy unambiguously leads to a decrease in the skilled workers’ 
unemployment rate, since 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0. However, the effects of subsidy on the aggregate and unskilled 
workers’ unemployment rates, 𝑢 and 𝑢𝑙, are somewhat ambiguous, qualitatively. In particular, 
in Appendix 2, we show that the partial effect of subsidy on aggregate unemployment rate yields, 
equation (A20), 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜁
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
(𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿)(1 − 𝛾)2
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝜁
−
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿]2(1 − 𝛾)
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
).          
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As has already been established, by reducing the cost of vacancy creation, an increase in 
subsidy raises market tightness, 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0. Therefore, the exit rate unemployment is expected to be 
higher, due to the tightening in the labour market. Whether or not subsidy ultimately reduces u, 
however, depends on the response of the share of unskilled workers, 𝛾; but as we have shown, 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝜁
> 0  and 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝛾
> 0 . It follows that for an increase in subsidy to reduce the aggregate 
unemployment rate, its effect through market tightness, i.e., 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0, must be sufficiently large 
so as to make 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜁
< 0. 
2.4 Numerical Evaluation 
Here we use numerical examples to gauge the quantitative importance of policy instruments as 
well as clarify any ambiguity noted in the preceding section. We first discuss the calibration 
strategy and then the results from our simulation exercises. 
2.4.1 Model Calibration 
We calibrate the model such that the initial solution for the fraction of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙, is 
at least 70 percent to reflect the percentage of small and medium-sized enterprises in the OECD 
countries which ranges from 69 percent in Ireland to 96.5 in Greece (OECD, 2013b). Also, 
aggregate unemployment is targeted at around 8 percent to capture the OECD average in recent 
years. In doing these, we take into consideration that our parameterisations should be such that 
they guarantee the existence of a cross-skill matching equilibrium outlined previously. 
To commence the calibration, we need to specify the functional form for the matching 
technology. As in Hagedorn, Manovskii, and Stetsenko (2016) we assume that the matching 
technology takes the Cobb-Douglas form given by 𝑚(𝑢, 𝑣) = 𝜒𝑢𝜇𝑣1−𝜇 , where 𝜒 > 0  is a 
positive constant reflecting the efficiency of matching technology and 𝜇  captures matching 
elasticity, assumed to be between 0 and 1 (Krause & Lubik, 2010; Ravenna & Walsh, 2012). 
This functional form thus allows us to rewrite a firm’s vacancy filling rate as 
𝑚(𝑢,𝑣)
𝑣
≡ 𝑞(𝜃) =
𝜒𝜃−𝜇  and the corresponding worker’s job finding rate as 
𝑣
𝑢
𝑚(𝑢,𝑣)
𝑣
 ≡ 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) = 𝜒𝜃1−𝜇 . The 
summary of the baseline calibration is provided in Table 2.2 in Appendix 2.  
The bargaining power of workers is conventionally assumed to be symmetric, as in 
Pissarides (2000). Therefore, we let 𝛽 = 1/2, which implies that the agents to a job match to 
have an equal share of the match surplus. Following Dolado et al. (2009) and many other studies 
in search literature, we set matching elasticity 𝜇 to equal 𝛽. This ensures that the share of the 
match surplus received by each party to a job match equals their contribution to matching; thus, 
satisfying the Hosios (1990) condition.24 The value of unemployment benefit is set as 𝑏 = 0.1 
                                                             
24 See Hosios (1990) and Pissarides (2000, ch. 8) for details. 
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as in Dolado et al. (2009) and falls between the 0.1, chosen by AV-02, and 0.349, set by 
Mortensen and Pissarides (2003). Other parameters: the interest rate 𝑟 = 0.05, job separation 
rate 𝛿 = 0.2, the fraction of unskilled workers in the labour force 𝑝 = 2/3, the measure of match 
efficiency, 𝜒 = 2 and the cost of posting each vacancy 𝑐 = 0.5 are chosen in line with AV-02 
and Dolado et al. (2009). We normalize the output of low-tech job type 𝑦𝑛 = 1 and set that of 
high-tech job as 𝑦𝑠 = 1.4, close to the value chosen by Dolado et al. (2009). Finally, we assume 
a policy-free initial equilibrium and, thus, set 𝛼 = 𝐵𝑗 = 𝜂 = 𝜁 = 0;  𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑠. 
2.4.2  Numerical Results 
The second row (Bench) of Table 2.3 in Appendix 2 summarises the benchmark steady state 
solution of the model. The initial solution to model shows that the duration of unemployment for 
skilled and unskilled workers differ quite considerably. With a job finding rate of 𝜃𝑞(𝜃) =
2.4449 , a skilled worker spends approximately 4.9 months in unemployment on average, 
whereas the unskilled counterpart spends 5.7 months searching for job which he finds with an 
effective rate of 𝜙𝜃𝑞(𝜃) = 2.0941. For skilled and unskilled workers, the steady state solution 
yields an average unemployment rate of 7.56 and 8.72 percent respectively. Aggregate 
unemployment (𝑢)  is approximately 8 percent, while the fraction of low-tech vacancies is 
approximately 85.7 percent, within the range outlined above. 
We focus on examining the effects of changes in specific instruments on endogenous 
variables. Note that in isolation, severance compensation (𝐵𝑗 ; 𝑗 = 𝑛, 𝑠) and the measure of EPL 
strictness (𝜂) have no ‘real’ effect on labour market outcomes. This is because the direct effect 
of severance compensation disappears through wage negotiation as noted previously. The cost 
induced by severance, however, can be examined if there is some form of strictness in the EPL, 
(𝜂 > 0). Thus, we set the measure of EPL strictness, 𝜂, to 0.5 to enable us examine the effects 
of severance induced cost on the variables. Table 2.3 in Appendix 2 shows the effects of changes 
in individual policy instruments (𝛼, 𝜁, 𝐵𝑛 and 𝐵𝑠) on the labour market. 
Fixed separation cost and low-tech severance compensation: As can be seen, an 
increase in 𝛼 and 𝐵𝑛 have similar qualitative effects on labour market outcomes; quantitatively, 
however, these effects differ. In both cases job creation reduces, causing market tightness, 𝜃, to 
fall. A lower 𝜃, in turn, reduces job finding rate, leading to higher unemployment rate across all 
categories of worker. The unskilled workers are worse off by the increases in 𝛼 and 𝐵𝑛, both in 
terms of percentage decrease in job finding and increase in unemployment rates. In fact, our 
result reveals that in all cases with changes in 𝐵𝑛, the percentage increase in the unemployment 
rate of the unskilled is at least three times the increase in that of skilled workers. However, in 
the case of 𝛼, while the unskilled are also worse off, the impact is less compared to 𝐵𝑛. These 
results are broadly supported by Boeri et al. (2012) who stressed that the unemployment rate of 
unskilled workers tends to be more responsive to changes in EPL than that of skilled worker. 
The intuition, based on our model, is that as 𝛼 and 𝐵𝑛 increase, low-tech job matches become 
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less attractive, inducing firms to shift the allocation of vacancies towards high-tech job type; 
thus, creating a much more favourable market prospect for skilled workers. However, given that 
both 𝛼 and 𝐵𝑛 have negative impacts on the overall job creation, as reflected in the decrease in 
𝜃, 𝑢ℎ rises but not as much as the increase in 𝑢𝑙. In general, there is an increase in the aggregate 
unemployment as shown by the rise in 𝑢, due to deterioration in labour market condition. 
High-tech severance compensation: In contrast to 𝛼 and 𝐵𝑛, an increase in severance 
compensation 𝐵𝑠 on high-tech jobs reduces the aggregate unemployment rate, 𝑢. The reason is 
that a higher 𝐵𝑠 lowers the profitability of high-tech jobs, shifting vacancy allocation in favour 
of low-tech job type. As 𝜃  is independent of 𝐵𝑠  (by virtue of equation (23)), it remains 
unaffected. Thus, the effect of 𝐵𝑠 is essentially to influence vacancy allocation. Quantitatively, 
as shown in Table 2.3, the share of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙, rises by 2 and 8 percent when 𝐵𝑠 rises 
by 0.1 and 0.5 percentage points respectively. The increase in the availability of low-tech 
vacancies raises the effective job finding rate of unskilled workers, leading to decrease in the 
share of the unskilled unemployed, 𝛾. Consequently, the unemployment rate of this category of 
workers, 𝑢𝑙, falls, while that of skilled workers remains the same as 𝐵
𝑠 rises. Intuitively, given 
that skilled workers can undertake any of the two job types, even though the share of high-tech 
vacancies drops, the increased availability of low-tech vacancies induces some skilled workers 
to match with low-tech jobs rather than remain unemployed. 
Recruitment subsidy: Compared to other instruments, a rise in recruitment subsidy 𝜁 
boosts vacancy creation and lowers unemployment across skills. The immediate impact of 
subsidy is to reduce vacancy creation cost, thereby raising market tightness, 𝜃 . Given that 
productivities of the two job types are unaffected by 𝜁 , there is tendency for firms to shift 
allocation of these vacancies in towards high-tech jobs since they have higher productivity, all 
else equal. Consequently, 𝜙 falls. However, the improvement in the job finding rate, resulting 
from the increase in market tightness, for both types of workers leads to a reduction in 
unemployment rate across board. The reason that unskilled workers’ unemployment rate, 𝑢𝑙, 
falls, even though 𝜙 declines, is that crowding out effect reduces given the increase in vacancy 
creation activities. Intuitively, as more high-tech vacancies become available, the arrival rate of 
such vacancies to skilled workers increases; thus, leading to a reduction in the competition for 
low-tech vacancies. 
2.5 Fixed Wage Model with Labour Market Policies 
In the previous section, we showed that the direct effect of severance compensation on labour 
market outcomes can be neutralised via Nash bargaining process, as reflected in the wage 
equation (12), but not the additional cost it creates. However, with a rigid wage structure, firms 
are typically unable to transfer (or share) the cost imposed by severance compensation to the 
workers through wage cut (Garibaldi & Violante, 2000). This implies that severance cost itself 
can have a real effect on firms’ vacancy creation and allocation decisions, which, in turn, 
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influences unemployment rate and other labour market outcomes. Here, we assume that wages 
are predetermined (exogenously determined) – similar to Cahuc and Barbanchon (2010, p. 198). 
Additionally, we maintain the assumption that a skilled worker that is matched with a low-tech 
vacancy earns a wage rate greater that than that of an unskilled worker on the same job; i.e., 
𝑤𝑙
𝑛 < 𝑤ℎ
𝑛 < 𝑤ℎ
𝑠 . The new equilibrium with cross skill matching and fixed wage can be 
summarised as follows, 
𝜙 =
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛾)𝑝 + 𝛿(𝑝 − 𝛾)
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾(1 − 𝑝)
,                                                                                           (15) 
𝑢 =
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿](1 − 𝛾)
,                                                                                                         (16) 
𝑢𝑙 ≡
𝛾𝑢
𝑝
=
𝛿
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙 + 𝛿
,                                                                                                           (27) 
𝑢ℎ ≡
(1 − 𝛾)𝑢
1 − 𝑝
=
𝛿
𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿
,                                                                                                 (28) 
𝑦𝑛 − [𝛾𝑤𝑙
𝑛 + (1 − 𝛾)𝑤ℎ
𝑛] − 𝛿𝐹𝑛 −
(𝑟 + 𝛿)(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
= 0,                                              (29) 
(1 − 𝛾)[𝑦𝑠 − 𝑤ℎ
𝑠 − 𝛿𝐹𝑠] −
(𝑟 + 𝛿)(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
= 0,                                                             (30) 
where equations (27) and (28) characterise the unemployment rate of unskilled and skilled 
workers defined previously in section 2.3. Equations (29) and (30) now respectively represent 
vacancy creation conditions for low- and high-tech vacancies, obtained by imposing free-entry 
requirements, 𝑉𝑛 = 0 and  𝑉𝑠 = 0 , equations (6) and (7), and using (5). Note that we have taken 
into consideration that firms with low-tech vacancies can employ any type of worker, whereas 
those with high-tech vacancies can only hire skilled workers. Due to free-entry condition, the 
expected profit must be equal to the average cost of creating the vacancy, the equivalence of 
equations (17) and (18). Notice that compared to the flexible wage structure in the previous 
section, a firm now entirely bears the burden of the total firing cost 𝐹𝑗 = 𝛼 + (1 + 𝜂)𝐵𝑗;   𝑗 =
𝑛, 𝑠, which includes the value of severance payment and the additional cost it induces. 
2.5.1 Comparative Statics under Fixed Wage 
In the new setting, equations (29) and (30) jointly determine the equilibrium 𝜃 and 𝛾. More 
formally, let the values of having low- and high-tech job to the firms, i.e., (29) and (30), be 
denoted by 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) and 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) respectively. It can be shown that 
𝜕𝑉𝑛(𝜃,𝛾)
𝜕𝜃
|
𝛾
< 0, 
𝜕𝑉𝑛(𝜃,𝛾)
𝜕𝛾
|
𝜃
>
0, 
𝜕𝑉𝑠(𝜃,𝛾)
𝜕𝜃
|
𝛾
< 0 and 
𝜕𝑉𝑠(𝜃,𝛾)
𝜕𝛾
|
𝜃
< 0, noting that 𝑞′(𝜃) < 0. The intuition behind these results is 
straightforward. The lower is the value of 𝜃 the easier it is for firms to fill both low-tech and 
high-tech vacancies. The reason is that fewer vacancies lead to an increase in the competition 
for jobs, driving down the duration of vacancies (1/𝑞(𝜃))  and, consequently, the average 
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vacancy creation cost. Therefore, the value of each job type to the firm increases, for a given 
fraction of unskilled unemployed workers, 𝛾. More so, for a given value of market tightness, 𝜃, 
a higher 𝛾 implies higher expected profit for firms with low-tech vacancies. Intuitively, because 
low-tech job type pays lower wage rate to unskilled workers, its value (𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾)) increases with 
𝛾. A similar explanation applies high-tech jobs which become less attractive as the share of 
unskilled unemployed workers, 𝛾, rises, for a given θ value. Given the relationships stated above, 
𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) and 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) can be depicted diagrammatically in a 𝜃 − 𝛾 space, as shown in Figure 
2.1 in Appendix 2, where the former is upward-sloping and latter is downward-sloping.25  
The point of intersection of the two curves determines the unique equilibrium values of 
𝜃  and 𝛾 . Inspecting the figure, it is easy to qualitatively compare how changes in policy 
instruments influence the equilibrium variables 𝜃 and 𝛾. A rise in severance compensation 𝐵𝑛 
raises the total firing cost 𝐹𝑛 and shifts 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) curve to the left, while 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) curve remains 
unaffected. In other words, whilst the equilibrium market tightness 𝜃  falls, the fraction 𝛾  of 
unskilled unemployed workers rises. Intuitively, given that 𝐵𝑛 affects only low-tech jobs, as 𝜃 
falls, the share of low-tech vacancies reduces, leading to an increase in the fraction of unskilled 
unemployed workers, 𝛾. By contrast, an increase in 𝐵𝑠 raises 𝐹𝑠 and shifts 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) curve down, 
leaving 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾)  curve unchanged. As a consequence, the equilibrium 𝜃  decreases because 
firms cut back on the creation of high-tech vacancies. By differentiating 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) w.r.t. 𝐵𝑠 , 
considering 𝐵𝑠 as a function of 𝛾 and holding 𝜃 constant, we find that 𝛾 also falls.  
The effects of the fixed separation cost, 𝛼, on the market tightness and the share of the 
unskilled unemployed are qualitatively the same as the effects of severance payments, 𝐵𝑛 . 
However, unlike 𝐵𝑛, 𝛼 affects both 𝐹𝑛 and 𝐹𝑠. Specifically, an increase in 𝛼 raises both 𝐹𝑠 and 
𝐹𝑛, and shifts 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) downwards and 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) to the left. The reason is that – irrespective of 
the type – the expected profit of filled jobs falls. This, in turn, leads to a reduction in vacancy 
creation and therefore market tightness, 𝜃. Since 𝛼 shifts 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) downward and 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) to 
the left, its effect of on 𝛾  is somewhat ambiguous from the diagram. We can however 
straightforwardly establish this effect by differentiating (29) and (30) w.r.t 𝛼, assuming that 𝛾 is 
a function of 𝛼 and holding 𝜃 fixed. The result shows that the increase in 𝛼 also increases the 
fraction of unskilled workers in unemployment, 𝛾. So we would expect a larger shift in 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) 
curve to the left than the downward shift in 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) curve. This suggests that the negative 
effects of 𝛼 through 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) dominates; i.e., the increase in 𝛼 is more harmful to firms with 
low-tech vacancies than it is to firms with high-tech vacancies. The reason for this follows from 
our previous explanation: given that 𝛼  is common to the two job type, posting high-tech 
vacancies is generally more attractive since, ceteris paribus, they attracts higher profits to firms 
compared to low-tech vacancies. Hence, the fraction of low-tech vacancies reduces by more, 
                                                             
25  Implicit differentiation of 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) and 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) yield 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝜃
= −(
(𝑟+𝛿)(1−𝜁)𝑞′(𝜃)
𝑤ℎ
𝑛−𝑤𝑙
𝑛 ) > 0 and 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝜃
= (
(1−𝛾)𝑞′(𝜃)
𝑞(𝜃)
) < 0 
respectively, as long as   𝑞′(𝜃) < 0 and 𝑤ℎ
𝑛 > 𝑤𝑙
𝑛 hold. 
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which then leads to an increase in the fraction of the unskilled in unemployment. 
An increase in recruitment subsidy 𝜁 shifts 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) up and 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) to the right, so it 
unambiguously raises 𝜃. Again, the diagram presents an ambiguous picture of the effect of 𝜁 on 
the share 𝛾  of unskilled workers in unemployment. Using equations (29) and (30) and 
differentiating them individually w.r.t 𝜁 – considering 𝜃 and 𝛾 as functions of 𝜁 – it is easy to 
show that the increase in 𝜁 unambiguously raises 𝜃 and reduces 𝛾 in equation (29), whereas it 
increases both (𝜃 and 𝛾)  in equation (30). These results are very intuitive: it suggests that 
subsidy could be more effective in reducing the share of unskilled workers in unemployment 
when availed directly to the firms with low-tech vacancies, than to the firms with high-tech 
vacancies. Combining the two results, since both equations jointly determine the equilibrium 
values of 𝜃 and 𝛾, we find that the effect of 𝜁 on 𝛾 cancels out, whereas the effect on 𝜃 remains 
positive. (Below, we use numerical example to verify this result.) 
In order to evaluate the partial effects of the policy instruments on unemployment rate in 
equation (16) we apply chain rule which takes the form  
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋𝜏
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑋𝜏
+
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝑋𝜏
),                                                                          
where 𝑋𝜏  represents the policy instruments, 𝜏 = 𝐵
𝑠, 𝐵𝑛 , 𝜁  and 𝛼  whose partial effects are 
individually examined, keeping the variations in other structural parameters constant. Recall 
from equation (16) that 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝜃 < 0⁄  and 𝜕𝑢 𝜕𝛾 > 0⁄ , also see Appendix 2. In other words, the 
interpretation of the sign of the partial effects of policy instruments on aggregate unemployment 
rate depends on their initial impact on 𝜃 and 𝛾, the two intermediate variables. Since both 𝐵𝑠 
and 𝐵𝑛  reduce aggregate vacancy posting and so the market tightness θ, the exit rate out of 
unemployment drops. Thus, we would expect a ceteris paribus increase in unemployment rate. 
However, the effects of 𝐵𝑠 and 𝐵𝑛, through 𝛾, on 𝑢 differ: a rise 𝐵𝑛(𝐵𝑠) increases (reduces) 𝛾. 
Given the relation in the equation above, the overall impact of 𝐵𝑛 on 𝑢 is, therefore, positive 
whereas the effect of 𝐵𝑠  is ambiguous. It follows that 𝐵𝑠  can only lead to a higher 
unemployment only if its impact through 𝜃 is sufficiently large to dominate its impact through 
𝛾, so as to make 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝑋𝜏
> 0. 
An increase in the fixed cost of separation, as implied by a rise in 𝛼, unambiguously 
reduces 𝜃  and increases 𝛾 , and so, unemployment rate is higher as 𝛼  rises. By contrast, an 
increase in subsidy 𝜁 reduces the cost of job creation and increases the market tightness 𝜃 in turn. 
So we expect aggregate unemployment rate to be lower – for a given 𝛾. The final effect of 𝜁 on 
𝑢 however depends on its effects on the share of unskilled workers that are unemployed, 𝛾. But 
since the effects of 𝜁 on 𝛾 in equations (29) and (30) both cancel out each other, subsidy reduces 
unemployment mainly by increasing vacancy creation as reflected in a higher the market 
tightness, 𝜃. 
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2.5.2 Numerical Examples under Fixed Wage 
In this subsection, we use numerical examples to illustrate the implications of changes in policy 
instruments under flexible and fixed wage system. To do this, we retain the original calibration 
in the previous sub-section. Also, given that wages are now exogenously determined, we use the 
initial solution derived under flexible wage model for 𝑤𝑙
𝑛, 𝑤ℎ
𝑛 and 𝑤ℎ
𝑠, reported in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.4 in Appendix 2 shows the benchmark results and comparative statics of the current 
exercise. We compare instances where 𝛼, 𝐵𝑛, 𝐵𝑠 and 𝜁 are raised individually by 0.1 percentage 
point under flexible and fixed wage model. 
As the results suggest, firms become extremely sensitive to policies under fixed wage 
system compared to the flexible wage system; even a small increase in policy instruments 
produces a large change in the labour market. Given a policy shock an equal magnitude, market 
tightness drops by more in the cases of 𝛼, 𝐵𝑛 and 𝐵𝑠 under fixed wage, signalling the fact that 
wages are unable to adjust to absorb part of the cost imposed by these instruments. The unskilled 
workers are worse off the higher are 𝛼 and 𝐵𝑛, as before. This is because, by raising the cost of 
labour to the firms, these policy instruments make vacancy creation unattractive. For a higher 
𝐵𝑛, there is a significant shift from low- towards high-tech vacancies, leading to a sharp increase 
in the unemployment rate of the unskilled. 
A higher 𝐵𝑠 , however, has an opposite effect, producing a significant rise in the 
allocation of vacancies towards low-tech job type, as shown by 𝜙 = 0.9967. A higher 𝜙 in turn 
leads to a considerable rise in the effective job finding rate for the unskilled, resulting in a lower 
𝑢𝑙. In fact, the effect of 𝐵
𝑠 is similar to that produced in AV-02, where 𝜙 = 1 as a result of an 
increase in the fraction of the unskilled in the workforce, 𝑝. Similar to the case of 𝑝, the reason 
is that, as 𝐵𝑠  rises, the incentive to post low-tech vacancies rises, pushing the equilibrium 
towards a corner solution where high-tech vacancies disappear. Finally, as we expected, the 
effect of recruitment subsidy on 𝛾 cancels out, as illustrated previously. However, given that 
vacancy creation rise in general, as shown by the increase in 𝜃, unemployment rate falls across 
board.  
2.6 Robustness Check 
To check the robustness of our results, we vary the values of two key parameters emphasised by 
AV-02 and Dolado et al. (2009), namely, the productivity of high-tech and low-tech jobs, 𝑦𝑠 and 
𝑦𝑛, respectively. An increase in 𝑦𝑠 leaves 𝜃 unchanged (
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑦𝑠
= 0), by virtue of equation (23). 
However, given that the productivity gap between low- and high-tech job becomes larger as 𝑦𝑠 
increases, it leads to a decrease in 𝜙, leaving unskilled workers worse off: both 𝑢𝑙 and 𝑢 rise as 
a result. A higher 𝑦𝑛, in contrast, directly raises job creation, as captured by the increase in 𝜃 
(
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝑦𝑛
> 0) . Additionally, given that the productivity gap between high- and low-tech jobs 
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reduces as 𝑦𝑛 increases, for a given 𝑦𝑠, there is higher incentive to post low-tech vacancies, and 
so 𝜙 rises. The increase in 𝜙 then reduces both 𝑢𝑙 and 𝑢ℎ, and consequently 𝑢. 
Table 2.5 in Appendix 2 summarises our policy experiments for different values of 𝑦𝑠 
and 𝑦𝑛. We report the responses of variables in terms of percentage change from their benchmark 
solution. Clearly, the results show that in all scenarios, the qualitative implications of policies 
remain the same as discussed in the previous section. Quantitatively, however, the magnitude of 
the impact of these policy instruments, to some extent, depend on the values of 𝑦𝑠 and 𝑦𝑛, our 
main focus parameters. A closer examination shows that an increase in severance compensation 
on a high-tech job (𝐵𝑠) tends to lead to a much larger reduction in unemployment rate 𝑢 the 
lower is 𝑦𝑠 and the higher is 𝑦𝑛. Intuitively, because a lower 𝑦𝑠 or a higher 𝑦𝑛, in isolation, 
implies a reduced productivity gap between low-tech and high-tech job, firms find it more 
beneficial to shift vacancy allocation towards low-tech job type. The percentage increase in 𝜙 is, 
therefore, higher. Thus, given that majority of the workforce are unskilled, i.e., 𝑝 = 2/3, there 
tends to be much lower aggregate unemployment as the share of low-tech vacancies increases. 
A similar analogy applies to rise in low-tech severance compensation (𝐵𝑛), but with opposite 
effect on 𝑢. Fixed separation cost, 𝛼, given that it is common to both job type, tends to produce 
a much larger adverse effect on the aggregate unemployment rate the lower is 𝑦𝑛 and the higher 
is 𝑦𝑠. This is because, with a further decrease 𝑦𝑛, the incentive to allocate vacancies away from 
low-tech type rises, due to lower payoffs associated with a lower 𝑦𝑛, whereas the payoff on high-
tech job rises as 𝑦𝑠  increases. For the recruitment subsidy, the percentage decrease in the 
aggregate unemployment rate is much higher as 𝑦𝑠 reduces and as 𝑦𝑛 increases. At the same 
time, there is a greater decrease in the fraction of available low-tech jobs in favour of the high-
tech ones. This intuitively implies that as high-tech vacancies become more available, skilled 
workers become more likely to match with such vacancies. Thus, job competition between the 
skilled and the unskilled workers reduce, creating higher opportunities for the unskilled workers 
to match with low-tech vacancies in the market. In general, the qualitative effects of these 
policies as shown Table 2.5 confirms the robustness of our result, provided the changes in the 
parameters are within reasonable bounds which ensure the requirements for cross-skill matching 
hold. 
2.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has examined the implications of labour market policies on vacancy creation and 
allocation decisions of firms and unemployment rates in the presence of cross-skill matching. 
We extended the Albrecht and Vroman (2002) search and matching framework with 
heterogeneous skilled and unskilled workers and with high-and low-tech jobs. While skilled 
workers are able to undertake both job types, the unskilled can only undertake on low-tech job 
type. This gives the former a better market prospect compared to the latter. Within this 
framework, we considered the effects of specific policies that consist of targeted severance 
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compensation (a less-studies policy instrument) and common fixed firing cost and vacancy 
creation or recruitement subsidy. 
Against conventional wisdom, we show that, as long as there is some degree of 
enforcement, severance compensation has a non-neutral effect on labour market outcomes. In 
particular, when directed towards low-tech jobs it leads to a reduction in vacancy creation and a 
decrease in the proportion of vacancies allocated to low-tech job type. Thus, unemployment rate 
rises across all categories of workers, but the unskilled are worse-off. By contrast, when targeted 
on high-tech jobs, severance compensation has an opposite effect on labour market outcomes. 
Fixed separation cost (common to low- and high-tech jobs) also adversely affects vacancy 
creation activities, but compared to low-tech job targeted severance, its effects are less. 
Recruitment subsidy is found to be an effective way of reducing the unemployment rates of 
skilled and unskilled workers by improving the vacancy creation rate. Such subsidy acts on the 
market by reducing vacancy creation cost, which, in turn, reduces crowding out effects of 
unskilled workers by their skilled counterpart. Finally, for comparison, we abstracted from 
flexible wage setting in which firms can transfer the burden of severance compensation by 
forcing workers to accept lower wage rate and considered a fixed wage system in which the 
opposite holds. We find that in the latter, firms become more sensitive to labour policies; even a 
small change in policy instrument triggers large changes in labour market variables. 
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Appendix 2 
2A Mathematical Derivations and Comparative Statics 
2A.1 Equal-value and Job Creation Conditions 
Subtract equation (17) from (18) to obtain the equal value condition, 
𝛾𝑆𝑙
𝑛 = (1 − 𝛾)(𝑆ℎ
𝑠 − 𝑆ℎ
𝑛),                                                                                                       (𝐴1) 
which is the equation (19) in the text. Next, using equations (11) and (20), equation (A1) can be 
rewritten as 
(1 − 𝛾){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛} =  𝛾
(𝑟+𝛿){𝑦𝑛−𝛿(𝛼+𝜂𝐵𝑛)−𝑏}
𝑟+𝛿+𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽
,                                      (𝐴2)  
which characterises the equal value condition, equation (22). To obtain equation (23) in the text, 
multiply both sides of (A2) by 𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜙𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽  and then add (1 − 𝛾)(𝑟 + 𝛿)[𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 +
𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏] to both sides of the equation. These yields, 
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽{𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑛 − 𝐵𝑛)}                                                        
+(𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏} =
(𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
(1 − 𝛾)
.   (𝐴3.1) 
Furthermore, substitute (21) into (18), noting that 𝑉𝑠 = 0, gives, 
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽{𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛 + 𝛿(𝐹𝑛 − 𝐵𝑛)}                                                       
+(𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏} =
(𝑟 + 𝛿)[𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽](1 − 𝜁)𝑐
(1 − 𝛾)(1 − 𝛽)𝑞(𝜃)
. (𝐴3.2) 
Using both (A3.1) and (A3.2), we obtain the equation (23) in the text, 
(1 − 𝛽){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽
=
(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
.                                                                    (𝐴4) 
This equation produces a unique solution for the market tightness, 𝜃. 
2A.2 Cross-skill Matching Equilibrium and Corner Solution 
A corner solution exists in equilibrium if firms choose to offer only low-tech vacancies, such 
that 𝜙 = 1. In a policy-free environment, this implies that the flow value of vacancies yields, 
𝑟𝑉𝑛 = −𝑐 + 𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛽)
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑟𝑈)
𝑟 + 𝛿
= 0,                                                                               (𝐴5) 
where rU represents the common flow value of unemployment for the two worker types derived 
in equation (25), which is now equal since 𝐽𝑙
𝑛 = 𝐽ℎ
𝑛 . To rule out an equilibrium with corner 
solution, we assume that a deviant must make a negative profit for posting a high-tech vacancy 
when 𝜙 = 1. Suppose a firm posts a high-tech job, when 𝜙 = 1, the value of the vacancy must 
satisfy, 
𝑟𝑉𝑠 = −𝑐 + (1 − 𝑝)𝑞(𝜃∗)(1 − 𝛽)
(𝑦𝑠 − 𝑟𝑈)
𝑟 + 𝛿
< 0,                                                         (𝐴6) 
where the market tightness that solves (23) is denoted by 𝜃∗. Comparing both (A5) and (A6), we 
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obtain 
(𝑦𝑛 − 𝑟𝑈) > (1 − 𝑝)(𝑦𝑠 − 𝑟𝑈),                                                                                        
which gives the condition that ensures the creation of high-tech job results in a negative profit 
when 𝜙 =1. To arrive at equation (26), substitute equation (25) to eliminate 𝑟𝑈. 
2A.3 Comparative Statics 
Since unemployment rate, equation (16), can be solved for given values of model parameters 
and endogenous variables, we first examine how policies affect 𝜙, 𝛾 and 𝜃. For the first purpose, 
we make use of equations (15), (22) and (23), respectively, which we reproduce here for 
convenience, 
𝜙 =
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)(1 − 𝛾)𝑝 + 𝛿(𝑝 − 𝛾)
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾(1 − 𝑝)
.                                                                                                  
(1 − 𝛾){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛} =  𝛾
(𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽
,                          
(1 − 𝛽){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽
=
(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
𝑞(𝜃)
,                                                                           
where 𝜙, 𝛾 and 𝜃 are the three endogenous variables of interest, which are determined by the 
above equations, and 𝐵𝑛, 𝐵𝑠, 𝜁 and 𝛼 are policy parameters. To carry out comparative statics, 
we totally differentiate (15), (22) and (23), setting all structural parameters (including 𝜂 ) 
variations to zero. For simplicity the results, after some manipulations, are arranged more 
compactly in a matrix form 𝐴 [
𝑑𝜙
𝑑𝛾
𝑑𝜃
] = g, where
42 
𝐴 =
[
 
 
 
 
 
 1
𝑝(𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿)
(1 − 𝑝)𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾2
−
𝛿(𝛾 − 𝑝)(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
𝛾(1 − 𝑝)[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]2
(1 − 𝛾){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛} 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽  −
(𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
(1 − 𝛾)
  (1 − 𝛾){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛}(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
𝜙𝛽
0 0 (
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽 + (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝜇
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
)
]
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
and 
g =
[
 
 
 
0
−[(𝑟 + 𝛿) + (1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽]𝛿𝜂
− 
(1 − 𝛽)𝛿𝜂
(1 − 𝜁)𝑐
   
0
(1 − 𝛾)𝛿𝜂(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
0
    
0
0
(1 − 𝛽){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
(1 − 𝜁)2𝑐
   
0
−(𝑟 + 𝛿)𝛾𝛿
−
(1 − 𝛽)𝛿
(1 − 𝜁)𝑐 ]
 
 
 
[
𝑑𝐵𝑛
𝑑𝐵𝑠
𝑑𝜁
𝑑𝛼
] . 
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Using A , we obtain the Jacobian determinant, 
|𝐴|
= −(
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽 + (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝜇
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
)
(
 
 
(𝑟 + 𝛿){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}
(1 − 𝛾)
+                                              
𝑝(𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿)
(1 − 𝑝)𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾2
(1 − 𝛾)[𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛] 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽
)
 
 
.     
Using equation (22), the above can be simplified as 
|𝐴| = − 
(
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽 + (𝑟 + 𝛿)𝜇
𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
)𝜆1 ((𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)  −  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾 𝛾
(1 − 𝛾) 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽)
(1 − 𝛾)(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
, 
where 𝜆1 = (𝑟 + 𝛿)[𝑦
𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏] , 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
= −
𝑝(𝜃𝑞(𝜃)+𝛿)
(1−𝑝)𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛾2
< 0 , (𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
> 0  and 
−𝜇 = 𝑞′(𝜃)
𝜃
𝑞(𝜃)
; with 0 < 𝜇 < 1, given the homogeneity assumption of the matching function. 
The first bracketed term on the right-hand-side of |𝐴| is positive. Since 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
< 0, the term in the 
bracket is positive. Thus, the sign of |𝐴| depends on the second term, 𝜆1. But since the expected 
gain or value of a filled vacancy must be nonnegative, i.e. 𝑦𝑛 > 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) + 𝑏, then 𝜆1 > 0. 
The Jacobian is, therefore, negative, |𝐴| < 0. For future reference we define 
|𝐴|1 =
𝜆1 ((𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)  −   
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾 𝛾
(1 − 𝛾) 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽)
(1 − 𝛾)(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
,                                      
where |𝐴|1 > 0 since 𝜆1 > 0 and 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
< 0. This is used where the first bracketed term of |𝐴| 
cancels out or is used to arrive at another result. Also, note that 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃
=
𝛿(𝛾−𝑝)(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))′
𝛾(1−𝑝)[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)]2
> 0 as long 
as 𝛾 > 𝑝. Using Cramer’s rule, it is straightforward to derive the comparative statics for each of 
the policy parameters 𝛼, 𝐵𝑛, 𝐵𝑠 and 𝜁 based on the information set out above.  
 
The impact of severance compensation 𝐵𝑛 on market tightness, 𝜃: 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
= −
(1 − 𝛽)𝛿𝜂𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽 + 𝜇(𝑟 + 𝛿)](1 − 𝜁)𝑐
< 0.                                                                    (𝐴7) 
An increase in nB  unambiguously reduces market tightness since it induces an additional 
separation cost to the firm. A key thing to note is that without the strictness of EPL, i.e., if 𝜂 = 0, 
firms can get away with severance payment through wage reduction. In this case changes in 𝐵𝑛 
has no effect on job creation as 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
= 0. 
 
The impact of fixed separation cost 𝛼 on market tightness, 𝜃: 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝛼
= −
(1 − 𝛽)𝛿𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽 + 𝜇(𝑟 + 𝛿)](1 − 𝜁)𝑐
< 0.                                                                      (𝐴8) 
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The impact of recruitment subsidy 𝜁 on market tightness, 𝜃: 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
(1 − 𝛽){𝑦𝑛 − 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) − 𝑏}𝜃𝑞(𝜃)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝛽 + 𝜇(𝑟 + 𝛿)](1 − 𝜁)2𝑐
).                                      (𝐴9) 
The above shows that, provided 𝑦𝑛 > 𝛿(𝛼 + 𝜂𝐵𝑛) + 𝑏, 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
 is unambiguously positive (
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0).  
 
The impact of recruitment subsidy 𝜁 on the share of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙: 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜁
) =                                                                                                                                       
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜆1 [
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁  
𝜕𝜙
 𝜕𝜃
(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽) + 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
𝜙𝛽𝛾(1 − 𝛾)]
|𝐴|1(1 − 𝛾)(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
).  (𝐴10) 
Denominator is positive since |𝐴|1 > 0. However, since 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0, 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
< 0 and 
𝜕𝜙
 𝜕𝜃
> 0, the sign of 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜁
 is ambiguous. (We discuss this further in the text.) 
 
The effect of severance compensation 𝐵𝑠 on the share of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙: 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝐵𝑠
= − 
 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
(1 − 𝛾)𝛿𝜂(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
|𝐴|1
> 0.                                                       (𝐴11) 
The above equation is unambiguously positive since 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
< 0.  
 
The impact of 𝐵𝑛 on the share of low-tech vacancies, 𝜙: 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝐵𝑛
) =                                                                                                                          
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
[(𝑟 + 𝛿) + (1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽]𝛿𝜂  +   
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛 (  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃 𝜆2  +   
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾 𝜆3 )
|𝐴|1
  ) , (𝐴12) 
where, 𝜆2 =
(𝑟+𝛿){𝑦𝑛−𝛿(𝛼+𝜂𝐵𝑛)−𝑏}
(1−𝛾)
> 0, by assumption. Also, by virtue of (22), in the text, 𝜆3 =
(1 − 𝛾){𝑦𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛}(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
𝜙𝛽 > 0. As the denominator of the above is positive, 
|𝐴|1 > 0, the sign of the derivation depends on the numerator. But given that, 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
 < 0,  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃
> 0 
and 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝛾
< 0, then 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝐵𝑛
 is somewhat ambiguous. 
 
The effect of severance compensation 𝐵𝑠 on the share of unskilled unemployed workers, 𝛾: 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝐵𝑠
= −
(1 − 𝛾)𝛿𝜂(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
  |𝐴|1
< 0.                                                               (𝐴13) 
The above equation is unambiguously negative, since |𝐴|1 > 0.  
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The effect of subsidy 𝜁 on the share of unskilled unemployed workers 𝛾: 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕γ
𝜕𝜁
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁 [
(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
𝜙𝛽 +  
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃 𝜃𝑞
(𝜃)𝛽] 𝛾𝜆1
|A|1(𝑟 + 𝛿 + 𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽)
).                                    (𝐴14) 
The equation above is unambiguously positive since  𝜆1 > 0,   
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0 and 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃
> 0. 
 
The impact of severance compensation 𝐵𝑛 on the share of unskilled unemployed workers 𝛾:  
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝐵𝑛
) =                                                                                                                                        
 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛(
[(𝑟 + 𝛿) + (1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑞(𝜃)𝜙𝛽]𝛿𝜂 + 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛 𝜆4 (
(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
𝜙𝛽 + 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃  𝜃𝑞
(𝜃)𝛽)
|𝐴|1
) , (𝐴15) 
where 𝜆4 = (1 − 𝛾){𝑦
𝑠 − 𝛿𝜂(𝐵𝑠 − 𝐵𝑛) − 𝑦𝑛} > 0. The first term of the numerator is positive, 
but due to the impact of 𝐵𝑛 on job creation (
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
< 0) and the fact that 
𝜕𝜙
𝜕𝜃
> 0, the second term 
is negative, which makes 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝐵𝑛
 difficult to sign.  
2A.4 Effects of Policies on Unemployment Rate 
From equation (16) in the text we know that 𝑢 = 𝑢[𝜃(𝐵𝑛 , 𝜁, 𝛼, 𝑋𝑖), 𝛾(𝐵
𝑛 , 𝐵𝑠, 𝜁, 𝛼, 𝑋𝑖)], where 𝜃 
and 𝛾 are two intermediate variables directly determining 𝑢, but dependent on policy instruments 
as well as other exogenous variables, 𝑋𝑖 . Again, we focus on the effect of each policy, setting all 
variations in 𝑋𝑖 = 0. Using (16) we first show that, 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜃
= −
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))
′
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿]2(1 − 𝛾)
< 0.                                                                                             (𝐴16) 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝛾
=
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿](1 − 𝛾)2
> 0.                                                                                                 (𝐴17) 
  
The effect of severance compensation 𝐵𝑛 on unemployment rate, u:  
Evaluation takes the form, 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐵𝑛
=
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
+
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝐵𝑛
.                                                                                                
which can be rewritten as, 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐵𝑛
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
(𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿)(1 − 𝛾)2
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝐵𝑛
−
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))′
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿]2(1 − 𝛾)
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
) . (𝐴18) 
Since 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑛
< 0, the last term on the right-hand-side is positive. However, due to the ambiguous 
sign of 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝐵𝑛
 in (A15), the overall effect of 𝐵𝑛 on 𝑢 is also ambiguous. 
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The effect of severance compensation 𝐵𝑠 on unemployment rate, 𝑢: 
This is evaluated using 
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐵𝑠
=
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑠
+
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝐵𝑠
. However, since 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝐵𝑠
= 0 we have,  
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝐵𝑠
=
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
(𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿)(1 − 𝛾)2
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝐵𝑠
< 0.                                                                             (𝐴19) 
As equation (A13) is negative, the above is also negative. 
 
The effect of recruitment subsidy 𝜁 on unemployment rate, 𝑢:  
Combing relevant terms yields 
𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝜕𝑢
𝜕𝜁
) = 𝑠𝑖𝑔𝑛 (
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)
(𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿)(1 − 𝛾)2
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝜁
−
𝛿(1 − 𝑝)(𝜃𝑞(𝜃))′
[𝜃𝑞(𝜃) + 𝛿]2(1 − 𝛾)
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
).          (𝐴20) 
As 
𝜕𝜃
𝜕𝜁
> 0, the last term in the bracket is negative, suggesting that unemployment is decreasing 
in recruitment subsidy. However, since the first term on the right-hand-side is positive as 
𝜕𝛾
𝜕𝜁
> 0, 
which implies that unemployment is increasing, the overall impact of subsidy on unemployment 
is ambiguous. 
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2B Tables and Figures 
Table 2.1: Match output 
                 Jobs 
Workers  Low-tech (type n) High-tech (type s) 
Unskilled (type l) 𝑥𝑙
𝑛 = 𝑦𝑛 𝑥𝑙
𝑠 = 0 
Skilled (type h) 𝑥ℎ
𝑛 = 𝑦𝑛 𝑥ℎ
𝑠 = 𝑦𝑠 
 
 
Table 2.2: Baseline calibration 
Parameters Value Source 
 𝛽 0.5 Pissarides (2000) 
 𝜇 μ = β Hosios (1990) 
 𝑏 0.1 AV-02  
 𝑟 0.05 AV-02 
 𝑐 0.5 Dolado et al. (2009) 
 𝑝 2/3 See text 
 𝛿 0.2 Dolado et al. (2009) 
 𝑦𝑠 1.4 See text 
 𝑦𝑛 1 AV-02 
 𝜒 2 See text 
𝐵𝑠 = 𝐵𝑛 = 𝜂 = 𝛼 = 𝜁 0 See text 
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Table 2.3: Comparative statics 
  𝜽 𝜸 𝝓 𝒖𝒍 𝒖𝒉 𝒖 𝒘𝒍
𝒏 𝒘𝒉
𝒏 𝒘𝒉
𝒔  𝜽𝒒(𝜽) 𝝓𝜽𝒒(𝜽) 
𝜶
 
Bench. 1.4944 0.6975 0.8565 0.0872 0.0756 0.0833 0.9133 0.9474 1.1474 2.4449 2.0941 
0.1 1.4581 0.6989 0.8502 0.0888 0.0765 0.0847 0.8938 0.9306 1.1306 2.4151 2.0533 
0.25 1.4038 0.7010 0.8405 0.0913 0.0778 0.0868 0.8647 0.9056 1.1056 2.3696 1.9916 
0.5 1.3135 0.7048 0.8235 0.0958 0.0803 0.0906 0.8162 0.8646 1.0646 2.2921 1.8876 
𝑩
𝒏
 
Bench. 1.4944 0.6975 0.8565 0.0872 0.0756 0.0833 0.9133 0.9474 1.1474 2.4449 2.0941 
0.1 1.4762 0.7010 0.8412 0.0891 0.0760 0.0848 0.8825 0.9211 1.1461 2.4300 2.0441 
0.25 1.4491 0.7060 0.8190 0.0921 0.0767 0.0870 0.8365 0.8816 1.1441 2.4075 1.9718 
0.5 1.4038 0.7140 0.7842 0.0972 0.0778 0.0907 0.7599 0.8160 1.1410 2.3696 1.8582 
𝑩
𝒔
 
Bench. 1.4944 0.6975 0.8565 0.0872 0.0756 0.0833 0.9133 0.9474 1.1474 2.4449 2.0941 
0.1 1.4944 0.6947 0.8692 0.0860 0.0756 0.0826 0.9143 0.9426 1.1176 2.4449 2.1251 
0.25 1.4944 0.6902 0.8892 0.0842 0.0756 0.0814 0.9159 0.9362 1.0737 2.4449 2.1739 
0.5 1.4944 0.6824 0.9253 0.0812 0.0756 0.0794 0.9185 0.9282 1.0032 2.4449 2.2622 
𝜻
 
Bench. 1.4944 0.6975 0.8565 0.0872 0.0756 0.0833 0.9133 0.9474 1.1474 2.4449 2.0941 
0.1 1.6763 0.7028 0.8341 0.0848 0.0717 0.0804 0.9154 0.9550 1.1550 2.5895 2.1597 
0.25 2.0427 0.7117 0.7968 0.0807 0.0654 0.0756 0.9190 0.9676 1.1676 2.8585 2.2776 
0.5 3.1559 0.7312 0.7205 0.0725 0.0533 0.0661 0.9265 0.9935 1.1935 3.5530 2.5598 
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Table 2.4: Labour market outcomes (fixed and flexible wage rates) 
 Model 𝜽 𝜸 𝝓 𝒖𝒍 𝒖𝒉 𝒖 
Bench (*) 
(1) (**) 1.4944 0.6975 0.8565 0.0872 0.0756 0.0833 
(2) (***) 1.4944 0.6975 0.8565 0.0872 0.0756 0.0833 
 𝛼 = 0.1 
(1) 1.4581 0.6989 0.8502 0.0888 0.0765 0.0847 
(2) 0.8668 0.7498 0.6316 0.1453  0.0970 0.1292 
 𝐵𝑛 = 0.1 
(1) 1.4762 0.7010 0.8412 0.0891 0.0760 0.0848 
(2) 0.6394 0.8021 0.4300 0.2253 0.1112 0.1873 
 𝐵𝑠 = 0.1 
(1) 1.4944 0.6947 0.8692 0.0860 0.0756 0.0826 
(2) 1.4544 0.6673 0.9967 0.0766 0.0768 0.0767 
ζ = 0.1 
(1) 1.6763 0.7028 0.8341 0.0848 0.0717 0.0804 
(2) 1.8449 0.6975 0.8576 0.0791 0.0686 0.0756 
*Benchmark results without policy 𝛼 = 𝐵𝑛 = 𝐵𝑠 = 𝜁 = 𝜂 = 0. 
** Results from model with flexible wage. 
** Results from model with Fixed wage. 
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Table 2.5: Robustness check 
    ys  yn 
    Var. 1.35 1.40 1.45 0.95 1 1.05 
𝑩𝒏 
0.1 
%∆𝑢 1.82 1.73 1.65 1.71 1.73 1.77 
%∆𝜙 -1.96 -1.79 -1.66 -1.69 -1.79 -1.93 
%∆𝛾 0.57 0.49 0.43 0.44 0.49 0.57 
%∆𝜃 -1.21 -1.21 -1.21 -1.29 -1.21 -1.15 
0.25 
%∆𝑢 4.60 4.36 4.17 4.32 4.36 4.47 
%∆𝜙 -4.78 -4.38 -4.06 -4.16 -4.38 -4.70 
%∆𝛾 1.41 1.22 1.07 1.07 1.22 1.41 
%∆𝜃 -3.03 -3.03 -3.03 -3.22 -3.03 -2.87 
𝑩𝒔 
 
0.1 
%∆𝑢 -1.04 -0.93 -0.85 -0.85 -0.93 -1.03 
%∆𝜙 1.68 1.48 1.33 1.34 1.48 1.67 
%∆𝛾 -0.49 -0.41 -0.35 -0.34 -0.41 -0.49 
%∆𝜃 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
0.25 
%∆𝑢 -2.62 -2.35 -2.13 -2.14 -2.35 -2.60 
%∆𝜙 4.34 3.81 3.40 3.43 3.81 4.32 
%∆𝛾 -1.25 -1.04 -0.89 -0.88 -1.04 -1.26 
%∆𝜃 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
 𝜶 
0.1 
%∆𝑢 1.59 1.61 1.62 1.73 1.61 1.50 
%∆𝜙 -0.72 -0.74 -0.76 -0.81 -0.74 -0.67 
%∆𝛾 0.21 0.20 0.19 0.20 0.20 0.20 
%∆𝜃 -2.43 -2.43 -2.43 -2.58 -2.43 -2.29 
0.25 
%∆𝑢 4.11 4.15 4.18 4.46 4.15 3.87 
%∆𝜙 -1.82 -1.87 -1.92 -2.07 -1.87 -1.70 
%∆𝛾 0.53 0.51 0.49 0.52 0.51 0.50 
%∆𝜃 -6.06 -6.06 -6.06 -6.43 -6.06 -5.73 
𝜻 
0.1 
%∆𝑢 -3.54 -3.51 -3.48 -3.48 -3.51 -3.54 
%∆𝜙 -2.65 -2.62 -2.59 -2.58 -2.62 -2.66 
%∆𝛾 0.79 0.75 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.80 
%∆𝜃 12.17 12.17 12.17 12.21 12.17 12.15 
0.25 
%∆𝑢 -9.33 -9.26 -9.19 -9.19 -9.26 -9.34 
%∆𝜙 -7.05 -6.97 -6.90 -6.88 -6.97 -7.06 
%∆𝛾 2.15 2.04 1.94 1.91 2.04 2.18 
%∆𝜃 36.69 36.69 36.69 36.79 36.69 36.60 
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Figure 2.1: Joint determination of 𝜽 and 𝜸 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 𝑉𝑠(𝜃, 𝛾) = 0 
 𝑉𝑛(𝜃, 𝛾) = 0 
θ* 
 
 
γ* 
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Chapter 3. Fiscal and Labour Market Policies in a General Equilibrium Model with 
Search and Matching Frictions 
3.1 Introduction 
The economic crisis that began in 2007/2008 attracted extensive attention in the literature, both 
because of the suddenness in output collapse and the consequent rise in unemployment rate 
across countries and because of the governments’ aggressive fiscal response used to stimulate 
aggregate demand and foster job creation. In the US, the GDP contracted substantially with the 
unemployment rate rising to a record high, since the 1980s, of approximately 10 percent in 2009. 
To restore economic activities, the US government signed into law the American Recovery and 
Reinvestment Act, designed to appropriate financial packages to stabilise economic activity by 
stimulating aggregate demand. As documented by Ahrens (2009) and ILO (2009), approximately 
1.4 percent of the world’s GDP was directed towards fiscal stimulus packages, with countries 
such as Germany and Spain respectively spending roughly 2.8 and 0.9 percent of the country’s 
GDP.1  
At the same time, several labour market measures and reforms have been implemented 
across different countries. Notable examples are the US Hiring Incentive to Restore Employment 
Act signed into law in March 2010 to provide incentives for firms to increase hiring and the 
extension of benefits insurance policy from 26 to 99 weeks to provide income support for the 
unemployed (Hagedorn, Karahan, Manovskii, & Mitman, 2015). Other countries like Spain 
whose unemployment rate more than doubled (from approximately 9 to 25 percent) between the 
first quarter of 2008 and the same quarter in 2014, equally employed alternative policy measures 
to combat rising unemployment. In both 2010 and 2012 the Spanish government engaged in a 
comprehensive labour market reforms that led to the reduction of monetary compensation for 
(sudden) unfair dismissal and the removal of additional cost incurred by firms between the 
effective date of dismissal and the final court ruling, thus giving firms better flexibility (OECD, 
2014). In Ireland, the government introduced subsidies to encourage employment as well as cut 
down on unemployment insurance benefits per unemployed worker, all aimed at reducing the 
country’s unemployment rate which had also increased to about 12 percent in 2009 from 5 
percent in 2007 (Heyes, 2013). 
While many recent studies have examined the effects of fiscal policies on economic 
outcomes, there remains little consensus on their effectiveness. This is in part due to the difficulty 
of isolating the direct effects of fiscal stimuli on economic variables (Batini et al., 2014). 
Empirical studies suggest that the degree of impact of fiscal spending depends on several factors 
(Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2013; Blanchard & Leigh, 2013; Corsetti, Meier, & Muller, 2012; 
Ilzetzki, Mendoza, & Végh, 2013; Kwan, 2007, among others). For example, Blanchard and 
                                                             
1 See Ahrens (2009) for further evidence of fiscal stimulus packages undertaken by 32 national governments across 
the world. 
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Leigh find that the initial level of household debt, among other variables, significantly influences 
the outcome of fiscal spending, contending that the forecast errors at the early stage of the crisis 
were principally due to poor estimation of fiscal multipliers. Using a dataset for 44 countries 
(consisting of developed and developing countries), Ilzetzki et al. find that factors such as the 
exchange rate system and degree of openness play a fundamental role in shaping the effects of 
fiscal multipliers. In their paper, Corsetti et al. find that the level of public finance (among other 
factors) matters for fiscal multipliers. Kwan finds that if public and private consumptions are 
highly substitutable, government spending is likely to result in a negative output multiplier. 
Labour market rigidities have also been identified as determining the size of fiscal multipliers 
(Auerbach & Gorodnichenko, 2013; Batini et al., 2014). 
From the theoretical front, the assessment of the effects of fiscal policies also remains 
contentious. Using a model with monopolistic competition, Molana and Zhang (2001) 
demonstrates that an increase in fiscal spending can generate an output multiplier larger than if 
the degree of firms’ market power is allowed to adjust. The authors show that, via its aggregate 
demand effect, an increase in fiscal consumption expenditure leads to a reduction in firms’ 
market power, which, in turn, increases market participation and the multiplier effect of fiscal 
expansion. Comparing government expenditure and tax cut, Fernández-Villaverde (2010) shows 
that, in the presence of financial frictions, an increase in the former is likely to be more effective 
in boosting economic activities. The nature of offsetting fiscal instruments also affects the 
effectiveness of fiscal policies (Baxter & King, 1993; Burnside, Eichenbaum, & Fisher, 2004; 
Uhlig, 2010). In particular, Baxter and King demonstrate that the distortionary effect of income 
tax can lead to negative output multiplier compared to traditional lump-sum tax financing. 
Besides concentrating on the output (and passively on the labour market) effect of fiscal 
expansion, a common shortcoming of these studies is the assumption of a perfect labour market, 
which disregards the issue of unemployment –  one of the greatest consequences of the last 
economic crisis (Bova, Kolerus, & Tapsoba, 2015; Salgado, Figari, Sutherland, & Tumino, 
2014). 
Several recent studies papers have attempted to fill this gap by explicitly considering the 
labour market effects of fiscal policies and how its structure drives fiscal multipliers (Cantore et 
al., 2014; Faia, Lechthaler, & Merkl, 2013; Mayer, Moyen, & Stähler, 2010; Monacelli et al., 
2010; Yuan & Li, 2000). Monacelli et al. study the transmission mechanisms of government 
consumption spending in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model with search 
and matching friction in the labour market. They show that the surplus of a job match plays a 
key role in determining the labour market impacts of fiscal policy shock. In particular, the show 
that an increase in government consumption spending leads to an increase in the match surplus 
and, in turn, induces firms to create more vacancies. The consequent tightening in the labour 
market leads to higher job finding rate and employment, but the implied fiscal multiplier effects 
are small. Mayer et al. also find small multiplier effect on unemployment but argues that a 
positive shock to government consumption can only result in a higher job creation and 
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employment if the shock is highly persistent. Campolmi et al. (2011a) and Brückner and Pappa 
(2012) extend their models to include labour force participation. The latter conclude that fiscal 
spending induces labour participation which can potentially lead to a higher unemployment. By 
contrast, Campolmi et al., (2011a) find that labour participation plays a limited role in shaping 
the effects of fiscal stimulus. They show further that even when financed by lump-sum taxes, 
government consumption spending can potentially lead to a negative employment multiplier. 
Cantore et al. emphasise the roles of model features (deep habits and the structure of production 
technology) in producing large fiscal multiplier which matches empirical estimates. 
The role of the labour market in shaping economic performance has been emphasised in 
the literature (Nickell & Layard, 1999; Walsh, 2005). Consequently, policies associated with the 
market influence the extent to which shocks impact on economic variables, including labour 
market variables such as unemployment, vacancy creation rate among others (Auerbach & 
Gorodnichenko, 2013; Pissarides, 2001). Most researchers (e.g. Blanchard & Wolfers, 2000; 
Nickell, et al., 2005, among others) argue that the heterogeneity in labour market institutions in 
countries like the US and those in the EU can explain the existence of persistently high 
unemployment rate in the latter; while the US is known for its market flexibility, most EU 
countries are characterised by strict labour policies which bring about market rigidity – the so-
called Eurosclerosis. In the presence of search and matching frictions, the responses of labour 
market variables and the economy as a whole to aggregate shocks depend on several important 
factors, including the (i) the workers’ valuation of unemployment, (ii) the ability of firms to 
terminate employment contract without incurring huge cost of separation, and (iii) the size of a 
match surplus which drives firms’ vacancy creation decision. These, in turn, depend crucially on 
the nature of regulations governing the labour market. When these regulations are unfavourable 
(rigid) they significantly alter the way the labour market adjusts to shocks (Blanchard, Jaumotte, 
& Loungani, 2013). 
The purpose of this chapter is to study the effects of fiscal policies on the labour market. 
In particular, we investigate how labour market institutions affect the long-run structure of the 
economy and the channels through which this shapes the transmission of fiscal policies. To this 
end, we construct a real business cycle DSGE2 model with labour market frictions (Pissarides, 
2000). We consider labour market institutions in the form of firing penalty (that incorporates a 
                                                             
2 Generally, there are two main classes of DSGE models that introduce search and matching friction in the labour 
market: the New Keynesian (NK) (Blanchard & Galí, 2010; Krause & Lubik, 2007; Walsh, 2005; Zanetti, 2011) 
and the real business cycle (RBC) (Andolfatto, 1996; Burda & Weder, 2016; Krause & Lubik, 2010; Merz, 1995; 
Monacelli et al., 2010; Yuan & Li, 2000). The key difference between these two classes of models is their emphasis 
on the sources and the propagation mechanisms of shocks (Duarte, 2015). However, as noted by Uhlig (2010), the 
long run characteristics of typical NK and RBC models are almost the same. DSGE models are often criticised for 
the complexity of their solutions (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2016; Flotho, 2009). Although we do not consider 
this since we interested in fiscal policies and labour market frictions, the models have also been criticised for not 
incorporating financial frictions (García, 2011). Despite these, DSGE models continue to serve as powerful tools 
for modern macroeconomics within policy and academic environments (Sbordone et al., 2010; Tovar, 2009).  
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fixed firing cost and severance transfer to workers), unemployment insurance benefits and 
distortionary labour tax. In contrast with many existing studies, we distinguish between 
traditional government expenditure and labour market-oriented policies. The latter consists of 
recruitment and employment tax subsidies (active labour market policy (ALMP) measures 
deployed during the crisis period).3 While recruitment subsidies are channelled towards reducing 
the cost of vacancy creation, tax subsidies are granted only when job matches have been 
consummated with a view to reducing labour costs. Furthermore, we allow for utility-enhancing 
as opposed to wasteful government consumption along the line proposed by, e.g., Aschauer 
(1985), Molana and Zhang (2001) and Kwan (2007). 
The model features two vertically integrated production sectors (an intermediate and final 
good sector). The intermediate sector, characterised by a monopolistically competitive structure 
in its product market, produces horizontally differentiated goods using capital and labour factor 
inputs. The recruitment of workers is time consuming and costly as reflected by search and 
matching frictions. Employment is modelled to adjust both at intensive (hours worked per 
worker) and extensive (number of workers employed) margins to enable us to capture 
government spending effects on the labour market as emphasised by Yuan and Li (2000). 
Differentiated goods are assembled by the final good sector to produce homogenous final good 
used by the household and government for consumption purposes as well as for capital 
formation. We adopt the representative household construct of Andolfatto (1996) and Merz 
(1995) and assume that members of this household pool their recourses to insure each other 
against earning uncertainty. The household maximises its utility by choosing the paths for 
consumption and capital stock. Capital serves a dual purpose as a store of wealth for the 
household and as a productive factor. The government sets rules regarding employment and has 
to satisfy a balanced budget each period. It raises revenue through taxes levied on labour and 
other household incomes and the penalties imposed on firms upon job separations. These are in 
turn spent on own consumption, active labour market policies and the provision of social 
protections for the unemployed through unemployment benefits insurance. 
We examine the long-run and dynamic properties of the model numerically. We find that, 
in the long-run, through their effects on cost hiring, ALMPs improve economic activity, whereas 
higher rigidities in the labour market reduce it. Government consumption spending also raises 
economic activity through its aggregate demand effect, resulting in increased hiring and lower 
unemployment. The effectiveness of this, however, depends on the degree of substitutability 
between private and government consumption. Specifically, we find that when associated with 
higher degree of substitutability the impact of a rise in government consumption spending on 
output and job creation reduces. The reason is that, by raising private utility, the household 
spends less on consumption as government consumption spending rises. Thus, the increase in 
                                                             
3 Faia, Lechthaler, and Merkl (2013) emphasised the fact that large percentage of fiscal stimulus policies utilised 
during the last economic crisis were channelled towards job creation 
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the latter is partly offset by the decrease in the former, reducing the impact on aggregate demand 
and the incentives for hiring. 
We argue that if labour market institutions are rigid, the incentives to create vacancies 
and supply more hours to work per employee are enhanced in response to government 
consumption expansion. The central mechanism underlying these results is the effects of the 
individual labour market policies on the initial sizes of match surplus and the household’s budget 
(or the disposal income (HDI)). By increasing the cost of employment and reducing productivity, 
higher rigidity leads to a decrease in the sizes of match surplus and HDI, making firms and 
households more sensitive to shocks. The idea is that – for the firms – when the size of match 
surplus is small, a positive shock which raises productivity leads to a larger percentage increase 
the values of a match (Hagedorn & Manovskii, 2008; Hornstein, et al., 2005; Shimer, 2005). 
This requires that vacancies – and by implication, hiring – must adjust more rapidly to equalise 
the value of creating an additional vacancy to the marginal cost of creating the vacancy. Thus, 
the resulting effect is a rapid adjustment in vacancy creation which in turn leads to a more 
dramatic response in extensive margin employment. The ultimate impact on output now depends 
on how each institution shapes the responses of capital accumulation and hours supplied per 
worker to the government consumption expansion. Given that higher rigidity also reduces the 
HDI in the long-run, the decrease in consumption and capital are larger, in percentage terms, 
following a positive government consumption shock, as the household anticipates an additional 
increase in tax obligations. The decrease in consumption further amplifies supply of hours per 
worker. Thus, even though the response of capital accumulation is weakened, the stronger 
response in intensive and extensive margins of employment sustains output response. In terms 
of its influence on shock propagation, we find that severance compensation has virtually the 
same effect, quantitatively, as fixed firing cost.4 However, when compared to the effects of 
benefits insurance and distortionary tax on the transmission of shocks, both are quantitatively 
small. 
Finally, we compare the labour market effects of lump-sum vs distortionary labour tax-
financed fiscal spending. Our result suggests that, regardless of the financing option, only labour 
market-oriented fiscal spending instruments remain effective in boosting employment compared 
to the traditional fiscal expenditure. Government consumption expansion produces negative 
output and employment multipliers when financed by a distortionary tax, in line with Campolmi 
et al. (2011a). Our results also show that, in the presence of rigid institution, recruitment subsidy 
is the only potent fiscal instrument that can generate output and employment multipliers that are 
above unity. Another finding from this study is that the presence of distortionary labour tax 
magnifies severance deduction from wage, whereas the strengthening of worker bargaining 
power reduces it. And provided there is some degree of strictness in its enforcement, severance 
                                                             
4  Zanetti (2011a) show that fixed separation cost has significant implications for the volatility of output and 
employment in a study which focuses on the transmission of monetary policy shocks. 
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compensation can have real implication for job creation decision within a general equilibrium 
model, especially in the long run.  
Our study closely relates to Monacelli et al. (2010) and Yuan and Li (2000). Monacelli 
et al., however, excludes the intensive margin of employment, which turns out to be an important 
channel through which the effects of government spending shocks can be transmitted. While 
Yuan and Li consider the intensive margin employment in their framework, they assume that its 
supply is determined at the household level. Instead, we let firms and their employees negotiate 
over the hours supply in line with recent studies (for example, Trigari, 2006; Faccini et al., 2013). 
This study also complements Campolmi et al. (2011b). However, that study ignores the 
implications of capital which provides an additional channel for the propagation of shocks 
(Baxter & King, 1993; den Haan, Ramey, & Watson, 2000; Heer & Maußner, 2010; Monacelli 
et al., 2010). Lastly, because this chapter offers further explanations about the influence of 
institutions on the dynamics of an economy, it contributes to the literature on labour market 
rigidities, such as Zanetti (2011a) and Dabusinskas, Konya, and Millard (2016). However, while 
Zanetti focuses on how institutions shape monetary policy transmission mechanisms, 
Dabusinskas et al. emphasise the implications of labour market rigidity for financial shock within 
an open economy framework. 
The remaining part of this chapter proceeds as follows: Section 3.2 presents the baseline 
DSGE model frictional search and matching labour market. In sections 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 we 
discuss the market clearing conditions, model calibration strategy and the role of match surplus. 
The steady state (long-run) properties of the model and the dynamic results are presented in 
sections 3.6 and 3.7. In Section 3.7, we consider the effects of labour market institutions on shock 
propagation, the role of subsidies and substitutability between private and public consumption, 
and effects of alternative government financing options on the economy as well as fiscal 
multipliers. The final section (3.8) concludes this chapter.  
3.2 The Model 
The main structure of the model economy closely follows Faccini et al. (2013), Krause and Lubik 
(2010) and Trigari (2006). However, unlike these authors, we concentrate on labour market 
institutions and fiscal stimulus policies. The choice of this model is driven by the fact that 
employment can be studied both at intensive (hours per worker) and extensive (number of 
employed workers) margin, unlike most other papers that focus solely on extensive margin. The 
economy we model here is made up of four types of agents: a representative household, two 
vertically integrated production sectors (an intermediate and final good sector) and a 
government. The household consumes, saves through investment in capital and supplies labour. 
The final good sector produces a unique final output using intermediate varieties as inputs. The 
final output is sold in a competitive market to the household for consumption and investment 
purposes and to the government for its consumption. The Intermediate sector has monopoly 
power in the product market and seeks to maximise profits employing workers and renting 
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capital for the production of intermediate varieties. The hiring of workers is costly and time-
consuming in the sense of search and matching frictions and job matches are dissolved at a 
constant rate determined exogenously (Hall, 2005). We assume full labour market participation 
so that workers who lose their jobs immediately commences search (Blanchard & Gali, 2010), 
rather than wait until next period (Dabusinskas et al., 2016). Both wages and hours worked by 
employed are determined through efficient Nash bargain (Trigari, 2006). The government 
implements employment policies through the provision of active labour market policies and 
unemployment benefits insurance and consumes final good, which is assumed to enhance 
household utility. It operates a balanced budget and finances its expenditures using revenues 
generated through taxes levied on labour and other household incomes and the penalties imposed 
on firms upon job separations. 
3.2.1 The Representative Household 
We model a representative household composed of a continuum of members whose measure is 
normalised to one. The household members are either employed or unemployed. We assume that 
at any given time 𝑡 a share  𝑁𝑡 of the household members are employed by firms. Normalising 
the number of firms to unity and denoting by 𝑛𝑖𝑡 the number of workers employed in firm 𝑖 ∈
[0,1], it follows that 𝑁𝑡 = ∫ 𝑛𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖 in each period. In line with the literature (Andolfatto, 1996; 
Merz, 1995), we assume members of household completely insure each other against earning 
uncertainty and unemployment risks.5 The household is assumed to have an infinite lifespan6 
and its objective is to maximise an expected lifetime utility, given by 
𝐸𝑡 ∑ 𝛽
𝑠 [
(𝐶𝑡+𝑠
𝑒 )1−𝛼𝑐
1 − 𝛼𝑐
 −  𝐴∫
𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠 ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠
1+𝛼ℎ
1 + 𝛼ℎ
1
0
𝑑𝑖]
∞
𝑠=0
,                                                                    (1) 
where 𝐸𝑡 represents the conditional expectation operator (based on information available at time 
𝑡 ). The parameters 𝛽 ∈ [0,1]  and 𝐴 > 0  respectively represent the household’s subjective 
discount factor and the measure of the disutility of working. 1 𝛼𝑐⁄  captures the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution and 𝛼ℎ > 0 is the inverse of the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. The 
variable ℎ𝑖𝑡 is the hours supplied per worker at firm 𝑖. The household is assumed to derive utility 
from government consumption (Kollintzas & Vassilatos, 2000; Molana & Zhang, 2001). Thus, 
𝐶𝑡+𝑠
𝑒 = 𝐶𝑡+𝑠 + 𝜑𝐺𝑡+𝑠 represents the effective household consumption, where 𝐶𝑡  and 𝐺𝑡 denote 
household (private) and government (public) consumptions, respectively. The measure  0 <
𝜑 < 1 is the degree of substitutability that governs the extent to which the household directly 
derives utility for a given level of government consumption. When 𝜑 = 0  government 
consumption spending is interpreted as wasteful from the viewpoint of the household as it yields 
                                                             
5  This assumption enables us to circumvent the complications which could arise due to heterogeneity among 
members. The aggregate number of the unemployed is defined below. 
6 See Chapter 2, page 18, of this thesis for the justification of this assumption. 
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no utility, and 𝜑 = 1 implies that both household and government consumptions are perfect 
substitutes.7  
Since all members pool their incomes, at any time 𝑡 + 𝑠 , the intertemporal budget 
constraint of the household is given by 
𝐶𝑡+𝑠 + 𝐼𝑡+𝑠 + 𝑇𝑡+𝑠 = ∫ 𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠(1 − 𝜏𝑡+𝑠)𝑤𝑖𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝑑𝑖
1
0
  
+(1 − 𝑁𝑡+𝑠)𝑏𝑡+𝑠 +  𝜂𝑁𝑡+𝑠𝐵 + 𝑁𝑡+𝑠𝜁𝑡+𝑠
𝑤 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠𝐾𝑡+𝑠 + 𝛱𝑡+𝑠,           (2) 
where 𝐼𝑡, 𝛱𝑡 and 𝐾𝑡 denote household’s investment, capital stock and profit income, ∫ 𝑛𝑖𝑡(1 −
1
0
𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖  and (1 − 𝑛𝑡)𝑏𝑡  are real after-tax labour income and unemployment benefits 
received by the aggregate household members who are left unemployed in at time  𝑡, 𝑟𝑡 is the 
real return rate on capital held during time 𝑡. The policy instruments 𝑇𝑡  and 𝜏𝑡 represent lump 
sum tax and the tax rate on labour income (distortionary tax). We assume that a worker whose 
employment is severed at time 𝑡 receives severance compensation, 𝐵, from the firm where he or 
she was employed. Both 𝐵 and 𝜏 are common to all workers. Therefore, the aggregate severance 
compensation received by the fraction of household members who lost their job at any time  𝑡 is 
𝜂𝑁𝑡𝐵 ; where 𝜂 > 0  denotes an exogenous job separation rate (Faccini, Millard, & Zanetti, 
2013). Additionally, following Pissarides (2000) and Zanetti (2011b), we assume that each 
employed worker receives tax subsidy given by 𝜁𝑡
𝑤 so that  𝜁𝑡
𝑤𝑁𝑡  is the total sum received by 
household members in employment.8 Capital stock evolves according to  
𝐾𝑡+𝑠+1 = 𝐼𝑡+𝑠 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+𝑠,                                                                                                   (3) 
where 𝛿  is the constant capital depreciation rate. 
Given the above, the household’s chooses the optimal paths of consumption and capital 
stock  {𝐶𝑡+𝑠,  𝐾𝑡+𝑠+1}𝑠=0
∞  in order to maximise the utility subject to the budget constraint taking 
account of the definition of effective consumption and the law of motion for capital, and treating 
as given: the initial value of capital  𝐾0; policy instruments {𝑇𝑡+𝑠, 𝜏𝑡+𝑠, 𝑏𝑡+𝑠, 𝜁𝑡+𝑠
𝑤 }𝑠=0
∞ ; aggregate 
profits received from firms  {𝛱𝑡+𝑠}𝑠=0
∞ ; real wage and real interest rate   {𝑤𝑡+𝑠, 𝑟𝑡+𝑠}𝑠=0
∞ , and the 
hours supplied per worker {ℎ𝑡+𝑠}𝑠=0
∞ . Denoting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the 
household’s budget constraint by  Λ𝑡 , the first order conditions resulting from maximisation, 
setting 𝑠 = 0, are given by 
Λ𝑡  =   (𝐶𝑡 + 𝜑𝐺𝑡)
−𝛼𝑐  ,                                                                                                               (4) 
Λ𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡[Λ𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝛿)].                                                                                                (5) 
Equations (4) and (5) respectively describe the representative household’s marginal 
utility of the effective consumption and the standard Euler condition governing the optimal 
consumption path. For later use it is convenient to define  𝑅𝑡+𝑠 ≡ 1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠 − 𝛿, the real payoff 
of capital at time  𝑡 + 𝑠, and rewrite the Euler condition (5) as 1 = 𝐸𝑡[λ𝑡+𝑠𝑅𝑡+𝑠], where 𝜆𝑡+𝑠 =
                                                             
7 There is also a possibility that 𝜑 < 0, in which case government and private consumptions are assumed to be 
complement Kollintzas and Vassilatos (2000). 
8 Note that Pissarides (2000) and Zanetti (2011b) consider the effects of tax subsidy within partial equilibrium 
framework, unlike this model.  
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𝛽 ∏ (
𝛬𝑡+𝑗
𝛬𝑡+𝑗−1
)𝑠𝑗=1 ≡ 𝛽 (
𝛬𝑡+𝑠
𝛬𝑡
)  denotes the stochastic discount factor or the marginal rate of 
substitution of consumption which governs the rate at which the household is willing to substitute 
between consumption time 𝑡 and 𝑡 + 𝑠. 
3.2.2 The Final Good Sector 
We assume that this sector is perfectly competitive and uses all the varieties of the intermediate 
good as inputs to produce a unique final good, which can be used for household and government 
consumptions as well as for capital formation.9 For simplicity, the production of final output is 
done costlessly in the sense that it uses neither labour nor capital. The aggregate production 
function of the sector is represented by a constant returns to scale technology,  
𝑌𝑡 = [∫ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖]
ℰ𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
,                                                                                                               (6) 
where 𝑦𝑖𝑡  represents intermediate varieties indexed by 𝑖 ∈ [0,1] and ℰ𝑡 > 1 is the elasticity of 
substitution across input varieties, with a higher value of ℰ𝑡 implying greater substitutability. At 
any given time, the sector takes the price of final good 𝑃𝑡  and input variety prices  𝑝𝑖𝑡   as given 
and chooses 𝑦𝑖𝑡  to maximise its profit, given by 
Π𝑡
𝑌 = 𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑡 − ∫ 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖,                                                                                                           (7) 
subject to (6). Profit maximisation implies a downward sloping demand curve for each 
intermediate variety, 
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡
)
−ℰ𝑡
𝑌𝑡 .                                                                                                                         (8) 
Given perfect competition, profits are driven to zero in each period, Π𝑡
𝑌 = 0. The price 
index 𝑃𝑡  dual to (6) can, therefore, be derived as, 
𝑃𝑡 = [∫ 𝑝𝑖𝑡
(1−ℰ𝑡)
1
0
𝑑𝑖]
1
1−ℰ𝑡
.                                                                                                        (9) 
3.2.3 The Intermediate Sector (Labour Market) 
The labour market is characterised by search and matching frictions which describe job finding 
and vacancy filling activities of workers and firms. As is common within search literature, we 
let the meeting process between the job searching unemployed workers and vacancy filling firms 
be governed by a matching technology given by Cobb-Douglas function,  
𝑀 (𝑈𝑡 , 𝑉𝑡) = 𝜒𝑈𝑡
𝛾
𝑉𝑡
1−𝛾 ,                                                                                                           (10) 
                                                             
9 This is a standard approach in the literature, especially if one is interested in investigating the effects of demand 
or mark-up shock as in Lubik (2009) and Krause and Lubik (2010). It is possible to let the household directly 
aggregate the differentiated varieties for its consumption and investment purposes without the intermediation of the 
final good sector as in Krause and Lubik. Doing so, however, would not alter the qualitative nature of our results.  
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where 𝑉𝑡 = ∫ 𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0
 denotes aggregate vacancies, 𝜒 > 0 captures the efficiency of the matching 
process and 𝛾 > 0  is the elasticity of match with respect to unemployment. The aggregate 
number of job searching workers – formally defined later – at time 𝑡 is given 𝑈𝑡. The matching 
function exhibits the usual properties: increasing in both arguments, concave and homogeneous 
of degree one (Petrongolo & Pissarides, 2001; Pissarides, 2000). It is useful to define 𝜃𝑡 =
𝑉𝑡
𝑈𝑡
⁄  
the measure of the degree of market tightness. Using (10), the job market transition rates: the 
rate with which a firm with vacancy meets an unemployed worker (vacancy filling rate) and that 
an unemployed worker meets a vacant job (job finding rate) can be defined, respectively, as  
𝑞𝑡
𝑓
=  
𝑀 (𝑈𝑡 , 𝑉𝑡)
𝑉𝑡
= 𝜒𝜃𝑡
−𝛾 ,                                                                                                       (11) 
and 
𝑞𝑡
𝑤 =
𝑉𝑡
𝑈𝑡
𝑀 (𝑈𝑡 , 𝑉𝑡)
𝑉𝑡
= 𝜒𝜃𝑡
1−𝛾 .                                                                                                (12) 
Both the vacancy filling and the job finding rates depend solely on the degree of market 
tightness: 𝑑𝑞𝑡
𝑓
𝑑𝜃𝑡⁄ < 0  and 𝑑𝑞𝑡
𝑤 𝑑𝜃𝑡⁄ > 0 . The inverse of these rates, [𝑞𝑡
𝑓]
−1
 and [𝑞𝑡
𝑤]−1,  
respectively yield the mean duration of vacancies and unemployment spell. Both firms and 
workers take these probabilities as given. The dependence of 𝑞𝑓  and 𝑞𝑤  on 𝜃 generates 
externalities because it alters the meeting rate of other agents. In particular, for an additional 
unemployed worker (vacancy), more agents are searching on the same side of the market, thus 
creating congestion or negative externalities, since it reduces the probability of locating potential 
trading partners for other job seeking workers (vacancy filling firms). By contrast, when fewer 
agents are searching from the same side of the market, positive externalities arise because it 
increases the probability of being matched with a potential partner. As stressed by Hosios (1990) 
and Pissarides (2000), both the job seekers and firms ignore these externalities created by their 
actions, giving rise to inefficiency search. However, Hosios shows that by equating each party’s 
share of the surplus of a job match to their respective contributions to the matching is a sufficient 
condition for the two opposite externalities to cancel out.  
3.2.3.1 Demand Side in the Labour Market  
Labour is employed directly by firms producing the intermediate varieties.10 These firms operate 
under monopolistically competitive conditions in their product market, as governed by the 
horizontally differentiated nature of the varieties. During each period, firm 𝑖, 𝑖 ∈ [0,1], produces 
one variety using the following production function,  
                                                             
10 Another possibility is to allow for labour market intermediation, where an agency hires workers and sell their 
services to production sector (e.g. de Walque et al., 2009). Note that, either way, it can be shown that the conclusions 
reached in this these will not differ qualitatively. 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡  = 𝑧𝑡 (
𝑛𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜙
)
𝜙
(
𝑘𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝜙
)
1−𝜙
 ,                                                                                           (13) 
where 𝜙 ∈ (0,1) is the elasticity of output with respect to labour input, 𝑛𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 , and 𝑘𝑖𝑡  is the 
stock of capital used as input at firm 𝑖. The variable  𝑧𝑡 is the total factor productivity, assumed 
to be common to all firms and defined by an autoregressive process of order one (AR(1)): 
log𝑧𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧log𝑧𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑧𝑡,                                                                                                        (14) 
where  𝜌𝑧  ∈ (0,1) is an autoregressive parameter which measures the persistence of the AR(1) 
process and 𝜓𝑧𝑡  ~𝑊𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑧
2). The higher is the value of  𝜌𝑧, the more persistence is the AR 
process, and when  𝜌𝑧 = 1 the variance of productivity factor becomes infinite in which case the 
AR(1) process is non-stationary. 
We follow Blanchard and Galí (2010) and Faccini et al. (2013) and assume that newly-
matched workers become productive in the same period they are matched. This requires that, at 
any given point in time, employment at each firm evolves according to  
𝑛𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜂)𝑛𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝑞𝑡
𝑓
𝑣𝑖𝑡,                                                                                                  (15) 
where 𝑞𝑡
𝑓
𝑣𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑖(𝑢𝑖𝑡 , 𝑣𝑖𝑡)  is the number of new matches in firm i. As implied by equation (15), 
employment at any time period comprises of the workers who are already in employment and 
survive separation from the previous period, (1 − 𝜂)𝑛𝑖𝑡−1, and the new matches in the current 
period, 𝑞𝑡
𝑓
𝑣𝑖𝑡.  
To hire workers, each firm creates 𝑣𝑖𝑡 vacancies at fixed sunk cost 𝑥 > 0 measured in 
terms of the final good and pays real wage 𝑤𝑖𝑡   per employee for supplying ℎ𝑖𝑡 hours of work. 
Both 𝑤𝑖𝑡 and ℎ𝑖𝑡 are determined jointly by workers and the firms in a privately efficient way, 
through Nash bargaining solution. They are therefore taken as given when maximising profit 
(Faccini et al., 2013; Ravenna & Walsh, 2012; Trigari, 2006). Also, we assume that each firm 
faces the demand for its product given by equation (8). Given the price of final good, 𝑃𝑡, and the 
initial value of employment, the optimization problem of each firm is to choose that paths for 
variety price, number of vacancies, number of workers and the amount of capital stock, 
{ 𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝑠, 𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑠,  𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠, 𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝑠}𝑠=0
∞ , to maximise its present discounted value of expected profit given 
by 
𝑚𝑎𝑥𝐸𝑡 ∑λ𝑡+𝑠 [
 𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝑠
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
 𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑟𝑡+𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − (1 − 𝜁𝑡+𝑠
𝑉 )𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − 𝜂𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝐹𝑡+𝑠] ,
∞
𝑠=0
 
subject to the demand function (8), the production function (13) and the evolution of employment 
in (15), where λ𝑡+𝑠 = 𝛽𝛬𝑡+𝑠  𝛬𝑡⁄  represents the stochastic discount factor described in 
subsection 3.2.1. 
We assume each firm receives a common subsidy 𝜁𝑡
𝑉 from the government towards its 
vacancy creation and pays firing costs, 𝐹𝑡 = 𝑃𝐶𝑡  + 𝐵, for laying off workers. The latter consists 
of a procedural cost component paid to the government and the severance component paid to the 
worker that is laid off. The procedural cost, in turn, is made up of two components: a fixed cost 
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of separation and severance induced cost.11 Thus,  𝑃𝐶𝑡 = 𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵, where, 𝛼𝑓 > 0; 0 < 𝜂𝑤 <
1. In particular, 𝜂𝑤  can be thought as a measure of the strictness of EPL as in Boeri, Conde-
Ruiz, and Galasso (2012) or the degree of enforcement of EPL so that 𝜂𝑤 = 1 and 𝜂𝑤 = 0   
correspond to the extreme cases of maximum and no strictness in employment protection 
policies. 
Denoting by  𝐽𝑖𝑡  and by  𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡  the respective Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
constraints (15) and (13), the first order conditions, evaluated at 𝑠 = 0, are12 
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡
=
ℰ𝑡
ℰ𝑡 − 1
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                                      (16) 
 
(1 − 𝜁𝑡
𝑉)𝑥
𝑞𝑡
𝑓 =  𝐽𝑖𝑡 ,                                                                                                                         (17) 
 𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑡 (
𝑛𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜙
)
𝜙−1
(
𝑘𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝜙
)
1−𝜙
ℎ𝑖𝑡                                                                          
−𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝐹𝑡 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡λ𝑡+1 𝐽𝑖𝑡+1,                          (18) 
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑡 (
𝑛𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜙
)
𝜙
(
𝑘𝑖𝑡
1 − 𝜙
)
−𝜙
= 𝑟𝑡.                                                                                         (19) 
In the absence of price setting frictions, equation (16) represents the standard mark-up 
pricing rule for a monopolist facing a market demand with price elasticity ℰ𝑡. Thus, the Lagrange 
multiplier  𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 can be interpreted as the firm’s real ‘overall marginal cost’. Equation (17) shows 
that a firm posts the optimal number of vacancies 𝑣𝑖𝑡  that equalises the marginal hiring costs 
with the value of the marginal match. The value of the marginal match is given by (18) and 
depends on the marginal revenue product per worker,  𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜙 𝑦𝑖𝑡 𝑛𝑖𝑡⁄ , wage bill per 
worker, 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 , firing cost, 𝜂𝐹𝑡, and the continuation value of the job. Equation (19) has the 
standard implication that capital is employed until the value of its marginal product (the term on 
the left-hand-side) equalises its real rental rate (the term on the right-hand-side). 
Combining equations (17) and (18), we obtain  
(1 − 𝜁𝑡
𝑉)𝑥
𝑞𝑡
𝑓 =
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝐹𝑡 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡λ𝑡+1
(1 − 𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥
𝑞𝑡+1
𝑓 ,                        (20) 
which is the condition that characterises job creation decision of each firm. It states that at every 
point in time a firm expands employment (by creating vacancies) up to a point where the 
marginal contribution of an additional worker to the firm (right-hand-side) equals the marginal 
hiring or vacancy creation costs (the left-hand-side). 
                                                             
11 See Bentolila and Bertola (1990) and Garibaldi and Violante (1999) for detailed description of a typical firm’s 
firing cost components. 
12 See 3A.3 in Appendix 3 for the derivation. 
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3.2.3.2 Optimal Wage and Hours Contract   
As already noted, we assume that the real wage and hours per worker are determined through 
Nash bargaining solution. To facilitate these derivations, it is useful to define the marginal value 
of employment to a worker employed by firm 𝑖 as 13 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 + 𝜁𝑡
𝑤 − [𝑏𝑡 +
A(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
Λ𝑡
] + 𝜂𝐵                                                     
 
+(1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡λ𝑡+1[1 − 𝑞𝑡+1
𝑤 ]𝑊𝑖𝑡+1,                                            (21) 
where  
A(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
Λ𝑡
= 
𝐴ℎ
𝑖𝑡
1+𝛼ℎ
Λ𝑡(1+𝛼ℎ)
 is a measure of disutility of work. Equation (24) states that a worker’s 
return from employment with firm 𝑖 is given by the after-tax wage income adjusted to account 
for: (i) tax subsidy, (ii) the worker’s unemployment value, which is increasing in the utility of 
leisure (measured in terms of its consumption value) and unemployment benefits, and  given 
that the employment is subject to being terminated at a rate 𝜂  (iii) a weighted average of the 
severance compensation and the discounted continuation value of employment with weights 𝜂 
and (1 − 𝜂), respectively. 
Let  𝛷 ∈ [0,1], denote a worker’s relative bargain power. Since 𝐽𝑖𝑡  and 𝑊𝑖𝑡  are 
respectively the current marginal gains of employment to the firm and the worker, they 
correspond to their respective match surplus. The Nash solution to the firm-worker bargaining 
problem are then given by the real wage and hours per worker which maximise the weighted 
product of both party’s respective surpluses, i.e. 𝐽𝑖𝑡
(1−𝛷)
𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝛷 , subject to (18) and (21). The first 
order condition with respect to 𝑤𝑖𝑡 yields  
𝛷(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝐽𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝛷)𝑊𝑖𝑡 .                                                                                                    (22) 
The above condition (22) gives rise to the following effective surplus sharing relationships 
𝑊𝑖𝑡 =
𝛷(1 − 𝜏𝑡)
(1 − 𝛷𝜏𝑡)
(𝐽𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡)                                                                                                   (23) 
and 
𝐽𝑖𝑡 =
(1 − 𝛷)
(1 − 𝛷𝜏𝑡)
(𝐽𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡),                                                                                                    (24) 
for the worker and the firm, respectively (Pissarides, 2000, p. 210). As can be seen, distortionary 
tax, 𝜏𝑡, influences the division of the joint match surplus, 𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐽𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡. In particular, a ceteris 
paribus increase in 𝜏𝑡  reduces a worker’s and increases a firm’s share of the match surplus. 
However, as discussed later, 𝜏𝑡  reduces the joint surplus of a match and so both firms and 
workers are worse off.14  
By substituting equations (18) and (21) into the first order condition (22) and rearranging, 
we obtain the wage equation 
                                                             
13 This is also interpreted as the household’s net value of having an additional worker employed at firm 𝑖. 
14 See Pissarides (2000) and Vanhala (2006) for a similar effective surplus sharing rule. 
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𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷 (
𝑚𝑐𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝜂(𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵)) + 𝛷 ((1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆,𝑡+1
(1−𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥
𝑞𝑡+1
𝑓 ) ×  
 (1 − (1 − 𝑞𝑡+1
𝑤 )
(1−𝜏𝑡+1)
(1−𝜏𝑡)
) + (
1−𝛷
1−𝜏𝑡
) (𝑏𝑡 +
𝐴ℎ
𝑖𝑡
1+𝛼ℎ
Λ𝑡(1+𝛼ℎ)
− 𝜁𝑡
𝑤) −
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)𝜂𝐵
(1−𝜏𝑡)
.     (25) 
In the absence of policy instruments ( 𝛼𝑓 , 𝜂
𝑤 , 𝐵, 𝜏, 𝜁𝑤 , 𝜁𝑉) = 0  the above equation 
collapses to the standard wage expressions normally found in the literature with DSGE enhanced 
with search and matching frictions – see Krause and Lubik (2010); Di Pace and Faccini, (2012) 
and Krause et al. (2008). In general, equation (25) shows that the wage paid to the worker is a 
weighted average of the match productivity net of the procedural cost of firing, plus the savings 
from job continuation and the worker’s outside option of the worker, adjusted for employment 
tax subsidy, and severance compensation. 
Clearly, equation (25) reveals that 𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡 𝜕𝛼𝑡
𝑓⁄ < 0, 𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡 𝜕𝐵⁄ < 0 and 𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡 𝜕𝜁𝑡
𝑤⁄ < 0, all 
else equal. Intuitively, wages are negotiated such that the costs of severing employment 
relationships are partly transferred to the workers. The extent to which this occurs entirely 
depends on the worker’s relative bargaining strength  𝛷. In the extreme case where a firm has 
no bargaining power (𝛷 = 1), a worker bears the entire cost of layoff but enjoys the entire value 
of his/her marginal product. In the other extreme case, when 𝛷 = 0 , the worker has no 
bargaining power and has to accept his reservation wage adjusted for tax subsidy and (expected) 
severance compensation. Thus, as in the partial equilibrium setting of, e.g., Lazear (1990) and 
Garibaldi and Violante (2000), whilst the firm bears the entire burden of the procedural cost of 
laying off a worker, it is able to transfer the entire burden of the tax adjusted severance payment 
to the worker through wage cuts. An interesting feature is that when none of the agents to the job 
match has absolute power, i.e., 0 < 𝛷 < 1, the presence of distortionary tax can amplify the 
burden of severance transferred to the worker. To see this, suppose 𝜏𝑡+1 = 𝜏𝑡 = 0, the wage 
equation (25) collapses to  
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷 (
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝜂(𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵 ) + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1𝜃𝑡+1(1 − 𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥)  
+(1 − 𝛷) (𝑏𝑡 +
𝐴(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
𝛬𝑡
) − 𝜂𝐵.  
From the above, it is evident that regardless of the bargaining strength of agents to a 
match, the total cost of severance compensation is transferred to the worker via wage reduction. 
As found in Chapter 2 of this thesis (and also in Garibaldi & Violante, 2000) this amount is then 
deducted over a period of  1 𝜂⁄ , i.e. the average duration of a job match before separation occurs. 
However, in the presence of tax, i.e. 0 < 𝜏 < 1, the burden passed on to worker is 
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)
(1−𝜏𝑡)
𝜂𝐵, 
which exceeds 𝜂𝐵, since as 
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)
(1−𝜏𝑡)
> 1. In fact, the scale factor, 
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)
(1−𝜏𝑡)
 , is increasing in 𝜏 and 
decreasing in 𝛷, which suggests that while the impact of severance is amplified by the tax rate, 
the strengthening of a worker’s bargaining power reduces it. As for the implications of a change 
in the tax rate from one period to the next, a ceteris paribus rise in the future tax rate, 𝜏𝑡+1 > 𝜏𝑡, 
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raises the current wage and vice versa  as found in Burda and Weder (2016) and Campolmi et 
al. (2011a). Also, an increase in tax subsidy,  𝜁𝑤 , reduces labour cost to the firm.  
Finally, with efficient Nash bargaining, the condition that determines the optimal hours 
of work can be obtained by differentiating the product of the joint surplus with respect to ℎ𝑖𝑡 , 
Φ
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝜕ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝐽𝑖𝑡 + (1 − Φ)
𝜕𝐽𝑖𝑡
𝜕ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 0,                                                                                      (26) 
where  
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝜕ℎ𝑖𝑡
= (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑖𝑡 −
A′(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
Λ𝑡
 and   
𝜕𝐽𝑖𝑡
𝜕ℎ𝑖𝑡
= 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑡 (
𝑛𝑖𝑡
𝜙
)
𝜙−1
(
𝑘𝑖𝑡
1−𝜙
)
1−𝜙
ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜙−1
 − 𝑤𝑖𝑡 . 
Substituting these partial derivatives into (26), and solving using equation (22), we obtain the 
condition for optimal hours’ contract as follows 
𝐴ℎ𝑖𝑡
(1+𝛼ℎ)
(1 − 𝜏𝑡)Λ𝑡
=
𝜙2𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
.                                                                                                         (27) 
Condition (27) implies that agents to a job match bargain hours supply such that its 
marginal product equals the tax adjusted marginal rate of substitution between consumption and 
leisure. As pointed out by Trigari (2006), this is the correct measure of worker’s input to the firm 
in the sense of a frictionless labour market rather than the wage rate, since the existence of search 
and matching frictions make the wage rate unequal to the worker’s marginal product.  
3.2.4 The Government 
We abstract from public debt – in line with Baxter and King, (1993), Burnside et al. (2004) and 
Angelopoulos, Malley, and Philippopoulos (2012), among others – and assume that the 
government maintains a balanced budget in each period. 15  The budget constraint of the 
government, therefore, takes form  
𝑇𝑡 + ∫ 𝜏𝑡𝑤𝑖𝑡𝑛𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0
+ ∫ 𝜂𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑃𝐶𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0
=                                                                                      
𝐺𝑡 + ∫ (1 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡)𝑏𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0
+ ∫ 𝜁𝑡
𝑤𝑛𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0
+ ∫ 𝜁𝑡
𝑉𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑡𝑑𝑖
1
0
,                         (28) 
where the right-hand-side of (28) reflects aggregate government expenditure consisting of 
spending on consumption goods, unemployment benefits, tax subsidy and job creation subsidy. 
These expenditures are financed using revenues received from taxing on labour income and the 
household, the proceeds received from the procedural cost of firing, 𝑃𝐶𝑡 = (𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵 ). To 
avoid the distortionary effects of taxes on labour and firms, we follow convention (e.g., Cantore 
et al., 2014; Monacelli et al. 2010) and allow lump sum tax to adjust to balance the government 
budget in the baseline analysis. 
                                                             
15  As argued by these authors abstracting from public debt will not alter the results of the model given that 
households interpret variations in debts and lump-sum tax in the same way. 
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3.3 Aggregation and Market Clearing Conditions 
In line with the literature, we restrict our attention to an equilibrium where firms behave 
identically – the symmetric equilibrium. Therefore, the following hold: 𝑃𝑡 = 𝑝𝑡 = 𝑝𝑖𝑡 =
1;  𝐾𝑡 = 𝑘𝑖𝑡;   𝛱𝑡 = 𝜋𝑖𝑡;   𝑉𝑡 = 𝑣𝑖𝑡;   𝑁𝑡 = 𝑛𝑖𝑡;   ℎ𝑡 = ℎ𝑖𝑡;   𝑤𝑡 = 𝑤𝑖𝑡;   𝑚𝑐𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡 . Firms’ profit 
therefore given by  
𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − [𝑤𝑡𝑁𝑡ℎ𝑡 + 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡 + (1 − 𝜁𝑡
𝑉)𝑥𝑉𝑡 + 𝜂𝑁𝑡𝐹𝑡].                                                       (29) 
 The equations which determine the aggregate equilibrium values of the endogenous 
variables for period 𝑡 are given in Appendix 3 (section 3B). 
 Combining household’s budget constraint, firms’ profit and the government budget 
constraint  respectively given by (2), (28) and (29)  we obtain 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝐺𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑥𝑣𝑡 which 
represents the national income identity and implies that the final good market clears: the left-
hand-side consists of the three sources of demand, and the right-hand-side is the value of output 
net of what is used in creating the vacancies. 
The two equations governing the flows of employment (given by equation (15), which 
we repeat here) and unemployment are  
𝑁𝑡 = (1 − 𝜂)𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡,                                                                                                          (15) 
𝑈𝑡 = [1 − 𝑁𝑡−1] + 𝜂𝑁𝑡−1.                                                                                                       (30) 
According to (15), aggregate employment at any time t consists of the total number of 
workers whose employment were not severed (1 − 𝜂)𝑁𝑡−1  in the preceding period and the 
newly-matched workers 𝑀𝑡 . Equation (30) shows that aggregate unemployment is given by the 
number of workers who were not at all unemployed from last period 𝑡 − 1, [1 − 𝑁𝑡−1], and 
those who were employed but lost their job at the end of that period, 𝜂𝑁𝑡−1.  
Finally, all exogenous variables and policy instruments are assumed to follow an 
autoregressive process of order one AR (1): 
log𝑙𝑡 = 𝜌𝑙 log𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑙𝑡;       𝑙𝑡  = ℰ𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡, 𝑏𝑡 , 𝛼𝑡
𝑓
, 𝜁𝑡
𝑤  and 𝜁𝑡
𝑉 ,                                           (31) 
where  𝜌𝑙 ∈ [0,1] is autoregressive parameter measuring the persistence of the respective AR(1) 
process (31), and 𝜓𝑙𝑡 represents random shock, assumed to be ~𝑊𝑁(0, 𝜎𝑙
2).  
3.4 Model Calibration 
We calibrate the model to reflect the structural characteristics of the UK economy with quarterly 
frequency, using the parameter and steady state values commonly used in the literature.16 The 
parameter values used are summarised in Table 3.1. 
We set the subjective discount factor, 𝛽, to 0.99, consistent with the value widely used 
in the literature, which implies a steady state quarterly real interest rate of about 4 percent. To 
obtain an average annual capital depreciation rate of 10 percent, we set the quarterly depreciation 
                                                             
16 As in Trigari (2006), Krause and Lubik (2007), Krause et al. (2008), Faccini et al. (2013) and many others 
within this line of literature. Also note that most of the values chosen here are based on studies which focus on the 
UK economy. 
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rate of capital 𝛿 = 0.025 as in Zanetti (2011a). The actual empirical estimate of the inverse of 
Frisch elasticity of hours supply,  𝛼ℎ
−1, is still contested in the literature. As pointed out by 
Trigari, (2006, 2009), the micro estimates of  𝛼ℎ
−1 range from close to 0 to approximately 0.5. In 
our baseline calibration, we set   𝛼ℎ = 2 , which corresponds approximately to 𝛼ℎ
−1 = 0.5 , 
consistent with the literature focusing on the UK economy (e.g. Villa & Yang, 2011). The 
coefficient of relative risk aversion, 𝛼𝑐 , is set to 0.9 , close to the posterior mean estimate 
obtained by Faccini et al. (2013). The degree of substitutability between private consumption 
and public consumption in the household’s utility function is set to  𝜑 = 0.1 per quarter, which 
is consistent with the empirical estimate obtained for the UK by Ahmed (1986). As is common 
in the literature, we set hours per worker, ℎ̅, to 1/3 and allow the measure of disutility of working, 
𝐴, to be residually determined. The implied value of 𝐴 from the steady state computation equals 
approximately 13.0218. 
Hall (2005) document that quarterly job separation rate is in the range of 8 and 10 percent 
in the US. We use the estimate for the UK provided by Hobijn and Şahin (2009) and set the 
steady state quarterly job separation rate 𝜂  to 0.0459. This value implies that established job 
matches last up to 20 quarters (or a period of 5 years), on average. In line with Villa and Yang 
(2011), we set the value of the elasticity of demand for differentiated goods, ℰ, to 6. This gives 
a steady state price mark-up over marginal cost of 20 percent, consistent with most studies within 
this area of research – see, e.g., Campolmi et al. (2011b). The bargaining power of workers is 
assumed to be symmetric as in Pissarides (2000); therefore, we let 𝛷 = 0.5. Following Pissarides 
(1998) we set matching elasticity 𝛾 to equal Φ in order to satisfy Hosios (1990) search efficiency 
condition. The benchmark value of the elasticity of output with respect to labour input 𝜙 is set 
to 0.69, in the same manner as Faccini et al. (2013). 
We define the initial unemployment benefit in terms of the steady state wage bill: 𝜌𝑏 =
?̅? (1 − 𝜏)?̅?ℎ̅⁄ , where 𝜌𝑏 , set to 0.38 as in Faccini, Millard, and Zanetti (2011), captures 
replacement rate of unemployment benefits. It is common within DSGE search literature to 
define the quarterly job filling rate of firms, ?̅?𝑓, and the level of employment, ?̅?, in order to 
facilitate the derivation of the steady state values of other labour market variables. Hence, in line 
with Zanetti (2011a), we set ?̅?𝑓  and  ?̅?  to equal 0.9 and 0.945 respectively. The size of the 
labour force is normalised to one. Thus, the value of  ?̅? implies a steady state unemployment 
rate of 0.055 and aggregate number of job searchers of ?̅? = 1 − (1 − 𝜂)?̅? = 0.09838. Given 
steady state employment rate and job destruction rate above, the aggregate quarterly number of 
new matches in the economy is 𝑀(?̅?, ?̅?) = 𝜂?̅? = 0.04338, while the aggregate number of 
vacancies created is given by ?̅? = 𝑀(?̅?, ?̅?) ?̅?𝑓⁄ = 0.0482. The steady state solutions for job 
finding rate,  ?̅?𝑤 ,  and the degree of market tightness, ?̅?,  are respectively given by ?̅?𝑤 =
𝑀(?̅?, ?̅?) ?̅?⁄ = 0.44092 and ?̅? = ?̅? ?̅?⁄ = 0.48991. The measure of match efficiency is therefore 
obtained as 𝜒 =
𝑀(𝑈,𝑉)
𝑈𝛾𝑉1−𝛾
= 0.62994. Vacancy creation cost, 𝑥, is determined residually from the 
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steady state calculation.  
Regarding policy parameters, we calibrate the steady state share of government 
consumption spending in output, ?̅? ?̅?⁄ , to match the historical average of 0.2199 for the UK 
between the period 1980: Q1 and 2013: Q1. The initial values of recruitment and tax subsidies ,
𝜁𝑉 and 𝜁𝑤, and the measure of EPL strictness, 𝜂𝑤 , are set to zero. Zanetti (2011a) calibrated the 
firing cost of a firm to 0.3, which corresponds to the procedural cost in this study given that the 
author excludes the severance transfer component. As pointed out by Garibaldi and Violante 
(2000), however, the severance transfer component of firing cost constitutes about 90 percent of 
total firing costs in the UK. For the purpose of our study we assume that two-third of the total 
firing cost represents pure transfer to each worker, 𝐵. Thus, using the fact that 𝐵 = (2/3)?̅? and 
𝑃𝐶̅̅̅̅ = (?̅?𝑓 + 𝜂𝑤𝐵) = 0.3, we have a total cost of firing which equals ?̅? = ?̅?𝑓 + (1 + 𝜂𝑤)𝐵 =
0.9. In line with Angelopoulos et al. (2012) we set the benchmark value of labour tax rate 𝜏 =
0.27, and allow lump-sum taxes to adjust to satisfy the differences in government expenditure 
and revenue received (as in Harrison & Oomen, 2010; Shi & Wen, 1999). Also, in line with the 
literature, the steady state aggregate output Y is normalised to one, while allowing the measure 
of total factor productivity 𝑧 to adjust to target this value. The persistence parameter for all 
exogenous variables/policy instruments and the standard deviation of shocks are respectively set 
to 0.90 and 0.01 in all cases to facilitate comparison of the effects of shocks on the economy. 
Table 3.2 in Appendix 3 summarises data averages of key economic indicators compared 
with the steady state solutions of the model. As can be observed these solutions very closely 
matches some of the key structural characteristics of the UK economy. 
3.5 The Match Surplus 
To help understand how labour market institutions and policies affect the dynamics of labour 
market discussed in the next section, it is useful to briefly discuss the role of match surplus, 
which have been found to be crucial in determining the response of labour market variables to 
shocks (Hornstein et al., 2005; Shimer, 2005). Using equations (18) and (21) the expression for 
the steady state match surplus can be written as 
𝑆̅ =
𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ 𝜙?̅?
?̅?
− 𝜏̅𝑤ℎ̅ − 𝜂(?̅?𝑓 + 𝜂𝑤𝐵) − (?̅? +
𝐴ℎ̅1+𝛼ℎ
(1 + 𝛼ℎ)?̅?
− 𝜁𝑤)                                  
+
(1 − 𝜁?̅?)𝑥(1 − 𝜂)𝛽?̅?𝛾
(1 − 𝛷)𝜒
((1 − 𝛷𝜏̅) − 𝛷(1 − 𝜏̅)𝜒?̅?1−𝛾).        (32) 
The above equation (32) shows that labour market institutions have clear implications 
for the match surplus. For a given value of 𝜂, an increase in either the fixed separation cost, ?̅?𝑓, 
or severance, 𝐵,  reduce the size of the match surplus – with the effects of severance increasing 
in the strictness of EPL,  𝜂𝑤 . Recall that a firm’s effective share of the sum of the match surplus 
is given by 𝐽 =
(1−𝛷)
(1−𝛷𝜏)
𝑆. It follows that the value of a given job match to the firm is also reduced 
by an increase either in the fixed separation cost or severance induced cost – caused by an 
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increase in 𝜂𝑤  or 𝐵, or both. Given the equality condition for job creation (equation (20)), a 
lower 𝐽 must, therefore, be met by a reduction in the number of vacancies. More precisely, 
suppose we let 𝜁𝑉 = 𝜁𝑤 = 𝜏 = 0, it can be shown that the value of a job match to the firm, 𝐽, is 
reduced by an amount 𝜂(?̅?𝑓 + 𝜂𝑤𝐵) . Higher values of unemployment benefits (b) and 
distortionary tax (τ) also reduce the match surplus through their impact on workers’ valuation of 
unemployment (as we will explain later) and so have a similar qualitative effect on job creation. 
3.6 Steady State (Long-run) Comparative Statics 
Here, we explore the steady state properties of the model in order to understand the long-run 
effects of: (i) fixed separation cost,  ?̅?𝑓; (ii) severance compensation, 𝐵; (iii) recruitment and tax 
subsidies, 𝜁𝑉  and 𝜁𝑤 ; (iv) distortionary labour tax, 𝜏 ; (v) the measure of the degree of 
substitutability between private and public consumption, 𝜑 ; (vi) government consumption 
spending, 𝐺; and (vii) unemployment benefits, 𝑏. The results from this exercise will shed light 
on the effects of, especially, labour market policies/institutions on the transmission of shocks 
discussed in the next section. 
Fixed separation cost: Consider a sudden increase in fixed separation cost, 𝛼𝑓. By raising 
the procedural cost of separation, a higher 𝛼𝑓 reduces the size of the match surplus as well as the 
value of a filled job. This reduction weakens the incentives for vacancy creation, resulting in 
lower market tightness, 𝜃 . A lower 𝜃  triggers decline in job finding rate, causing extensive 
margin employment to fall and aggregate unemployment to rise. The duration of unemployment 
spell measured by ?̅?𝑤−1  also increases. Consequently, labour income falls, leading to a 
tightening of the household budget, as evident by the drop in household disposable income 
(HDI), and causing consumption and capital accumulation to fall. Given the decrease in job 
creation, and thus in extensive margin employment, firms meet production requirements using 
increased hours supply. The rise in hours per worker is however not sufficient to boost 
productivity, and so ?̅? drops, further reducing HDI due to lower returns to capital and profit 
remittances. Also, despite the increase in unemployment benefit income resulting from higher 
unemployment, the HDI falls due to the negative effects of wage, capital and profit income. 
Severance compensation: An increase in severance compensation, in the absence of any 
strict enforcement in EPL, 𝜂𝑤 = 0, has no adverse effect on job creation decision, which is the 
usual result in the search literature as predicted by Lazear (1990). As recently emphasised by 
Parsons (2013), severance has little or no impact in economies without strict EPL enforcement. 
In this model, when 𝜂𝑤 = 0, severance pay could even lead to higher job creation. This is 
because firms can, intuitively, take advantage of no strictness in employment protection 
regulation to deduct the severance amount from the negotiated real wage. To see this, consider 
the steady state surplus equation (32). For a given real wage, an increase in severance leaves the 
match surplus unaffected if 𝜂𝑤 = 0 . However, since firms are able to pass the burden of 
severance – which is further amplified by the presence of distortionary tax as shown in equation 
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(25) – to the workers, the resulting lower real wage will increase the surplus, thereby 
incentivising firms to create more vacancies. By contrast, when firms are faced with strict EPL 
enforcement, 𝜂𝑤 > 0 , the match surplus and the value of a job match become smaller as 
severance increases. As shown in column (5) of Table 3.3 in Appendix 3, the reduction in the 
value of a job causes vacancy creation and the degree of market tightness to fall as well, resulting 
in a lower job finding rate and higher unemployment. Consequently, output, consumption and 
investment all reduce.  
Subsidies: Columns (6) and (7) of Table 3.3 respectively show the long-run effects of 
recruitment and employment tax subsidies, 𝜁𝑉  and 𝜁𝑤 . Whilst both subsidies have a similar 
qualitative effect on all the variables, their effects on the real wage and match surplus differ. The 
immediate impact of an increase in recruitment subsidy, 𝜁𝑉 , is to reduce the marginal cost of 
vacancy creation relative to the value of a filled job. This implies vacancies must increase in 
order to restore the job creation condition, thus resulting in a higher market tightness. The 
increase in market tightness lowers firms’ vacancy filling rate. Therefore, for a given match that 
survives job separation at a rate (1 − 𝜂) , an employed worker is compensated, since the 
recruitment need of the firm is reduced (Pissarides, 2000). This, in turn, leads to a higher real 
wage and a lower match surplus. Despite the increase in the real wage, the reduced cost 
associated with vacancy creation subsidy raises employment via a higher job finding rate. By 
contrast, the employment tax subsidy, 𝜁𝑤 , directly reduces the real wage cost of firms and, in 
turn, boosts match surplus, inducing more hiring and lower unemployment. In both cases, 
productivity rises due to higher employment, resulting in higher labour, capital and profit income 
to the household, which consequently leads to increases in consumption and investment. 
Distortionary tax: Compared to the fixed cost of separation and severance compensation, 
the impact of an increase in distortionary tax, 𝜏, on the economy is more substantial. A higher 𝜏 
magnifies workers’ outside option (unemployment value) and leads to a higher real wage. 
Consequently, the size of match surplus and the value of a job match fall, discouraging firms 
from engaging in vacancy creation. The decrease in vacancy creation causes market tightness 
and job finding rate to fall; thus, unemployment rises while employment at extensive margin 
reduces. Employment at intensive margin (the hours per worker) also drops since the 
distortionary tax raises the disutility of work (equation (27)). Hence, even though the real wage 
rises due to a higher outside option, the reduction in hours per worker and number of employees 
reduce labour income. Thus, accompanied by the decreases in profit and capital income, the 
reduction in labour income leads to lower HDI, causing consumption and investment to fall.  
Government consumption expenditure: An increase in ?̅?  raises aggregate demand, 
creating profit-making opportunities for firms and causing the match surplus to rise. The 
utilisation of factor inputs, labour and capital, consequently shoots up, causing vacancy creation 
and the overall market condition, as captured by the increase in the degree of market tightness, 
to rise. Both job finding rate and employment at extensive margin rise as well, while aggregate 
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unemployment falls. As we would expect, households cut down on consumption due to negative 
wealth effect (fall in HDI) introduced by an increase in tax obligation required to balance 
government budget. Moreover, because government consumption is utility-enhancing, it 
encourages further cut in the household’s consumption, who, instead, channel their resources 
towards investment to attract higher returns associated with the increase in government 
consumption demand. 
For a higher 𝜑  value, a given government expenditure yields more utility to the 
household and causes a larger decline in the marginal utility of consumption, Λ̅. The fall in Λ̅ 
consequently drives up worker’s valuation of unemployment and, in turn, reduces the surplus of 
a job match, leading to lower vacancy creation and higher unemployment. Employment at 
intensive margin falls as well due to an increase in the consumption value of the disutility of 
supplying work hours. The overall effect of a higher 𝜑 is thus to cause aggregate output in the 
economy to fall; even when government expenditure rises, its impact on output and employment 
are lower (Kwan, 2007). 
Unemployment benefits: As with the case of the distortionary tax, the impact of higher 
unemployment benefits on the economy is also substantial compared to those caused by fixed 
separation cost and severance compensation. A comparison of benchmark results and those 
reported in column (3) of Table 3.3 reveals that an increase in unemployment benefit, 𝑏, reduces 
vacancies, the job finding rate and the number of job matches, and results in higher 
unemployment. The intuition is that a higher b raises workers’ outside option and leads to a 
higher wage, which, in turn, reduces match surplus and the incentive for vacancy creation. We 
consider scenarios where the government can provide more generous benefit insurance for the 
unemployed and at the same time avail ALMPs to encourage hiring. Columns (12) and (13) in 
Table 3.3 shows the results of two scenarios with a joint increase in b and 𝜁𝑉, and 𝑏 and 𝜁𝑤. As 
suggested by these results, the effects of a higher unemployment benefit on job creation are lower 
when accompanied by ALMPs compared to when it is implemented in isolation. In particular, it 
is possible to offset the effects of higher benefits on job creation if accompanied by employment 
tax subsidy, 𝜁𝑤, as revealed in column (13). 
3.7 Dynamic Analysis 
In order to solve the dynamic version of the model, we log-linearise the model about the non-
stochastic steady state using first order Taylor series expansion. The linearised version is then 
solved using Dynare (Adjemian et al., 2014).17 The complete log-linearised model is given in 
                                                             
17 The complexity of DSGE models makes it difficult to obtain a close-form solution. Thus, to reduce computational 
burden, researchers often resort to linear approximations of the nonlinear equations characterising the equilibrium, 
which can then be solved using various solution techniques for linear difference equations under rational 
expectations (e.g., as discussed by Aruba et al., 2006; Flotho, 2009; Negro & Schorfhiede, 2013). With the 
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Appendix 3, where “hat” is used to denote the percentage deviation of a variable (𝑥𝑡) from its 
steady state (?̅?) , i.e. ?̂?𝑡 = log (
𝑥𝑡
?̅?
) = log(1 +
𝑥𝑡−?̅?
?̅?
) ≈ log1 +
1
?̅?
(𝑥𝑡 − ?̅?) =
𝑥𝑡−?̅?
?̅?
. 18  Thus, 
except otherwise stated, the impulse responses of endogenous variables are interpreted as 
percentage deviation from the steady state. In what follows, we discuss the dynamic results of 
the model, starting with the baseline case.  
3.7.1 Benchmark Results 
Figures 3.1, 3.2 and 3.3 in Appendix 3 plot the baseline impulse response functions (IRFs) – 
based on benchmark calibration described in Section 3.4 – to a positive one standard deviation 
shock to TFP, government consumption and unemployment insurance spending, i.e., 𝑧𝑡, 𝐺𝑡 and 
𝑏𝑡. As shown in Figure 3.1, the TFP shock produces positive impact responses on the selected 
variables with the exception of unemployment, which falls as hiring activities rises. On impact, 
productivity per factor input rises, leading to a significant increase in match surplus. In response, 
vacancy creation increases, accompanied by a strong tightening in the labour market and an 
increase in job finding rate. The increase in job finding rate raises employment and decreases in 
unemployment. Employment and hours worked per worker respond differently to TFP shock 
(Krause & Lubik, 2010). Intuitively, given that hours per worker is driven by the marginal rate 
of substitution between consumption and leisure, as more people become employed, the hours 
spent working reduces. This is because the level of consumption rises due to increased wage, 
capital and profit income, which leads to higher household disposable income. 
Figure 3.2 displays the impulse response to a positive government consumption shock, 
𝐺𝑡. By raising aggregate demand, an increase in 𝐺𝑡 leads to a rise in match surplus, on impact. 
Therefore, firms create more vacancies, prompting increases in the market tightness, job finding 
rate, aggregate new matches and the number of employment. The real wage, however, falls. As 
explained above, the reason is that, by raising marginal utility, an increase in 𝐺𝑡 reduces the 
consumption value of the disutility of work, which in turn lowers the value of unemployment 
and, consequently, the real wage, consistent with Monacelli et al. (2010). Also consistent with 
the literature, the positive government consumption shock crowds out private consumption, due 
                                                             
advancement in computing power, software such as Dynare and Perturbation AIM are now available for solving 
DSGE models. Dynare has been used, for instance, by Cahuc and Barbanchon (2010), Gorodnichenko and Weber 
(2016), Mandelman and Zanetti (2008), Sophocles, Plagborg-Møller, and Stock (2014), and Weber (2015) in 
handling various economic models, including DSGE. In general, it is a toolbox for Matlab developed by Adjemian 
et al. (2014) that allows researchers to write the model in its original or linearised form; further information about 
Dynare can be found at http://www.dynare.org/. A key limitation of this software, which does not apply to the 
model, is that it can only find solution up to third order approximation (Fernandez-Villaverde et al., 2016). Pfeifer 
(2014, 2015) provides extensive coverage of ways to specify DSGE models and graphs in Dynare. The Perturbation 
AIM, developed by Swanson, Anderson, and Levin (2006), is implementable in Mathematica; see, 
http://www.ericswanson.us/perturbation.html for more information. 
18 Steady state solutions are computed using Maple and Matlab. All the codes are available upon request. 
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to negative wealth effect induced by an increase in tax obligation. Investment also decreases 
minimally, causing capital accumulation to fall. 
Figure 3.3 shows that a shock to unemployment insurance benefit reduces the size of 
match surplus by raising workers’ value of unemployment, thus leading to a rise in the real wage 
on impact. Consequently, the gains from posting new vacancies shrink considerably, forcing 
firms to reduce recruitment activities. This, in turn, leads to the deterioration of market tightness, 
driving down both job finding rate and employment. Those in employment supply more hours 
per worker as employment shrinks. However, the rise in hours per worker is not sufficient to 
sustain production, and so output drops, further leading to less demand for labour and capital. 
The decline in the economy’s output causes profit to fall and, together with the fall in labour and 
capital income, results in lower private consumption as well as investment. 
3.7.2 Labour Market Institutions and Shock Propagation 
We now investigate the implications of labour market institutions and policies (highlighted in 
the previous section) on the transmission of shocks. In particular, we focus on the effects of (i) 
fixed separation cost; (ii) severance compensation; (iii) unemployment benefit and (iv) 
distortionary tax. Figures 3.4 and 3.5 display the IRFs to positive TFP and government 
consumption shocks, respectively. We focus on these two shocks, and to facilitate comparison, 
the economy is subjected to shocks of equal size as in the baseline case above.  
Obviously, changes in individual labour market institutions do not alter the qualitative 
response of the plotted variables to shocks, but affects their magnitude and persistence of 
responses.19 The magnitude of response of each variable – particularly those of the labour market 
– depend crucially on the way each policy affects the surplus of a job match. The smaller the 
size of the match surplus, as a result of a policy change, the larger is the effect of shock on the 
adjustment path of these variables. The intuition is that when the match surplus is initially small, 
a positive shock which enhances productivity generates a larger percentage increase in the value 
of a job match. All else equal, this implies that vacancies must rise until the value of a match 
equals the cost of creating the vacancy. Hence, shocks are transmitted through rapid adjustment 
in the number of vacancies unto employment and, consequently, output. As shown by Hagedorn 
and Manovskii (2008), Hornstein et al. (2005) and Shimer (2005) within a partial equilibrium 
framework, even a small shock can result in large amplification in vacancies and employment 
when the size of equilibrium match surplus is small.  
As suggested by the steady state results presented in the previous section, higher 𝛼𝑓, 𝜂𝐵, 
𝑏 and 𝜏 result in considerable decrease in the match surplus. Thus, as we would expect, the 
dynamic adjustment of the match surplus following TFP and government spending shocks under 
different labour market regimes are much larger compared to the baseline responses. For the TFP 
shock, the response of employment is enhanced as a result of firms’ adjustments through higher 
                                                             
19 These sensitivity analyses confirms the robustness of our numerical solution. 
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vacancy creation. The peak responses and persistence are much larger than the baseline case. 
The final impact of the shock on output depends on the strength of the responses of hours per 
worker and capital. In all instances after regime change, the response of hours per worker is 
weakened as the magnitude of employment rises. However, given the increased number of 
workers in employment, the impulse of aggregate hours supplied by workers (i.e. the product of 
the number of workers and the hours supplied by each) remains resilient. Thus, together with the 
stronger response in capital (though not quantitatively large), the impulse of output is slightly 
amplified. The effects of fixed separation costs and severance compensation on the transmission 
of TFP shock are, however, quantitatively small compared to the effects of benefit insurance and 
distortionary tax. This follows from the fact that they do not significantly alter the steady state 
match surplus and household disposable income compared to the effects of benefit insurance and 
distortionary tax.  
The case of government consumption shock (displayed in Figures 3.5) appears to be more 
significant quantitatively. The impact and peak effects of employment, hours per worker and 
output are amplified under all four scenarios, as are the persistence of responses. Higher steady 
state distortionary tax and unemployment benefit affect these responses in a more profound way 
– the former, primarily through its effect on individual work hours. A higher distortionary tax 
reduces the steady state HDI, making the household more sensitive to further increase in 
government consumption spending, especially since such spending is associated with additional 
decrease in HDI via tax increase. Therefore, consumption and capital accumulation fall much 
more on impact compared to the benchmark case. The additional weakening in consumption 
therefore strengthens the response of hours per worker, which, in turn, reinforces the response 
of output. A permanent rise in unemployment insurance benefit, also has a significant negative 
effect on the HDI and the match surplus as shown in Table 3.3. Thus, as in the case of 
distortionary tax, a smaller HDI responds more to shocks, leading to a larger drop in consumption 
and an increase in hours per worker. The response of vacancies, and in turn employment, is also 
amplified due to increased value of match surplus following the government spending shock. 
The implications of changes in fixed separation cost and severance compensation on the 
transmission of government consumption shock are similar to that of benefit insurance. But 
unlike unemployment benefit, their effects are also relatively small as in the case of TFP shock. 
A clear implication of our findings is that whilst the magnitude of response of vacancies and 
employment depend on the initial value of match, the magnitude of response of hours per worker 
to a given shock depends on the initial disposable income of the household.  
3.7.3 The Effects of Subsidies on the Labour Market 
Recent empirical evidence suggests that policies targeted at the labour market are more effective 
in stimulating job recovery compared to the traditional government consumption spending (see 
e.g., Tcherneva, 2011). In reality, however, labour market-oriented fiscal spending takes 
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different forms.20 Here we examine the short run dynamic effects of the two forms (tax and 
recruitment subsidies) considered in this chapter. (In subsection 3.7.6 below, we show how the 
multiplier effects of these subsidies compare those of fiscal consumption spending.) In Figure 
3.7, we report the IRFs of selected variables to a positive one percent standard deviation shock 
to recruitment and tax subsidies; the solid and dash-dot lines represent the impulses resulting 
from the respective shocks. As illustrated by the figure, both subsidies have the same qualitative 
impact on vacancies, employment and hours worked. Also, in both cases, consumption, capital 
and output all increase. The mechanisms remain the same as previously explained. On impact, 
by directly reducing job creation cost, a higher recruitment subsidy raises vacancy creation rate. 
Consequently, the market tightness and job finding rate rise, positively impacting the aggregate 
number of new matches and employment. Tax subsidy also enhances vacancy creation on 
impact, but in contrast to the recruitment subsidy, it leads to a decrease in the real wage as against 
directly reducing vacancy creation cost. The fall in real wage, thus, allows match surplus to rise, 
which then induces higher recruitment activities. 
 Quantitatively, the effects of both subsidies differ in the short run. A one percent standard 
deviation shock to recruitment subsidy generates a stronger effect on variables compared to a 
shock of equal size to tax subsidy. The peak response of vacancies is 0.2 percent above the steady 
state level, while that of employment is 0.008 percent. In contrast, vacancies (employment) 
increase (reduce) by 0.16 (0.0052) percent in response to a positive shock to tax subsidy of equal 
size. This suggests that recruitment subsidies could be more effective in fostering employment 
in the short run. This result is surprising considering that the real wage rises under recruitment 
subsidy, whereas falls under tax subsidy, due to the reason explained in Section 3.6.21 The fact 
that recruitment subsidy can be an effective policy instrument for job creation has been 
documented by Campolmi et al. (2011b) and Kato and Miyamoto (2015). Kato and Miyamoto  
studied the short-run effects of vacancy creation and employment subsidies in a DSGE model 
with search frictions. The difference between the subsidies considered by the authors and ours 
is that, in their paper, both subsidies are given to the firms. 
3.7.4 Alternative Government Expenditure Financing 
The results from fiscal stimulus policies considered above show positive effects on employment 
and on output when financed by lump-sum taxes (Faia, Lechthaler, & Merkl, 2013; Monacelli et 
al. 2010). In reality, however, an increase in government expenditures can be offset, fully or 
partly, by revenues generated through various financing schemes (Baxter & King, 1993; 
Campolmi et al., 2011b). Here, we examine the impact of a fully distortionary tax-financed 
                                                             
20 See Martin (2014) for discussion on the types of ALMPs and their effectiveness. 
21 Note that job creation cost can be likened to the cost of setting up a job/business. Intuitively, the higher ease of 
setting of business within an economy, the more vacancies will become available. Moreover, since firms do not 
have to keep vacancies for long –thus loosing gains from production – they may be willing to pay higher salaries to 
continuing workers to in order to maintain productivity level.  
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government fiscal spending. Figures 3.7, 3.8 and 3.9 respectively display the responses of 
selected variables to an increase in government consumption expenditure, recruitment and 
employment tax subsidies under two financing options: lump-sum vs distortionary tax. Clearly, 
compared to lump-sum financing, a distortionary tax-financed government consumption 
expansion leads to a decrease in match surplus, reducing the incentive for vacancy creation. The 
reason is that the corresponding increase in the distortionary tax – associated with the 
government’s consumption expansion – generates higher labour cost to the firms via an increase 
in the disutility of work. Accordingly, the real wage rises, forcing firms to cut down on vacancy 
creation. As employment reduces, the aggregate labour income to the household drops also. The 
tightening in the household budget leads to substantial reduction in both private consumption 
and investment, further compounding the contractionary effects of distortionary tax-financing.  
Figure 3.8 shows that the responses of variables to a distortionary tax-financed 
recruitment subsidy differs considerably from the earlier case. In particular, the rise in 
recruitment subsidy produces a strong and positive impact on vacancy creation and employment, 
despite being financed by distortionary tax. Output, private consumption and capital also rise. 
The mechanism through which this occurs remain as previously explained. However, and 
surprisingly, rather than increase tax obligations, recruitment subsidy reduces it. As explained 
by Campolmi et al. (2011a), policies such as recruitment subsidy are likely to become self-
financing, which can serve as an incentive for the government to introduce a temporal decrease 
in distortionary tax. This reduction, in turn, puts less pressure on HDI, which further stimulates 
consumption and investment in capital. Higher consumption boosts the continuation value of 
vacancies and aggregate demand, spurring firms to increase hiring activities and leading to 
overall improvement in the labour market condition. 
Tax subsidy – in Figure 3.9 – financed by distortionary tax has a less adverse effect on 
employment, compared to government consumption spending under a similar financing option. 
In fact, it generates positive employment at the extensive margin, on impact, due to increased 
number of vacancies. A distortionary tax-financed tax subsidy has two opposing effects on the 
real wage: while an increase in tax subsidy lowers the real wage, the accompanying increase in 
distortionary tax raises it. The impact of this on the real wage thus depends on which effect 
dominates. As shown in Figure 3.9, the decrease in the real wage suggests that the effect of tax 
subsidy dominates. There is, thus, a relatively small incentive to post vacancies. However, given 
that a higher distortionary tax reduces the incentive to supply work hours, the hours per worker 
reduces significantly; thus, even though the actual number of workers employed rises, on impact, 
aggregate hours supply drops. Consumption and capital accumulation also fall due to lower 
household income resulting from reduced labour and capital income as well as profits.  
3.7.5 Utility-Enhancing Government Consumption 
In section 3.6 we introduced a higher the degree of substitutability between private and public 
consumption, 𝜑, and then examined the implications on the economy. We show, numerically, 
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that for a given level of government consumption expenditure, by driving up the value of non-
work activities, a higher 𝜑  makes job creation costlier and results in lower employment. Output 
also declines due to further cut in aggregate demand. Here we investigate how the propagation 
of government consumption spending shock to the rest of the economy is shaped by a higher 
value of 𝜑 and then compare the results to those obtained from the benchmark economy.  
In Figure 3.10 we present the impulse responses of selected variables to one percent 
standard deviation shock to government consumption under two different values of 𝜑: the solid 
lines represent the benchmark case with 𝜑 = 0.1, while the dash-dot lines plot the case with 𝜑 =
0.3. Clearly – for a plausible parameter range – the qualitative impact of a shock to government 
consumption spending remains the same for all the plotted variables, expect for scaling. 
Following an increase in  𝜑, the response of private consumption to an expansionary demand 
expenditure drops further below the benchmark level (almost by 5 percentage points). In line 
with Kwan (2007), this result shows that the crowding out effect on private consumption is larger 
the higher is the degree of substitutability. The intuition is that when public consumption is 
associated with a higher weight in private utility, the effect of an increase in the latter on 
aggregate demand will be offset by a corresponding decrease in private consumption. This 
implies that aggregate demand could potentially remain unchanged or even reduce as 
government’s consumption expenditure increases, depending on the degree of substitutability. 
In the case where both consumptions are complements ( 𝜑 < 0 ), an increase in public 
consumption with will result in a higher aggregate demand in the sense that private expenditure 
on consumption will also increase (Esteve & Sanchis-Llopis, 2005; Kwan, 2007).22 
Turning to the effect on the labour market. Since the response of consumption weakens 
further with a higher 𝜑, the incentive to create vacancies reduces due to the stochastic discount 
factor and aggregate demand effects – similar to the case described by Campolmi et al. (2011a). 
Although the household tend to reallocate resources towards capital accumulation, this is not 
sufficient to mitigate output contraction; therefore, there is a dampening effect on output. Given 
that vacancies reduce, the responses of market tightness, job finding rate and employment 
weaken also. 
3.7.6 The Multipliers Effects 
A recent trend in the literature involves evaluating the effectiveness of fiscal interventions in 
terms of their multiplier effects (Campolmi et al., 2011a; Faia et al., 2013; Monacelli et al., 
2010). In this section, we concentrate on how various labour market policies, government’s fiscal 
offsetting instrument and the degree of substitutability drive the sizes of employment and output 
multipliers. Following Faia et al., we evaluate fiscal multipliers using their net present values 
                                                             
22 We, however, do not consider complementarity between private and public consumption. As suggested in Molana 
and Zhang (2001), 𝜑 < 0 implies that government consumption expenditure is bad since it produces negative 
marginal utility to the household, which may not be consistent. 
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which are computed as follows: 
𝐹𝑀𝑢𝑙𝑡𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 =
∑ 𝛽𝑖−1(𝛯𝑡+𝑖 − ?̅?)
𝑠
𝑖=1
∑ 𝛽𝑖−1(𝛩𝑡+𝑖 − ?̅?)
𝑠
𝑖=1
,                                                                                  (33) 
where 𝛯 = 𝑌 for output multiplier, and 𝛯 = 𝑁 for employment multiplier. 𝛩𝑡 captures the cost 
associated with a given fiscal instrument at date 𝑡 , and in the case of pure government 
consumption spending corresponds to 𝐺𝑡. When considering the fiscal costs associated with tax 
and recruitment subsidies, we let 𝛩𝑡 be equal to 𝜁𝑡
𝑤?̅?   and 𝜁𝑡
𝑉𝑥?̅?  respectively (see, Campolmi 
et al., 2011a; Kato & Miyamoto, 2015). Table 3.4 in Appendix 3 summarises the computed 
multipliers under different time horizons after each shock. Figures 3.11 and 3.12 further display 
employment and output multipliers, over a 100 quarter horizon, comparing lump-sum and 
distortionary taxe-financing options. 
 Apparently, recruitment subsidy turns out to produce substantial employment and output 
multipliers much larger than one, even when financed by distortionary tax. The intuition for these 
results is the same as explained in Section 3.7.4. In particular, by inducing a temporary decrease 
in distortionary tax, recruitment subsidy has a more expansionary effect on employment and 
output level, thus resulting in large multiplier effects. By contrast, the resultant multipliers effects 
of both government consumption expansion and tax subsidy are quantitatively small, largely 
below one. The small quantitative effects observed in the former is broadly consistent with the 
current debates about the ability of DSGE models with search and matching frictions to generate 
empirically estimated size of fiscal consumption expenditure multiplier (Campolmi et al., 2011a; 
Cantore et al., 2014; Monacelli et al., 2010). Campolmi et al. (2011b) show that government 
consumption spending can potentially result in a negative employment multiplier effect when 
financed by lump-sum tax (due to the crowing out effect on private consumption), which is the 
case with ours when the offsetting fiscal instrument is the distortionary tax. Additionally, as 
suggested by the results, an increase in the degree of substitutability between private and public 
consumption also has a depressive effect on both employment and output multipliers, confirming 
the empirical evidence documented by Kwan (2007). 
The effects of labour market institutions on the fiscal multipliers are also reported in 
Table 3.4. As with their impact on the transmission of shocks discussed in subsection 3.7.2, fixed 
firing and severance induced costs do not have substantial impact on government consumption 
spending and tax subsidy multipliers. They do, however, markedly amplify the multiplier effects 
of recruitment subsidy. Again, these impacts are more pronounced in the cases of higher steady 
state distortionary tax and unemployment benefits. The implications of the latter on the 
effectiveness of fiscal policies (especially demand stimulus) is somewhat controversial in the 
literature. Monacelli et al. (2010) show that a higher unemployment benefit dampens the 
multiplier effect of government consumption on unemployment and output. By contrast, Kato 
and Miyamoto (2013) show that it amplifies employment multipliers, consistent with our 
findings. A similar result is reported by Mayer et al. (2010) who examined the unemployment 
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effect of government demand stimulus. 
 In sum, although the effects of labour market institutions on the fiscal multipliers remain 
qualitatively the same, the quantitative differences that we observe imply that in general labour 
market rigidities are likely to enhance the multiplier effects of fiscal stimulus policies. In 
addition, compared to other forms of fiscal stimuli considered in this study, our results 
consistently demonstrate that only recruitment subsidy can generate positive output and 
employment multipliers that are above one, even in the presence of labour market rigidities and 
regardless of the financing option 
3.8 Conclusion 
The last economic crisis drew significant attention in the literature due to the extensive use of 
fiscal policy measures to stimulate output and employment across the globe. At the same time, 
labour market reforms were implemented in many countries. This chapter developed a closed 
economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model with search and matching frictions to 
study the labour market effects of fiscal stimulus policies and the role of labour market 
institutions in shaping the transmission mechanisms of these policies. 
We show that more rigid labour market institutions, captured by higher fixed firing cost, 
severance compensation, distortionary tax and unemployment insurance benefit, stifle economic 
activities and reduce employment. On the contrary, active labour market policies in the form of 
tax and recruitment subsidies, and government consumption demand all boost economic 
activities and employment. 
Our model indicates that the effectiveness of fiscal policies depends on the degree of 
substitutability between private and public consumption and labour market rigidity. In particular, 
we find that a higher degree of substitutability reduces the effectiveness of government 
consumption spending on aggregate demand and job creation. This is because, by raising private 
utility, households spend less on consumption as government demand rises; thus, reducing its 
output and employment effects. Furthermore, our model predicts that, by shrinking the size of 
match surplus as well the household disposal income in the long-run, rigid labour market 
institutions make firms and the household more sensitive to government consumption 
expenditure shock. This, in turn, enhances the effects of the shock on vacancy creation, 
employment and hours supply. The influence of fixed firing tax and severance compensation in 
driving this transmission process is, however, quantitatively small compared to unemployment 
benefits insurance and distortionary labour tax. Finally, our model suggests that labour market-
oriented fiscal stimulus policies will be more effective in fostering employment in the presence 
of rigid labour market. In particular, our results consistently show that only recruitment subsidy 
can generate positive output and employment multipliers that are above one, even in the presence 
of labour market rigidities and regardless of the financing option. 
As recently suggested in the literature, the functioning of the labour market as a key 
determinant of the dynamics of unemployment depends not only on the institutional settings of 
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the market but also on a complex interaction between the degree of economic openness and these 
institutions. In the next chapter, we aim to extend the closed-economy analysis developed in this 
chapter to an open-economy setting in order to study how economic openness to international 
trade and capital mobility, as well as their interactions with labour market drive the dynamics of 
unemployment. This has become important due to the growing concerns that the links (both in 
trade and capital flow) between countries – globalisation – can serve as an important channel 
through which economic crisis can be propagated (see Rodrik, 1998). In addition, the recent 
reforms of labour market institutions towards a flexicurity system – advocated by the European 
Commission – among the EU member states have been justified by the challenges posed by 
globalisation (Eurofound, 2007; European Commission, 2010). 
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Appendix 3 
3A Mathematical Derivations 
3A.1 Household’s Optimisation Problem 
The present discounted lifetime utility of the household is given by 
𝐸𝑡 ∑𝛽
𝑠 [
(𝐶𝑡+𝑠
𝑒 )1−𝛼𝑐
1 − 𝛼𝑐
 −  𝐴
𝑛𝑡+𝑠 ℎ𝑡+𝑠
1+𝛼𝑒
1 + 𝛼𝑒
]
∞
𝑠=0
,                                                                              (𝐴1) 
where 𝐶𝑡+𝑠
𝑒 = 𝐶𝑡+𝑠 + 𝜑𝐺𝑡+𝑠 , subject to the budget constrain, 
𝐶𝑡+𝑠 + 𝐼𝑡+𝑠 + 𝑇𝑡+𝑠 =     ∫ 𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠(1 − 𝜏𝑡+𝑠)𝑤𝑖𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝑑𝑖
1
0
                                             
+(1 − 𝑛𝑡+𝑠)𝑏𝑡+𝑠 + 𝜂𝑛𝑡+𝑠𝐵
   
+ 𝑛𝑡+𝑠𝜁𝑡+𝑠
𝑤 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠𝐾𝑡+𝑠 + 𝛱𝑡+𝑠,        (𝐴2) 
and capital accumulation equation 
𝐾𝑡+𝑠+1 = 𝐼𝑡+𝑠 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+𝑠.                                                                                                (𝐴3) 
The household maximises (A1) subject to (A2) and (A3). Following Chow (1992, 1993, 
1997) and the usual practice in the literature, we can write the Lagrangian of the household 
optimisation problem as 
𝐿𝐻 = 𝐸𝑡 ∑𝛽
𝑠 ({
(𝐶𝑡+𝑠 + 𝜑𝐺𝑡+𝑠)
1−𝛼𝑐
1 − 𝛼𝑐
 −  𝐴
𝑛𝑡+𝑠 ℎ𝑡+𝑠
1+𝛼𝑒
1 + 𝛼𝑒
}
∞
𝑠=0
+ Λ𝑡+𝑠 {
𝑛𝑡+𝑠(1 − 𝜏𝑡+𝑠)𝑤𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑡+𝑠 + (1 − 𝑛𝑡+𝑠)𝑏 + 𝑛𝑡+𝑠𝜂𝐵 + 𝜁𝑡+𝑠
𝑤 𝑛𝑡+𝑠
+𝑟𝑡+𝑠𝐾𝑡+𝑠 + 𝛱𝑡+𝑠 − 𝐶𝑡+𝑠 − 𝐾𝑡+𝑠+1 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑇𝑡+𝑠
}). 
The first order conditions with respect to { 𝐶𝑡+𝑠} and { 𝐾𝑡+𝑠+1} are given by
23
𝜕𝐿𝐻
𝜕𝐶𝑡+𝑠
∶     𝐸𝑡[𝛽
𝑠(𝐶𝑡+𝑠 + 𝜑𝐺𝑡+𝑠)
−𝛼𝑐 − Λ𝑡+𝑠] = 0 ;   𝑠 ≥ 0,                                             (𝐴4) 
 
𝜕𝐿𝐻
𝜕𝐾𝑡+𝑠+1
:    𝐸𝑡[𝛽
𝑠+1Λ𝑡+𝑠+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+𝑠+1 − 𝛿) − 𝛽
𝑠Λ𝑡+𝑠] = 0;  𝑠 ≥ 0.                         (𝐴5) 
Setting 𝑠 = 0 in (A4) and (A5) and rearranging, we obtain the following equations: 
                                                             
23 In stochastic dynamic optimization problem – such as the current one – optimality conditions can be obtained 
using either dynamic programming or the Lagrangian method. Though as pointed out by Wickens (2008, p. 442) 
solution may be more difficult to obtain using the latter approach, because stochastic optimisation problems usually 
involve expectations of random variables. This, in turn, makes it difficult to eliminate the Lagrange multiplier in 
equation (A5) using (A4), given that itself is a random variable and that 𝐸𝑡(𝑋𝑡+𝑠𝑌𝑡+𝑠) ≠ 𝐸𝑡(𝑋𝑡+𝑠)𝐸𝑡(𝑌𝑡+𝑠); 𝑠 > 0. 
Chow (1992, 1993, 1997), however, extensively demonstrate that either of the two methods can yield the same 
result. In particular, as pointed out by Pfeifer (2014), using the Law of iterated expectations, 𝐸𝑡(𝐸𝑡+1(𝑋𝑡+2)) =
𝐸𝑡(𝑋𝑡+2), it is possible to eliminate the Lagrange multipliers by substituting (A4) and (A5). The intuition is that, 
although the household do not know about future variables, since these conditions (A4) and (A5) hold every period 
and expectations are rational, they know that, for example,   Λ𝑡+1  =   (𝐶𝑡+1 + 𝜑𝐺𝑡+1)
−𝛼𝑐  for any realisation of 
Λ𝑡+1. The Lagrangian method which we use here, as suggested by Chow, has been applied extensively in studies 
involving stochastic optimisation problems, see Christoffel et al. (2008) and Sbordone et al. (2010), among others. 
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Λ𝑡  =   (𝐶𝑡 + 𝜑𝐺𝑡)
−𝛼𝑐  ,                                                                                                         (𝐴4′) 
 Λ𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡[Λ𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝛿)],                                                                                          (𝐴5′) 
which corresponds to equations (4) and (5) in the text. 
3A.2 Final Good Sector’s Optimisation Problem 
The composite final good is aggregated according to the following CES function, 
𝑌𝑡 = [∫ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡1
0
𝑑𝑖]
ℰ𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
.    (𝐴6) 
The sector maximises its profit, 
𝛱𝑡
𝑌 = 𝑃𝑡 𝑌𝑡 − ∫ 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖, 
subject to equation (A6). We can then rewrite the sector’s problem at time 𝑡 as 
𝛱𝑡
𝑌 = [∫ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡1
0
𝑑𝑖]
ℰ𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
−
1
𝑃𝑡
∫ 𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖𝑡
1
0
𝑑𝑖. 
Maximisation with respect to  𝑦𝑖𝑡   yields 
ℰ𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
[∫ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡1
0
𝑑𝑖]
1
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡
𝑦
𝑖𝑡
−1
ℰ𝑡 −
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= 0,  
[∫ 𝑦𝑖𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡1
0
𝑑𝑖]
1
ℰ𝑡−1
𝑦
𝑖𝑡
−1
ℰ𝑡 −
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= 0,   
[𝑌𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡 ]
1
ℰ𝑡−1
𝑦
𝑖𝑡
−1
ℰ𝑡 −
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡
= 0,   
𝑌𝑡
1
ℰ𝑡𝑦
𝑖𝑡
−
1
ℰ𝑡 =
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡
,  
𝑦𝑖𝑡 = (
𝑝𝑖𝑡
𝑃𝑡
)
−ℰ𝑡
𝑌𝑡.  (𝐴7) 
3A.3 Intermediate Sector’s Optimisation Problem 
Each firm in this sector maximises the present discounted value of expected profit given by 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑡 ∑λ𝑡,𝑡+𝑠 [
 𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝑠
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
 𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑟𝑡+𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − (1 − 𝜁𝑡+𝑠
𝑉 )𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
− 𝜂𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝐹𝑡+𝑠] , 
subject to demand function 
𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑠 = (
 𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝑠
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
)
−ℰ𝑡+𝑠
𝑌𝑡+𝑠,                                                                                                          (𝐴8) 
the production function 
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𝑦𝑖𝑡+𝑠 = 𝑧𝑡+𝑠 (
𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠
𝜙
)
𝜙
(
𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝑠
1 − 𝜙
)
1−𝜙
,                                                                               (𝐴9) 
and the law of motion of employment at firm level 
𝑛𝑖𝑡+s = (1 − 𝜂)𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠−1 + 𝑞t+s
𝑓
𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑠.                                                                                   (𝐴10) 
Substituting (A8) into the profit function yields 
𝑚𝑎𝑥 𝐸𝑡 ∑λ𝑡+𝑠 [(
𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝑠
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
)
1−ℰ𝑡+𝑠
𝑌𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑟𝑡+𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − (1 − 𝜁𝑡+𝑠
𝑉 )𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑠
∞
𝑠=0
− 𝜂𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝐹𝑡+𝑠] . 
Let  𝐽𝑖𝑡  and 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡  denote the respective Lagrange multipliers associated with the 
constraints (A9) and (A10). The Lagrangian for each firm is written as 
𝐿𝑖 = 𝐸𝑡 ∑𝜆𝑡+𝑠 [{(
𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝑠
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
)
1−ℰ𝑡+𝑠
𝑌𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝑤𝑖𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑟𝑡+𝑠𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − (1 − 𝜁𝑡+𝑠
𝑉 )𝑥𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑠  
∞
𝑠=0
− 𝜂𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠𝐹𝑡+𝑠} + 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡+𝑠 {𝑧𝑡+𝑠(𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑡+𝑠)
𝜙𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝑠
(1−𝜙)
− (
 𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝑠
𝑃𝑡+𝑠
)
−ℰ𝑡+𝑠
𝑌𝑡+𝑠}
+  𝐽𝑖𝑡+𝑠{(1 − 𝜂)𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠−1 + 𝑞t+s
𝑓
𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑠 − 𝑛𝑖𝑡+s}]. 
The FOCs w.r.t. {𝑝𝑖𝑡+𝑠}, {𝑣𝑖𝑡+𝑠}, {𝑛𝑖𝑡+𝑠}  and  {𝑘𝑖𝑡+𝑠} are summarised, for   s = 0,  as follows 
𝑝𝑖𝑡:                  𝑝𝑖𝑡 =
ℰ𝑡
ℰ𝑡−1
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑃𝑡, 
𝑣𝑖𝑡 :                
(1−𝜁𝑡
𝑉)𝑥
𝑞t
𝑓 =  𝐽𝑖𝑡 ,   
𝑛𝑖𝑡:  𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑡 (
𝑛𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜙
)
𝜙−1
(
𝑘𝑖𝑡
1−𝜙
)
1−𝜙
ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝐹𝑡 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡λ𝑡+1 𝐽𝑖𝑡+1,   
and 
𝑘𝑖𝑡:                𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝑧𝑡 (
𝑛𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡
𝜙
)
𝜙
(
𝑘𝑖𝑡
1−𝜙
)
−𝜙
= 𝑟𝑡.   
The above optimal choices constitute equations (16), (17), (18) and (19) in the text. 
3A.4 Wage Determination 
Maximisation of the weighted product of both parties’ surplus with respect to wage yields 
𝛷
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝐽𝑖𝑡 + (1 − 𝛷)
𝜕𝐽𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
𝑊𝑖𝑡 = 0, 
where   
𝜕𝑊𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
= ℎ𝑖𝑡(1 − 𝜏𝑡) and  
𝜕𝐽𝑖𝑡
𝜕𝑤𝑖𝑡
= − ℎ𝑖𝑡, which gives rise to the following  
𝛷(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝐽𝑖𝑡 = (1 − 𝛷)𝑊𝑖𝑡 .                                                                                               (𝐴11) 
Noting that 𝑆𝑖𝑡 = 𝐽𝑖𝑡 + 𝑊𝑖𝑡   yields the effective surplus sharing relationships 
 𝑊𝑖𝑡 =
𝛷(1−𝜏𝑡)
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)
𝑆𝑖𝑡  and  𝐽𝑖𝑡 =
(1−𝛷)
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)
𝑆𝑖𝑡. 
As in Krause et al. (2008), using equations (17) and (A11) we have 
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(1 − 𝜁𝑡
𝑉)𝑥
𝑞t
𝑓 =  𝐽𝑖𝑡 = 𝑊𝑖𝑡  
(1 − Φ)
Φ(1 − 𝜏𝑡)
  ⟹ 𝑊𝑖𝑡 =
(1 − 𝜁𝑡
𝑉)𝑥
𝑞t
𝑓
Φ(1 − 𝜏𝑡)
(1 − Φ)
.                     (𝐴12) 
To obtain the real wage, we substitute the value equations (18) and (21) into (A11). Thus 
⇒ Φ(1 − 𝜏𝑡) [
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 − 𝜂𝐹𝑡 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡λ𝑡+1 𝐽𝑖𝑡+1] =  
(1 − Φ) [(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 − [𝑏𝑡 +
A(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
Λ𝑡
] + 𝜂𝐵 + 𝜁𝑡
𝑤 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡λ𝑡+1(1 − 𝑞𝑡+1
𝑤 )𝑊𝑖𝑡+1],  
⇒ −𝛷(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 − (1 − 𝛷)(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 =  
−𝛷(1 − 𝜏𝑡) [
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝜂𝐹𝑡 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1 𝐽𝑖𝑡+1]  
−(1 − 𝛷) [(𝑏𝑡 +
𝐴(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
𝛬𝑡
) − 𝜁𝑡
𝑤 − 𝜂𝐵 − (1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝑞𝑡+1
𝑤 )𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1𝑊𝑖𝑡+1],  
 ⇒ (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷(1 − 𝜏𝑡) [
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝜂𝐹𝑡 + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1 𝐽𝑖𝑡+1] 
                   +(1 − 𝛷) [(𝑏𝑡 +
𝐴(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
𝛬𝑡
) − 𝜁𝑡
𝑤 − 𝜂𝐵 − (1 − 𝜂)(1 − 𝑞𝑡+1
𝑤 )𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1𝑊𝑖𝑡+1].   
Using the fact that  𝐹𝑡 = 𝑃𝐶𝑡 + 𝐵, we have 
⇒ −𝛷(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝜂(𝑃𝐶𝑡 + 𝐵) − (1 − 𝛷)𝜂𝐵,  
⇒ −Φ(1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝜂𝑃𝐶𝑡 − (1 − Φ𝜏𝑡)𝜂𝐵.  
Substituting this into the wage equation, and making use of equation (A12) above, gives 
⇒ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷 (
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝜂(𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵) + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1
(1−𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥
𝑞t+1
𝑓 ) +  
(
1−𝛷
1−𝜏𝑡
) (𝑏𝑡 +
A(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
Λ𝑡
− 𝜁𝑡
𝑤 − (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1
(1−𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥
𝑞(𝜃𝑡+1)
𝛷𝐸𝑡(1−𝜏𝑡+1)
(1−𝛷)
) −
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)𝜂𝐵
(1−𝜏𝑡)
,  
 ⇒ 𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷 (
𝑚𝑐𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝜂(𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵)) + 𝛷 ((1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆,𝑡+1
(1−𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥
𝑞𝑡+1
𝑓 ) ×  
  (1 − (1 − 𝑞𝑡+1
𝑤 )
(1−𝜏𝑡+1)
(1−𝜏𝑡)
) + (
1−𝛷
1−𝜏𝑡
) (𝑏𝑡 +
𝐴ℎ
𝑖𝑡
1+𝛼ℎ
Λ𝑡(1+𝛼ℎ)
− 𝜁𝑡
𝑤) −
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)𝜂𝐵
(1−𝜏𝑡)
. 
The above is the wage equation that appears in the text (i.e. equation (25)). In the absence of 
tax,  𝜏𝑡 = 𝜏𝑡+1 = 0, the wage schedule becomes 
𝑤𝑖𝑡ℎ𝑖𝑡 = 𝛷 (
𝑚𝑐𝑖𝑡𝜙𝑦𝑖𝑡
𝑛𝑖𝑡
− 𝜂(𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵) + (1 − 𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1𝜃𝑡+1(1 − 𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥)  
+(1 − 𝛷)(𝑏𝑡 +
A(ℎ𝑖𝑡)
Λ𝑡
− 𝜁𝑡
𝑤) − 𝜂𝐵.                                                                 (𝐴13) 
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3B Summary of Equation System 
Here we summarise the equilibrium system by presenting each equation (Eq), the steady state 
(SS) and log-linearised (LL) versions. Note that in the absence of shocks, the economy converges 
to a steady state where all endogenous variables are constant. Hence, the steady state versions of 
the equations described below are obtained by dropping time subscripts from the original 
equation and assuming away shock, i.e., 𝜓𝑧 = 𝜓𝑙 = 0. The log-linearised version of the model 
is obtained using first order Taylor series approximation around the steady state to replace each 
equation with approximation, which are linear in the log-deviations of the variables. 
Law of motion for capital: 
Eq: 𝐾𝑡+1 = 𝐼𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)𝐾𝑡. 
SS: 𝐼 ̅ = 𝛿𝐾 . 
LL: ?̂?𝑡+1 = 𝛿𝐼𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿)?̂?𝑡. 
Marginal utility of consumption: 
Eq: 𝛬𝑡  = (𝐶𝑡 + 𝜑𝐺𝑡)
−𝛼𝑐 . 
SS: Λ ̅ = (𝐶̅ + 𝜑?̅?)−𝛼𝑐 . 
LL: ?̂?𝑡 =  − 
𝛼𝑐
(𝐶̅+𝜑?̅?)
(𝐶̅?̂?𝑡 + 𝜑?̅??̂?𝑡). 
Household Euler equation: 
Eq: 𝛬𝑡 = 𝛽𝐸𝑡[𝛬𝑡+1(1 + 𝑟𝑡+1 − 𝛿)]. 
SS: 
1
𝛽
= (1 + 𝑟 − 𝛿). 
LL: ?̂?𝑡 = 𝐸𝑡(?̂?𝑡+1 + 𝛽?̅??̂?𝑡+1). 
Aggregate productivity:  
Eq: 𝑌𝑡 = 𝑧𝑡 (
𝑁𝑡ℎ𝑡
𝜙
)
𝜙
(
𝐾𝑡
1−𝜙
)
1−𝜙
. 
SS: ?̅? = 𝑧̅ (
?̅?ℎ̅
𝜙
)
𝜙
(
?̅?
1−𝜙
)
1−𝜙
. 
LL: ?̂?𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 + 𝜙(?̂?𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑡) + (1 − 𝜙)?̂?𝑡. 
New Matches: 
Eq: 𝑀𝑡 = 𝑀𝑡(𝑈𝑡, 𝑉𝑡) = 𝜒𝑈𝑡
𝛾
𝑉𝑡
1−𝛾
. 
SS: ?̅? = 𝜒?̅?𝛾?̅?1−𝛾. 
LL:  ?̂?𝑡 = 𝛾?̂?𝑡 + (1 − 𝛾)?̂?𝑡. 
Market tightness: 
Eq: 𝜃𝑡 = 𝑉𝑡 𝑈𝑡⁄  . 
SS: ?̅? = ?̅? ?̅?⁄ . 
LL: 𝜃𝑡 = ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡. 
Vacancy filling rate: 
Eq: 𝑞𝑡
𝑓
=  𝜒𝜃𝑡
−𝛾
. 
SS: ?̅?𝑓 = 𝜒?̅?−𝛾. 
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LL: ?̂?𝑡
𝑓
 =  − 𝛾𝜃𝑡. 
Job finding rate:  
Eq: 𝑞𝑡
𝑤 =  𝜒𝜃𝑡
1−𝛾
. 
SS: ?̅?𝑤 = 𝜒?̅?1−𝛾. 
LL: ?̂?𝑡
𝑤  = (1 − 𝛾)𝜃𝑡. 
Aggregate employment: 
Eq: 𝑁𝑡 = (1 − 𝜂)𝑁𝑡−1 + 𝑀𝑡. 
SS: 𝜂?̅? = ?̅?. 
LL:   ?̅??̂?𝑡 = (1 − 𝜂)?̅??̂?𝑡−1 + ?̅??̂?𝑡. 
Aggregate unemployment: 
Eq: 𝑈𝑡 = [1 − 𝑁𝑡−1] + 𝜂𝑁𝑡−1. 
Eq: ?̅? = 1 − (1 − 𝜂)?̅?. 
LL: ?̅??̂?𝑡 = −(1 − 𝜂)?̅??̂?𝑡−1. 
Marginal cost (the inverse of mark-up): 
Eq: 𝑚𝑐𝑡 =
ℰ𝑡−1
ℰ𝑡
. 
SS:  𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ =
ℰ̅−1
ℰ̅
. 
LL: 𝑚?̂?𝑡 =
1
ℰ̅−1
ℰ̂𝑡. 
Optimal choice of capital: 
Eq: 𝑟𝑡 = 𝑚𝑐𝑡(1 − 𝜙)
𝑌𝑡
𝐾𝑡
. 
SS: ?̅? = 𝑚𝑐̅̅ ̅̅ (1 − 𝜙)
?̅?
?̅?
. 
LL: ?̂?𝑡 = 𝑚?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡. 
Job creation condition: 
Eq: 
(1−𝜁𝑡
𝑉)𝑥
𝑞𝑡
𝑓 =
𝑚𝑐𝑡𝜙𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 − 𝜂𝐹𝑡 + (1 − 𝜂)𝛽𝐸𝑡
𝛬𝑡+1
𝛬𝑡
(1−𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥
𝑞𝑡+1
𝑓 . 
SS: 
[1−(1−𝜂)𝛽](1−?̅?𝑉)𝑥
𝑞𝑓
=
𝑚𝑐̅̅̅̅̅𝜙?̅?
?̅?
− ?̅?ℎ̅ − 𝜂?̅?. 
LL: − {
?̅?𝑉?̂?𝑡
𝑉
(1−?̅?𝑉)
+ ?̂?𝑡
𝑓} =
𝑚𝑐̅̅̅̅̅𝜙?̅?
?̅?
(𝑚?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡) − ?̅?ℎ̅(?̂?𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑡) − 𝜂?̅??̂?𝑡 
+
(1−𝜂)𝛽(1−?̅?𝑉)𝑥
𝑞𝑓
{?̂?𝑡+1 − ?̂?𝑡 −
?̅?𝑉?̂?𝑡+1
𝑉
(1−?̅?𝑉)
− ?̂?𝑡+1
𝑓 } . 
Wage bill: 
Eq: 𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 = 𝛷 {
𝑚𝑐𝑡𝜙𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
− 𝜂(𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵 ) +
(1−𝜂)𝐸𝑡𝜆𝑡+1(1−𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉 )𝑥
𝑞𝑡+1
𝑓 [1 − (1 − 𝑞𝑡+1
𝑤 )
(1−𝜏𝑡+1)
(1−𝜏𝑡)
]} 
               +(1 − 𝛷) {
𝑏𝑡−𝜁𝑡
𝑤
1−𝜏𝑡
+
𝜙2𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑌𝑡
(1+𝛼ℎ)𝑁𝑡
} −
(1−𝛷𝜏𝑡)𝜂𝐵
(1−𝜏𝑡)
. 
SS: 𝑤ℎ = 𝛷 {
𝑚𝑐̅̅̅̅̅𝜙?̅?
?̅?
− 𝜂(?̅?𝑓 + 𝜂𝑤𝐵 ) + (1 − 𝜂)𝛽(1 − 𝜁𝑉)𝑥?̅?} 
 +(1 − 𝛷) {
𝑏−𝜁𝑤
1−𝜏
+
𝜙2𝑚𝑐?̅?
(1+𝛼ℎ)?̅?
} −
(1−𝛷𝜏)𝜂𝐵
(1−𝜏)
. 
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LL: ?̅?ℎ̅(?̂?𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑡) = 𝛷 {
𝑚𝑐̅̅̅̅̅𝜙?̅?
?̅?
(𝑚?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡) − 𝜂?̅?
𝑓?̂?𝑡
𝑓} 
 + 𝛷(1 − 𝜂)𝛽(1 − 𝜁?̅?)𝑥?̅? {𝛬𝑡+1 − 𝛬𝑡 + 𝜃𝑡+1 −
𝜁𝑉𝜁𝑡+1
𝑉
1−𝜁𝑉
+
𝜏(𝜏𝑡+1−𝜏𝑡)
𝑞𝑤(1−𝜏)
}  
+
(1−𝛷)
(1−𝜏)
{?̅??̂?𝑡 − 𝜁
𝑤𝜁𝑡
𝑤 +
(𝑏−𝜁𝑤−𝜂𝐵)𝜏?̂?𝑡
(1−𝜏)
+
(1−𝜏)𝜙2𝑚𝑐?̅?
(1+𝛼ℎ)?̅?
(𝑚?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡)}. 
Hours of work 
Eq: 
𝐴ℎ𝑡
(1+𝛼ℎ)
(1−𝜏𝑡)Λ𝑡
=
𝜙2𝑚𝑐𝑡𝑌𝑡
𝑁𝑡
. 
SS: 
𝐴ℎ(1+𝛼ℎ)
(1−?̅?)Λ ̅
=
𝜙2𝑚𝑐̅̅̅̅̅?̅?
?̅?
. 
LL: (1 + 𝛼ℎ)ℎ̂𝑡 +
?̅?
(1−?̅?)
?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡 = 𝑚?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 − ?̂?𝑡. 
Household budget constraint: 
Eq: 𝐶𝑡 + 𝐼𝑡 + 𝑇𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏𝑡)𝑁𝑡𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 + (1 − 𝑁𝑡)𝑏𝑡 + 𝜂𝑁𝑡𝐵 + 𝑁𝑡𝜁𝑡
𝑤 + 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡 + 𝛱𝑡. 
SS: 𝐶̅ + 𝐼 ̅ + ?̅? = (1 − 𝜏̅)?̅??̅?ℎ̅ +  (1 − ?̅?)?̅? + 𝜂?̅?𝐵 + ?̅?𝜁?̅? + ?̅?𝐾 + 𝛱. 
 LL: 𝐶̅?̂?𝑡 + 𝐼?̅̂?𝑡 + ?̅??̂?𝑡 = (1 − 𝜏̅)?̅??̅?ℎ̅ (?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑡 −
?̅?
(1−?̅?)
?̂?𝑡) 
  + (1 − ?̅?)?̅??̂?𝑡 + (𝜁
𝑤 + 𝜂𝐵 − ?̅?)?̅??̂?𝑡 + ?̅?𝜁
𝑤𝜁𝑡
𝑤 + ?̅?𝐾(?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡) + 𝛱?̂?𝑡. 
Profit equation: 
Eq: 𝛱𝑡 = 𝑌𝑡 − 𝑁𝑡𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 − 𝑟𝑡𝐾𝑡 − (1 − 𝜁𝑡
𝑉)𝑥𝑉𝑡 − 𝜂𝑁𝑡𝐹𝑡. 
SS: 𝛱 = ?̅? − ?̅??̅?ℎ̅ − ?̅?𝐾 − (1 − 𝜁?̅?)𝑥?̅? − 𝜂?̅??̅?. 
 LL: 𝛱?̂?𝑡 = ?̅??̂?𝑡 − ?̅??̅?ℎ̅(?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑡) − ?̅?𝐾(?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡) 
  −𝜁?̅?𝑥?̅? (?̂?𝑡 −
?̅?𝑉?̂?𝑡
𝑉
(1−?̅?𝑉)
) − 𝜂?̅??̅? (?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡). 
Government budget dynamics: 
Eq: 𝑇𝑡 + 𝜏𝑡𝑁𝑡𝑤𝑡ℎ𝑡 + 𝜂𝑁𝑡(𝛼𝑡
𝑓
+ 𝜂𝑤𝐵) = 𝐺𝑡 + (1 − 𝑁𝑡)𝑏𝑡 + 𝜁𝑡
𝑤𝑁𝑡 + 𝜁𝑡
𝑉𝑥𝑉𝑡. 
SS: ?̅? + 𝜏̅?̅??̅?ℎ̅ + ?̅?𝜂(?̅?𝑓 + 𝜂𝑤𝐵) = ?̅? + (1 − ?̅?)?̅? + 𝜁?̅??̅? + 𝜁?̅?𝑥?̅?. 
LL: ?̅??̂?𝑡 + 𝜏̅?̅??̅?ℎ̅(?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 + ?̂?𝑡 + ℎ̂𝑡) + 𝜂(?̅?
𝑓 + 𝜂𝑤𝐵)?̅??̂?𝑡 + ?̅?𝜂?̅?
𝑓?̂?𝑡
𝑓
= 
?̅??̂?𝑡 + (1 − ?̅?)?̅??̂?𝑡 − ?̅?𝑁?̂?𝑡 + 𝜁
?̅??̅?(𝜁𝑡
𝑤 + ?̂?𝑡) + 𝜁
?̅?𝑥𝑉(𝜁𝑡
𝑉 + ?̂?𝑡). 
Productivity factor: 
?̂?𝑡 = 𝜌𝑧?̂?𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑧𝑡. 
Autoregressive process of other exogenous variables: 
𝑙𝑡 = 𝜌𝑙𝑙𝑡−1 + 𝜓𝑙𝑡 ; 𝑙𝑡  = ℰ𝑡 , 𝐺𝑡, 𝑏𝑡 , 𝛼𝑡
𝑓
, 𝜁𝑡
𝑤  and 𝜁𝑡
𝑉. 
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3C Tables and Figures 
Table 3.1: Baseline calibration 
Para. Value Description Source 
𝛽 0.99 subjective discount factor Faccini et al. (2013) 
𝛿 0.025 depreciation rate Zanetti (2011a). 
𝜑 0.1 degree of substitutability Ahmed (1986) 
𝛼𝑐 0.9 relative risk aversion See text 
𝛼ℎ 2 inv. of Frisch elasticity Trigari (2006, 2009) 
𝜙 0.69 labour input elasticity  Faccini et al. (2013) 
ℰ̅ 6 set to target mark-up of 20 percent Villa and Yang (2011) 
𝛾 0.5 elasticity of match to unemp Pissarides (1998) 
𝛷 (1 − 𝛾) Hosios efficiency condition Hosios (1990) 
𝜂 0.05 job separation rate Pissarides (1998) 
𝜌𝑏  0.38 benefit replacement ratio Faccini et al. (2011) 
𝜒 0.62994 job match efficiency See text 
𝜏 0.27 labour tax Angelopoulos et al. (2012) 
𝐴 4 disutility of work measure Villa and Yang (2011) 
𝑃𝐶̅̅̅̅  0.3 firing tax Zanetti (2011a)/See text 
𝑥 0.28709 vacancy creation cost See text 
 
 
Table 3.2: Data averages and benchmark model’s steady state solution 
Variable Data average Model solution 
?̅?/?̅? 0.2199 0.2199 
𝐶̅/?̅? 0.5802 0.5823 
𝐼/̅?̅? 0.1856 0.1840 
𝐾/?̅? 7.4223 7.3597 
𝛱/?̅? 0.1707 0.1695 
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Table 3.3: Steady state solution and policy comparative statics 
Var. Bench 𝒃 𝜶𝒇 𝜼𝒘𝑩 𝜻𝑽 𝜻𝒘 𝝉 ?̅? 𝝋 𝝋 & ?̅?(2) 𝒃 & 𝜻𝑽(3) 𝒃 & 𝜻𝒘(4) 
?̅? 1.0000 0.9357 0.9990 0.9967 1.0038 1.0199 0.9384 1.0475 0.9779 1.0134 0.9406 1.0000 
𝐻𝐷𝐼̅̅ ̅̅ ̅̅  0.9851 0.9641 0.9803 0.9684 0.9882 1.0903 0.9324 1.0304 0.9641 0.9978 0.9670 1.0851 
𝐶̅ 0.5823 0.5376 0.5817 0.5803 0.5845 0.5927 0.5353 0.5201 0.5647 0.4929 0.5413 0.5823 
𝐾 7.3597 6.8865 7.3523 7.3355 7.3874 7.5062 6.9065 7.7096 7.1973 7.4584 6.9229 7.3597 
Π̅ 0.1695 0.1572 0.1693 0.1688 0.1700 0.1741 0.1586 0.1777 0.1658 0.1718 0.1580 0.1695 
ℎ̅ 0.3333 0.3450 0.3335 0.3338 0.3328 0.3308 0.3212 0.3472 0.3270 0.3372 0.3440 0.3333 
?̅? 1.6484 1.6810 1.6355 1.5893 1.6507 1.6267 1.6535 1.6523 1.6466 1.6495 1.6820 1.6484 
?̅? 0.0482 0.0209 0.0474 0.0457 0.0513 0.0683 0.0369 0.0515 0.0466 0.0491 0.0221 0.0482 
?̅? 0.4899 0.1132 0.4757 0.4455 0.5482 0.9323 0.3031 0.5533 0.4609 0.5077 0.1239 0.4899 
?̅?𝑤 0.4409 0.2119 0.4345 0.4205 0.4664 0.6082 0.3468 0.4686 0.4276 0.4488 0.2218 0.4409 
𝑆̅ 0.5519 0.2653 0.5438 0.5263 0.5254 0.7613 0.4089 0.5865 0.5352 0.5618 0.2498 0.5519 
?̅? 0.0984 0.1850 0.0997 0.1027 0.0935 0.0733 0.1218 0.0931 0.1011 0.0968 0.1783 0.0984 
?̅? 0.9450 0.8542 0.9436 0.9405 0.9501 0.9713 0.9204 0.9505 0.9421 0.9466 0.8613 0.9450 
(1) In all cases we consider 0.1 percentage point increase from the respective benchmark values, except for 𝜂𝑤  and 𝜑 whose change equal 0.5 and 
0.2, respectively. In all instances we allow lump sum tax to adjust to balance government’s budget. 
(2) An increase in government consumption expenditure, ?̅?, accompanied by an increase in the degree of substitutability, 𝜑. 
(3) An increase in unemployment benefit, 𝑏, accompanied by an increase in recruitment subsidy, 𝜁𝑉. 
(4) An increase in unemployment benefit, 𝑏, accompanied by an increase in tax subsidy, 𝜁𝑤. 
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Table 3.4: Fiscal employment and output multipliers 
  Employment Multiplier  Output Multiplier 
  Q1 1 year 2 years Peak  Q1 1 year 2 years Peak  
G
o
v
t.
 C
o
n
. 
E
x
p
. 
 
Benchmark 0.0029 0.0044 0.0050 0.0052 0.2475 0.2438 0.2386 0.2475 
Fixed firing cost (𝛼𝑓) 0.0029 0.0047 0.0054 0.0057 0.2475 0.2439 0.2389 0.2475 
Sev. induced cost  (𝜂𝑤𝐵) 0.0029 0.0045 0.0052 0.0054 0.2475 0.2438 0.2387 0.2475 
Distortionary tax  (𝜏) 0.0029 0.0048 0.0058 0.0063 0.2502 0.2467 0.2417 0.2502 
Unem. benefit  (𝑏) 0.0028 0.0053 0.0071 0.0086 0.2488 0.2458 0.2413 0.2488 
Substitutability (𝜑) 0.0021 0.0033 0.0038 0.0039 0.1842 0.1813 0.1773 0.1842 
Tax financing -0.0217 -0.0348 -0.0413 -0.0559 -0.4090 -0.4440 -0.4789 -0.7501 
R
ec
r.
 S
u
b
si
d
y
 Benchmark 3.0281 4.7103 5.4295 6.1030  1.7219 2.7711 3.3019 4.6731 
Fixed firing cost (𝛼𝑓) 3.5298 5.7950 6.8967 8.0046 1.9262 3.3367 4.1292 6.1335 
Sev. induced cost (𝜂𝑤𝐵) 3.2142 5.1086 5.9612 6.7805 1.7990 2.9797 3.6023 5.1930 
Tax (𝜏) 3.9744 6.7809 8.2781 9.8828 2.0069 3.6720 4.6814 7.2229 
Unem. Benefit (𝑏) 6.7605 13.2204 18.0072 25.3775 3.0131 7.0299 10.2807 19.6288 
Distotionary tax 3.0587 4.7721 5.5112 6.2261 2.1952 3.7637 4.5719 6.7952 
T
a
x
 S
u
b
si
d
y
 
Benchmark 0.0369 0.0506 0.0550 0.0587  0.0181 0.0267 0.0304 0.0428 
Fixed firing cost (𝛼𝑓) 0.0371 0.0528 0.0582 0.0630 0.0180 0.0277 0.0321 0.0459 
Sev. induced cost  (𝜂𝑤𝐵) 0.0370 0.0515 0.0563 0.0604 0.0181 0.0271 0.0311 0.0440 
Tax  (𝜏) 0.0431 0.0614 0.0678 0.0734 0.0207 0.0321 0.0372 0.0533 
Unem. benefit  (𝑏) 0.0371 0.0591 0.0691 0.0787 0.0171 0.0304 0.0375 0.0570 
Tax financing 0.0190 0.0255 0.0269 0.0270 -0.7861 -0.8089 -0.8426 -1.1317 
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Figure 3.1: Benchmark impulse responses to a positive TFP shock. 
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Figure 3.2: Benchmark impulse responses to a positive government consumption shock 
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Figure 3.3: Benchmark impulse responses to unemployment insurance shock 
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Figure 3.4: Policy reforms and productivity shock 
   
 
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Quarters
Employment      
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Quarters
Vacancy         
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Aggregate Hours 
5 10 15 20 25
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Hours per Worker
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Quarters
Output          
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Quarters
Match Surplus   
5 10 15 20
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Quarters
HDI             
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Quarters
Consumption     
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Quarters
Capital         
 
 
Bench Flat Sep Cost Severance Induced Cost Distortionary Tax Benefit
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Quarters
Employment      
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Quarters
Vacancy         
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Aggregate Hours 
5 10 15 20 25
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Hours per Worker
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Quarters
Output          
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Quarters
Match Surplus   
5 10 15 20
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Quarters
HDI             
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Quarters
Consumption     
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Quarters
Capital         
 
 
Bench Flat Sep Cost Severance Induced Cost Distortionary Tax Benefit
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Quarters
Employment      
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Quarters
Vacancy         
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Aggregate Hours 
5 10 15 20 25
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Hours per Worker
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Quarters
Output          
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Quarters
Match Surplus   
5 10 15 20
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Quarters
HDI             
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Quarters
Consumption     
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Quarters
Capital         
 
 
Bench Flat Sep Cost Severance Induced Cost Distortionary Tax Benefit
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Quarters
Employment      
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Quarters
Vacancy         
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Aggregate Hours 
5 10 15 20 25
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Hours per Worker
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
Quarters
Output          
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Quarters
Match Surplus   
5 10 15 20
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Quarters
HDI             
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Quarters
Consumption     
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Quarters
Capital         
 
 
Bench Flat Sep Cost Severance Induced Cost Distortionary Tax Benefit
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.01
0.02
0.03
0.04
Quarters
Employment      
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
Quarters
Vacancy         
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.
Quarters
Aggregate Hours 
5 10 15 20 25
-0.05
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
Quarters
Hours per Worker
4 4.05 4.1 4.15 4.2 4.25 4.3 4.35 4.4 4.45
1.06
1.065
1.07
1.075
1.08
1.085
Quarters
Output          
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.5
1
1.5
2
Quarters
Match Surplus   
5 10 15 20
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
Quarters
HDI             
5 10 15 20
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.7
0.8
0.9
Quarters
Consumption     
5 10 15 20 25
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
Quarters
Capital         
 
 
Bench Flat Sep Cost Severance Induced Cost Distortionary Tax Benefit
96 
Figure 3.5: Policy Reforms and government consumption spending shock 
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Figure 3.6: Recruitment vs Tax subsidies 
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Figure 3.7: Government consumption spending under alternative financing scheme 
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Figure 3.8: Recruitment subsidy under alternative financing scheme 
 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
Quarters
Employment      
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.05
0.1
0.15
0.2
0.25
Quarters
Vacancy         
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
Quarters
Aggregate Hours 
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-2
-1.5
-1
-0.5
0
0.5
1
x 10
-3
Quarters
Hours per Worker
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
0.002
0.004
0.006
0.008
0.01
0.012
Quarters
Real Wage       
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-0.03
-0.025
-0.02
-0.015
-0.01
-0.005
0
0.005
Quarters
Match Surplus   
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
x 10
-3
Quarters
Output          
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
-1
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 10
-3
Quarters
Capital         
10 20 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 100
0
1
2
3
4
5
x 10
-3
Quarters
Consumption     
 
 
Lumpsum Tax
Distortionary Tax
100 
Figure 3.9: Tax subsidy under alternative financing. 
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Figure 3.10: Degree of substitutability between private and public consumption 
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Figure 3.11: Employment multipliers 
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Figure 3.12: Output multipliers 
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Chapter 4. Unemployment Dynamics and Economic Openness to International Trade 
and Capital Mobility 
4.1 Introduction 
“The recent economic crisis has no precedent in our generation. The steady gains in 
economic growth and job creation witnessed over the last decade have been wiped out – 
our GDP fell by 4% in 2009, our industrial production dropped back to the levels of the 
1990s and 23 million people - or 10% of our active population - are now unemployed…” 
                                                                                  European Commision (2010, p. 7)  
 
The above statement is an extract from the Europe 2020: A strategy for smart, sustainable and 
inclusive growth regarding the recent economic crisis which began in 2007. A remarkable feature 
of that crisis is the dramatic collapse of international capital and trade flows. In 2008, global 
capital flow dropped by 16 percent – having attained a record high of approximately $2 trillion 
and accounting for over 16 percent of the world’s gross fixed capital formation in 2007 – and 
additionally by 40 percent in 2009 (Poulsen & Hufbauer, 2011). At the same time, global trade 
contracted significantly, witnessing an unprecedented 30 percent decline between September 
2008 and January 2009 (Bricongne, Fontagné, Gaulier, Taglioni, & Vicard, 2012). 
 The Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of individual countries were not left unaffected by 
these global developments. An example is the UK, whose GDP fell substantially by 7.2 percent 
between 2007 and 2009, of which about two-third of the decline is attributed to global shock – 
driven mostly by the collapse in foreign demand for UK’s exports and export prices (Chowla et 
al., 2014). The contraction in the GDP was accompanied by deterioration in the labour market 
condition: vacancy creation rate fell by 5.6 percent between the first and second quarters of 2008, 
and by the first quarter of 2009, this had fallen further by 22 percent. Unemployment rate also 
rose by 1.3 percentage points to 7.1 percent between the third quarter of 2008 and the first quarter 
of 2009  (Clancy, 2009). These developments in the UK and elsewhere1 spurred renewed interest 
in the literature regarding the effects of globalisation on the labour market. This chapter aims to 
contribute to this literature by investigating the dynamics of unemployment in a framework that 
integrates both international trade and capital mobility. 
 The literature on the labour market effects of international economic openness is large 
and varied. Here, we distinguish between two main strands of the literature relating to 
unemployment issues. 2  The first strand of this literature focuses on the consequences of 
                                                             
1 See Zmitrowicz and Khan (2014) for an assessment of labour market conditions in Canada and the United States 
during the economic crisis. Also see Salgado et al., (2014) for further evidence of the variations in the labour market 
responses following the crisis, and Jenkins, Brandolini, Micklewright, and Nolan, (2013) and Joyce and Sibieta 
(2013) for the distributional impact of the crisis on household income. 
2 For a recent survey of both theoretical and empirical effects of trade openness on unemployment see e.g. Belenkiy 
and Riker (2015) and the references therein. Also see Vallanti (2015) for the empirical study on capital mobility 
and unemployment. Yet. another strand of the literature focuses on the effects of international trade on wage – see 
Haskel, Lawrence, Leamer, and Slaughter (2012) for a review. An aspect of globalisation which has, to some extent, 
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international trade integration on the labour market as measured by changes in unemployment. 
Despite extensive research in this area, the exact impact of trade openness on unemployment 
remains inclusive. Dutt, Mitra, and Ranjan (2009) show that an increase in openness to trade 
which improves aggregate labour productivity will result in a lower unemployment. Cacciatore 
(2014) and Felbermayr et al. (2011) find a similar unemployment-reducing effect of trade, 
arguing that higher trade openness induces the reallocation of resources towards more productive 
firms, causing the larger and more profitable ones to select into exporting; thus, resulting in an 
economy-wide increase in average firms’ productivity. A central message from these studies is 
that as long as a reduction in barriers to trade raises the (average) productivity of firms, and 
consequently, the marginal product of labour, it is likely to have an unemployment-reducing 
effect. By contrast, Cosar et al. (2016), Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) and Helpman, Itskhoki, 
and Redding (2010) show that while trade openness raises the profitability of exporting firms, it 
can lead to higher unemployment. Moore and Ranjan (2005) find an ambiguous effects of trade 
liberalisation on unemployment, but argue that such liberalisation can lead to an increase in the 
unemployment rate of unskilled workers. 
 The structure of the institutions governing the labour market are identified as playing an 
important role in determining the effects of trade integration on unemployment. In their static 
model with labour market frictions, Felbermayr et al. (2011) argue that wage setting mechanism 
is relevant for explaining the extent of effects of trade liberalisation: comparing both collective 
(unionised) and individual firm level wage bargaining solutions, they found that trade 
liberalisation results in a much lower unemployment in the latter. Cacciatore (2014) also shows 
that in the short run, the response of unemployment to trade openness is weakened in countries 
with high labour market rigidity. In the long run, however, countries with and without labour 
market frictions experience lower unemployment as a result of the opening to international trade. 
By contrast, Cosar et al. (2016) show that the unemployment-increasing effects of trade openness 
can be lowered via a simultaneous reduction in firing restrictions, measured by the firing cost 
incurred by firms upon job separation, and trade barriers. In their two-sector open economy 
model, Helpman and Itskhoki (2010) show that, through the reallocation of workers towards a 
more profitable exporting sector, trade integration can result in higher unemployment if this 
sector is to some extent characterised by greater labour market frictions. 
The second strand of the literature, which has received considerably less attention, 
focuses on the labour market effects of international capital mobility. Rodrik (1998), one of the 
early authors who emphasised the link between international capital mobility and the labour 
market in a static partial equilibrium framework, shows that the degree of openness to capital 
mobility significantly affects the dynamics of the labour market. In particular, he demonstrates 
that lower barriers to international capital flow increases the volatility of wages and hours 
                                                             
also attracted attention in the literature is migration and its effects on the labour market (see, among others, 
Dustmann, Glitz, & Frattini, 2008). 
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worked in response to shocks. Using a one-sector equilibrium life-cycle framework characterised 
by search and matching frictions, Azariadis and Pissarides (2007) also show that perfect capital 
mobility increases the responsiveness of unemployment to domestic productivity shock. 
However, when compared to a closed economy setting, without access to international capital 
facilities, the effect is less persistent as the impact of shock dies out. Focusing on the structure 
of the labour market, Du et al. (2015) show that a lower restriction to capital movement induces 
the inflow of foreign capital into countries with higher flexible labour market (low vacancy 
creation cost), and thus leads to lower unemployment. A similar unemployment-reducing effect 
is found by Head and Smith (2004) who studied the implications of labour market rigidities 
(measured by changes in unemployment benefits insurance) for unemployment rates in a 
symmetric two-country model with search and matching frictional labour market. In particular, 
the authors conclude that the gap in the unemployment rate between two countries widens as 
capital mobility increases, with a less flexible labour market country experiencing a greater 
increase in unemployment rate.  
The above contributions typically separate the effects of international trade and capital 
mobility on the labour market, which is not warranted when they are both identified as key 
drivers of globalisation (Greenaway & Nelson, 2001; Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010), important 
sources of heterogeneity across countries (Antràs & Caballero, 2009) and channels through 
which global shocks can be transmitted to the domestic economy (Chowla et al., 2014; Rodrik, 
1998). Antràs and Caballero show that, in the presence of international capital mobility, trade 
liberalisation leads to capital outflow, which can potentially result in higher unemployment 
volatility (Azariadis & Pissarides, 2007). Egger, Greenaway, and Seidel (2011) also argue that 
while an increase in labour market rigidity leads to higher unemployment and lower trade flow, 
allowing for international capital mobility can reverse the latter effect. 
Another common feature of the above studies is the emphasis on the ‘direct’ effects of 
economic openness (i.e. liberalisation). Little attention is paid to how the actual degree of 
openness of an economy drives its reaction to global and domestic economic shocks (e.g, in 
Cosar et al., 2016; Felbermayr et al., 2011; Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010). In the trade-
unemployment literature, a notable exception is Cacciatore (2014), who shows that the degree 
of trade openness matters for the propagation of domestic shock. A recent survey of labour 
market responses to the last economic crsis by Salgado, Figari, Sutherland, and Tumino (2014) 
shows that wide variations persisted in many countries in the EU throughout the period of the 
crisis. Given the variation in the degree of economic openness from one country to another, the 
sensitivity of each to global economic developments – including those emerging from within – 
and their attendant consequences on the domestic economy is likely to depend on their extent of 
openness to the rest of the world. Gamberoni, Uexkull, and Weber (2010) show (empirically) 
that the contractionary effect of the last economic crisis on unemployment was higher in 
countries with greater openness to international trade. Additionally, in an empirical study which 
covered a panel of 20 OECD countries over a 30-year period, Vallanti (2015) found that greater 
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exposure to international capital mobility increases unemployment fluctuations in response to 
aggregate shock. 
This chapter develops a small open economy dynamic stochastic general equilibrium 
(DSGE) model in which unemployment arises due to search and matching frictions. An 
important departure from the literature is that we explicitly model an economy linked to the rest 
of the world through international trade and capital mobility. We are particularly interested in 
answering the following specific questions: first, what are the individual and combined effects 
of changes in the degree of openness to international trade and capital mobility on labour market 
outcomes, especially unemployment? Second, how does the degree of openness shape the 
transition path of unemployment in response to, e.g., domestic productivity and foreign demand 
shocks? Third, what are the individual and joint effects of labour market reforms – including 
active labour market policies (ALMPs) – and economic openness on unemployment? And, how 
do labour market reforms and ALMPs drive unemployment dynamic to openness shocks? 
Our framework features a representative household, two vertically integrated production 
sectors (final and intermediate good sectors), a hiring sector, and a government. The household 
consumes, store its wealth in physical capital and supplies labour. To capture international 
capital mobility, the household is assumed to have access to international capital facilities which 
can be used to deal with the domestic residual capital requirement. Capital mobility involves 
transaction cost, which we model along the line proposed by Rodrik (1998). The intermediate 
good sector is characterised by monopolistic competition in its product market as governed by 
the horizontally differentiated nature of the varieties produced using capital and labour man-
hours as factor inputs. Differentiated varieties are sold both domestically and as export. The final 
good sector, assumed to operate under perfect competition, produces a homogenous non-traded 
final good by aggregating domestic and imported differentiated varieties. Both exporting and 
importing activities are subject to iceberg-trade cost (e.g., see, Feenstra, Obstfeld, & Russ, 2014; 
Molana et al., 2016). The hiring sector is modelled – as in Christoffel and Kuester (2008) and de 
Walque, Pierrard, Sneessens, and Wouters (2009) – to act as an intermediary between the 
household that supplies labour and the intermediate sector that uses the service of labour as input. 
This sector is established by the government3 that is also responsible for regulating policies 
governing the employment. 
                                                             
3 A recent evaluation of private vs public recruitment agencies in the EU show that the former provides a much 
more effective service delivery in terms of number of workers who exit unemployment (Behaghel et al., 2014). 
Additionally, there is marked difference between the percentage of unemployed job seekers who use private and 
public recruitment agencies within the EU. As suggested by the European Labour Market Survey data, provided by 
the Eurostat, these differences ranges from approximately 25 percent and 53 percent in the UK to 8 percent and 70 
percent in Sweden for private and public recruitment agencies respectively, between the first quarter of 2008 and 
third quarter of 2016. (The EU-27 average over this period is reported to be 22 percent and 53 percent.) Also note 
that allowing for direct matching between workers and firms will not change the qualitative effects of our results. 
In fact, as suggested by data, in the UK, Sweden and Germany, the percentages of workers who applied directly to 
employers between the first quarter of 2008 and third quarter of 2016 are respectively 1.3, 24.8 and 60.1 percentage 
point less that those who applied through public recruitment agencies. Source: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database, [lfsq_ugmsw]. 
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We calibrate the model so that its steady state can reflect the main empirical 
characteristics of the current UK economy, with particular focus on its long-run labour market 
features, and then examine both the steady state and the dynamic features of the model 
numerically. The key results are summarised as follows: first, we demonstrate that both 
international trade and capital mobility matter for the behaviour of unemployment. Both in the 
steady state and the dynamic short-run, a reduction in the barriers to capital mobility in isolation 
leads to lower unemployment. The intuition is that an increase in capital mobility signifies a rise 
in investment opportunities, due to lower transaction cost associated with the movement of 
capital across borders. All else equal, this incentivises the household to increase investment in 
capital. We identify two main channels through which this can impact unemployment, which we 
refer to as domestic demand effect and wealth effect. First, by raising investment drive, and thus 
capital, an increase in capital mobility, drives up the demand for domestic goods, which, in turn, 
leads to a rise in labour productivity. Higher labour productivity induces more recruitment in the 
hiring sector, leading to lower unemployment. Second, as domestic capital increases, the ensuing 
negative interest rate differential triggers capital outflow. Since this implies an increase in 
household’s financial wealth via returns on net capital flow, consumption rises, further 
encouraging vacancy creation and employment. As for the effect of international trade, we find 
that a reduction in barriers to trade leads to lower unemployment through an increase in foreign 
demand for domestic export, which increases labour productivity, consistent with the literature. 
Our model predicts that, compared to individual cases, a joint reduction in capital mobility and 
trade barriers can deliver greater benefit in terms of lower unemployment. 
Second, our results reveal that the degree of openness to trade and capital mobility is also 
crucial for determining how shocks – arising from both the domestic economy and the rest of 
the world – affect unemployment dynamics. More importantly, the ability of the economy to 
smooth out the effects of these shocks hinges on its degree of access to the international capital 
facility: a higher (lower) barrier to international capital facilities reduces (increases) the ability 
of the household to respond to shocks by either importing or exporting capital. The intuition is 
straightforward: suppose a positive productivity shock hits the domestic economy. This 
intensifies the demand for factor inputs (labour and capital) as well as raises the domestic rate of 
return on capital. With lower barriers to capital mobility, it is cheaper to import capital to support 
domestic production. The inflow of foreign capital, thus, enables firms to increase production, 
leading to a much lower unemployment, along the line predicted by Azariadis and Pissarides 
(2007). By contrast, if there is high barrier to international capital mobility, agents are forced to 
formulate investment plans in order to meet sudden changes in domestic capital requirements, 
which implies that investment and capital must rise in response to a positive productivity shock. 
Under this condition, the impact of the shock on unemployment depends on the degree of 
openness to international trade. If trade cost is relatively low, the positive productivity shock 
tends to produce a much larger reaction in unemployment than if there is higher trade barrier. A 
striking finding from this study is that shocks arising from different sources are likely to have 
109 
different impact on the adjustment of unemployment, depending the degree of capital mobility. 
In particular, we find that while a lower barrier to capital mobility amplifies the response of 
unemployment to a positive productivity shock, it weakens the response to a positive foreign 
demand shock. By contrast, a reduction in trade cost amplifies the effect of both shocks on 
unemployment: both the speed of initial adjustment and the peak effects are enhanced. 
Finally, this chapter illustrates the relevance of labour market policies in an economy 
with international openness. We find that whilst labour market reforms and ALMPs – through 
their effects on the cost of vacancy creation and labour cost to the hiring sector – lead to a lower 
unemployment, their individual effect on unemployment is enhanced when accompanied by a 
reduction in either trade or capital mobility barriers. More crucially, given the recent emphasis 
on reforms towards a more flexible labour market system,4 we investigate how the flexicurity 
welfare system – which combines flexibility in hiring and firing rules, while providing social 
security for unemployed workers in terms of unemployment benefits –  affects the adjustment of 
unemployment to shocks. We then compare the results with two other notable welfare systems: 
the liberal (e.g. the UK) system, characterised by low unemployment benefit and firing cost, and 
moderately high job creation cost; and the Mediterranean (e.g. Spanish) system which features 
high unemployment benefit, high vacancy creation cost, and high firing cost structure. Consistent 
with data evidence (as recently documented by, e.g., Andersen, 2012), our results show that 
labour markets which are to some extent characterised by higher flexibility (corresponding to 
flexicurity and liberal welfare systems) exhibit higher volatility in unemployment in response to 
shocks compared to the more rigid Mediterranean system that produces a much slower and more 
protracted response in unemployment.  
Our study is closest to a recent contribution by Egger, Greenaway, and Seidel (2011) who 
study the implications of labour market imperfections for trade flow in a multi-country static 
model with trade and capital mobility. The current paper, however, differs from theirs in that we 
consider a dynamic model which allows us to not only investigate the interactions between 
labour market rigidity and economic openness, but also examine how various degrees of 
openness influence the dynamics of unemployment to international shocks. This paper is also 
close to Dix‐Carneiro (2014), but in contrast to the author, we consider international (rather than 
sectoral) capital mobility and take up the issue of unemployment which is missing in that paper. 
In general, our paper complements those in trade-unemployment literature, as well as the 
literature focusing on the effects of capital mobility on unemployment. A key distinction between 
these papers and ours is that we integrate both trade and capital mobility in a unified framework. 
Moreover, most studies within trade-unemployment literature assume that labour is the only 
factor of production. However, illustrated by, e.g., Heer and Maußner (2010) and Monacelli, 
                                                             
4 The rise in the integration of global economies raise the emphasis on welfare state reforms that aim to increase the 
flexibility of firms in order to reduce the impact of globalisation on unemployment (see, e.g., Eurofound, 2007; 
European Commision, 2010).  
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Perotti, and Trigari (2010)5 capital provides an additional channel for shock propagation. 
The remainder of this study is structured as follows. In section 4.2, we formulate the 
model used for the analyses in this chapter, with details of equilibrium and market clearing 
conditions highlighted in section 4.3. The model calibration and details of our findings are 
discussed in sections 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6. Section 4.7 summarises and concludes this chapter. 
4.2 The Model 
This section develops a small open economy DSGE model characterised by households, two 
production sectors, a hiring sector, and a government. We adopt the representative household 
construct of Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995), which supplies labour, consumes final good 
and invests in capital. The latter serves a dual function as a productive factor and as a store of 
wealth and is assumed to be internationally mobile. We model a competitive final good sector 
that produces a non-traded homogenous final good using both imported and domestic 
differentiated varieties as inputs.6 Differentiated varieties are produced using both labour and 
capital as factor inputs by an intermediate sector that faces monopolistic competition in the 
products market. These varieties are traded domestically and internationally. Both international 
trade in goods and capital movement are respectively subject to iceberg trade cost (e.g., Molana 
et al., 2017; Feenstra, Obstfeld, & Russ, 2014) and capital mobility transaction cost (e.g. 
Rodirk,1998). The ‘small’ open economy assumption implies that activities of domestic agents 
cannot influence the foreign demand for domestic exports, the price of imported varieties, and 
the world rate of return on capital. The hiring sector is characterised by search and matching 
frictions and acts as an intermediary between household members searching for jobs and the 
intermediate sector that uses the services of these workers (similar to Christoffel, Kuester, & 
Linzert, 2009; de Walque, Pierrard, Sneessens, & Wouters, 2009). The sole function of this 
sector is to hire and train unemployed workers and sell their services as trained man-hours. We 
assume that employment relationships are destroyed at an exogenous rate, and wages and hours 
worked per worker are determined via Nash bargaining solution. There is a government that sets 
employment policies and is assumed to own the hiring sector. The government operates a 
balanced budget and uses net revenue generated from the operation of the hiring sector as well 
as lump-sum tax to finance social benefits provided to the unemployed. 
4.2.1 The Representative Household 
Consider an economy consisting of a representative household with a unit measure of members, 
                                                             
5 Both authors study the role of labour market frictions for the transmission of shocks with a closed economy 
environment.  
6 Our approach is motivated by the increasing evidence of international production fragmentation, where firms are 
able to source intermediate goods from different countries (Foster, Stehrer, & Timmer, 2013). Additionally, as 
revealed by Sébastien, Lanz, and Ragoussis (2009), trade in intermediate input accounts for approximately 56 
percent trade flow in most developed countries.  
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who are either employed or unemployed at any given time. At time t, a share tN  of the household 
members are employed by the labour market hiring firms while the rest are unemployed. The 
latter consists of workers who were not at all employed in the previous period  11 tN   and 
those who were employed but lost their job at the end of period 1t  , 1tN  , where  0,1  
denotes the rate of job destruction assumed to be exogenous as in Hall (2005) and Blanchard and 
Galí (2010).7 Hence, by normalising the labour force to the size of representative household, the 
aggregate number of members who are unemployed – and searching for job – in the household, 
at time t, is given by   11 1t tU N    . We assume that members of the household completely 
insure each other against uncertainty in earnings and unemployment risks in line with the 
literature.8 The objective of the representative household, assumed to have an infinite lifespan, 
is to maximise an expected lifetime utility function, which takes the form 
0
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where  0,1   and 0A  represent the household’s subjective discount factor and a measure 
of the disutility of working, respectively. c  captures consumption preference shock (e.g. 
Christoffel et al., 2008), and 0 1c   and 0h   determine, respectively, the intertemporal 
elasticity of substitution and the Frisch elasticity of labour supply. As will be explained below 
in more detail, there is a sector in the economy which fulfils the exclusive, and intermediary, 
role of recruiting and training workers and selling services of trained workers as labour man-
hours. The sector is populated by a mass of ‘labour hiring firms’ which is normalised to unity 
with the firms indexed by  0,1j . Based on this structure, jt sn   and jt sh   in the utility function 
denote the number of household members employed by firm j at time t s  and the respective 
labour supply of these members. 
The household uses physical capital to store its wealth and at any time t s  it faces two 
intertemporal constraints: the budget constraint 
 
 
*
0
1
,1jt s jt s jt
t s t s t s t s t s t s
t s t s t s t s ts t s t s ts sw n h dj N
C I r M k K
M rb M k T


    
       
   
  
      (2) 
and the capital accumulation constraint 
 1 1t s t s t sK I K      ,       (3) 
where C, I, K and π represent the real values of consumption, investment, capital stock and profit 
                                                             
7 Hall (2005) document that a large percentage of the variation of employment over the business cycle is explained 
by variations in vacancy creation rather than the job separation rate. For simplicity, we therefore assume that job 
separations are exogenous in this model. 
8 See, Andolfatto (1996) and Merz (1995). 
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from each intermediate firm (explained later), respectively. The variables tr  and tw  denote the 
gross domestic real return rate on capital held during time t and the real hourly wage rate, 
respectively. The members of the household who remain unemployed after hiring has taken place 
at time t, receive an unemployment benefit, tb , thereby attracting  1 t tN b  to the household. 
The stock of capital is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate δ, and tT  is a lump-sum tax paid 
to the government. 
As we will later explain in more detail, there also exist a sector in the economy populated 
with monopolistic firms. Each of these firms is assumed to produce a single variety – indexed 
by ti M  – of intermediate good, using itk  capital stock rented from the household as one of its 
input required for production. Thus, at time t s , the aggregate capital required by these firms 
is given by t s t sM k  , which then attracts an aggregate capital income, t s t s t sr M k   , to the 
household. We assume the availability of international capital mobility facility which the 
household can access to deal with any residual capital requirement  t s t s t sM k K   . This 
assumption implies that the household can borrow from abroad (or lend abroad), at a foreign real 
rate of return on capital, r*, when   0 ( 0)t s t s t sM k K     . Letting 0   denote a measure of 
the degree of capital mobility, as in Rodrik (1998), the capital market condition can be written 
as 
 *t s t s t s t s t s t sr r M k K        .      (4) 
In line with our small open economy assumption *tr  is exogenous and cannot be 
influenced by the activities in the domestic economy. Thus, condition (4) implies that, at any 
given time t , an increase in the demand for capital in excess of its supply, i.e. t t tM k K , 
requires that the domestic return rate on capital tr  must rise above 
*
tr  in order for the equilibrium 
condition (4) to be restored, for a given value of t . Intuitively, if domestic demand for capital 
rises above what the economy can supply, then to attract foreign capital, the domestic return rate 
of capital  tr  must rise in order to cover foreign interest on capital 
*
tr  plus the margin associated 
with the cost importing from abroad  t t t tM k K  . Note that 0t   is consistent with 
*
t tr r  
and corresponds to perfect mobility, while t   corresponds to the case of no mobility, and 
t t tM k K  holds for any  * 0t tr r  . 
The household’s problem is to choose the optimal paths of consumption and capital stock 
 1 0, t s t s sC K

   
 in order to maximise the utility function (1) subject to the budget constraint (2) 
and the law of motion for capital (3), taking into consideration the condition (4) which governs 
the capital market and treating as given: the policy instruments  
0
,t s t s sT b

  
; the aggregate 
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profits received from firms  
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; and the initial condition for capital, 
K0.9 Letting the Lagrange multiplier associated with the household’s budget constraint be Λt , 
the first order conditions resulting from maximisation, for 0s  , are given by10 
 cctt tC
   ,       (5) 
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Equations (5) and (6) respectively describe the representative household’s marginal 
utility of consumption and the Euler condition governing the optimal consumption path. For later 
use, we define  * 1 1 1 11 tt s s t s t s t sr M kR             and rewrite the Euler condition (6) as 
 1 t t s t sE R   , where 
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denotes the stochastic discount factor, governing the rate at which the household is willing to 
substitute consumption between time t and t s . 
4.2.2 The Final Good Sector 
The modelling of the final good sector follows Molana and Montagna (2000). This sector is 
represented by a single firm which operates under a perfectly competitive structure, and produces 
a homogeneous final good, Y, used by the households for consumption and for investment. We 
assume that the production technology of this sector is a CES function which combines quantities 
of domestically produced and imported intermediate varieties, dity  and 
*
ity , respectively, 
according to  
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where the superscript * refers to foreign variables, M and M* denote mass of available varieties 
both in the domestic and foreign economies. The parameter 0 1   determines the degree of 
importance attached to ‘the number of varieties’, where λ = 0 and λ = 1 respectively corresponds 
to the two extreme cases of ‘no effect’ and ‘maximum effect’. When λ > 0, an increase in M – 
for given quantities of the individual inputs – results in a higher output.11 The parameter 𝜎 > 1 
is the elasticity of substitution between input varieties, which is assumed to be equal across 
                                                             
9 Both the real wage and hours of work are determined jointly by firms and workers in the labour market, which 
we will discuss later in the paper. 
10 See Appendix 4 for the details of this, and other, derivations. 
11 For details, see Benassy (1996) and Molana and Montagna (2000). 
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countries. The sector’s profit is defined by 
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where ditp  and 
*
itp  are the prices of intermediate varieties produced domestically and imported 
and 1   denotes per-unit iceberg trade cost incurred in importing foreign intermediate 
varieties.  The iceberg specification of the trade cost implies that to one unit of the good abroad 
a firm needs to ship 1   units of the good (i.e., a proportion  1 1   melts in transport and a 
proportion 1   arrives at destination) – similar to Feenstra et al. (2014) and Ghironi and Melitz 
(2005).  
Maximising (9) subject to (8), taking all prices and the trade cost as given, we derive the 
demand functions for domestic and foreign intermediate varieties, 
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The perfect competition assumption requires 0Yt  . Therefore, using this assumption, 
the domestic price index dual to (8) can be shown to satisfy 
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4.2.3 Export (Foreign Demand) 
We assume that an endogenous quantity of the domestically produced intermediate variety is 
exported abroad at a nominal price ditp . However, given the existence of iceberg trade cost, 
foreign buyers are faced with an effective real price  *dt it tp P  per unit of exported variety, 
where P* denotes foreign price index. Letting F* denote the real foreign expenditure on exported 
varieties, and assuming that the demand elasticity is equal across countries, the foreign demand 
function for domestically produce intermediate variety can be written as 
1 *
*
d
x t it
it t t
t
p
y M F
P

 

    
 
, ti M ,    (13) 
where xity  represents the quantity of domestic variety that is exported. Again, by virtue of the 
small open economy assumption, F* and P* are unaffected by the developments in the domestic 
economy, so they are treated as exogenous variables. 
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4.2.4 The Intermediate Sector 
The intermediate goods sector comprises of a mass M of monopolistically competitive firms. 
Each firm produces a single intermediate variety i, which is subsequently sold domestically as 
input to the final good sector and as export, with demand functions respectively given by (10) 
and (13). Thus, at any given time the aggregate quantity of variety i  produced by a typical 
intermediate firm is defined as 
d x
it it t itz y y  .    (14) 
Each variety is produced using a composite of Cobb-Douglas input comprising of two 
factors: capital, which is rented from the household at a price tr  per unit of capital, and effective 
labour man-hours, purchased from the hiring sector at a price tw  per effective labour man-hour. 
Defining ita  as the composite input, and using itl  and itk  to denote the quantities of man-hours 
and capital, respectively, we assume that 
1
1
it it
it
l k
a
 
 

   
    
   
,    (15) 
where  0,1   represents the elasticity of output with respect to labour man-hours input. The 
production function of each firm is then described by its input requirement, which is assumed to 
be linear and given by 
it t itz a ,    (16) 
where t  represents productivity factor, assumed to be common to all firms and to vary 
exogenously over time. At any given time t , the real profit function of each firm is described by  
d
it
it it at it
t
p
z p a
P

 
  
 
,     (17) 
where atp  represents the unit cost of production and at itp a  denotes the firm’s real total cost of 
production at time t, which in turn is defined – based on the firm’s input requirement – as 
at it t it t itp a w l r k  .    (18) 
Using the production function (15) together with the total cost function (18) we obtain 
the cost minimising price level for factor input as 
 1
tt ta r wp
  ,    (19) 
which corresponds to the real marginal cost of production. Both prices, tr  and tw , are taken as 
given by each firm, thus making atp  independent of individual firm’s characteristics. Applying 
Shephard’s lemma to (18), we derive the respective optimal demand functions for each factor 
input  
it
t it at
t
z
w l p

     (20) 
and 
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t
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 .    (21) 
Finally, given the assumption of monopolistic competition, each firm chooses its own 
optimal price ditp  which maximise the profit function (17) subject to its product demand 
functions, (10) and (13). The first order condition with respect to ditp  yields 
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,    (22) 
which represents the standard flexible mark-up pricing rule.  The above equation shows that, in 
the absence of price setting frictions,12 each firm simply sets its price as a mark-up over the real 
marginal cost. 
4.2.5 Hiring Sector (The Labour Market) 
We model the labour market by introducing a sector which consists of hiring firms set up by the 
government to serve as intermediary between members of the household who supply labour and 
intermediate firms that demand labour (as in Christoffel & Kuester 2008; de Walque et al. 2009; 
Di-Pace & Hertweck, 2012). The main function of the firms in this sector is to hire and train 
unemployed members of the household and sell the labour service of trained workers as effective 
man-hours. Recall that when describing household’s preferences, we normalised the mass of 
labour hiring firms to unity, indexed firms by  0,1j  and assumed that at any time t, a firm j 
hires jtn  members of the household as workers who supply jth  hours of work each at an hourly 
real wage of jtw  in order to produce effective labour man-hours. We further assumed that each 
worker’s labour supply is converted to effective man-hours using a concave conversion 
technology13 
f
j
f
jt t
teh h


 , 0 1f  ,    (23) 
where 0te   is a measure of effort, determined exogenously. The aggregate supply of the sector, 
1
0
jt jtn h dj , is then offered to the intermediate good producing sector, whose aggregate demand is 
it
i M
l di

  – at the real rate tw . 
                                                             
12 In the models with price setting frictions, such as the Calvo (1983) type friction, a fraction of firms is assumed to 
optimally reset their prices in each period while the remaining fraction do not. The former simply update their prices 
based on a rule of thumb approach which is (commonly) based either on: (1) the most recently observed inflation 
and price level, (2) steady state inflation and most recently observed price level, or (3) simply on most recently 
observed price (McCandless, 2008). In the current model we assume full price flexibility – see Gali (2008) for 
details. 
13 In particular, we require this assumption in order to derive work optimal hours (de Walque et al., 2009). 
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The labour market is assumed to be characterised by search and matching frictions. The 
matching process between the firms with vacancies and searching unemployed workers is 
governed by a matching technology which at the aggregate level is assumed to take the form 
  1 ,  t t t tU V U V
  M , 0  ,  0 0  ,    (24) 
where   11 1t tNU      and 
1
0
jtt vV dj   denote aggregate unemployment and vacancies, 
respectively, χ is a measure of matching efficiency and μ is the elasticity of match with respect 
to U. We further define 
 tt
tU
V
  ,    (25) 
as a measure of ‘the degree of market tightness’. Using (24), the rates at which a firm with 
vacancy meets an unemployed worker (vacancy filling rate) and that an unemployed worker 
meets a vacant job (job finding rate) are, respectively, defined by 
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and 
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.     (27) 
Given the homogeneity assumption of the matching function, both vacancy filling and 
job finding rates depend solely on the degree of market tightness: a rise in t  raises the job 
finding rate and reduces the vacancy filling rate, and vice versa. Therefore, 1 ftq  and 1
w
tq  
respectively represent the mean duration of vacancies and unemployment spell.  
At each hiring firm’s level, aggregate employment evolves according to  
  11jt jt
f
t jtn n vq    ,     (28) 
where   11 jtn   and j
f
t tq v  respectively measure the number of jobs that survived separation 
from the previous period 1t   and the new matches at period t in firm j. Thus, in line with 
Blanchard and Gali (2010) and Faccini et al. (2013), the timing convention in (28) implies that 
newly matched workers become productive immediately after being matched with a vacancy. 
We follow the literature (e.g., Faccini, et al., 2013; Ravenna & Walsh, 2012; Trigari, 
2006) in modelling the bargaining process between workers and hiring firms that determine jtw  
and jth  and therefore assume that the outcome of the bargain maximises value of the mutual 
surplus of the resulting match.  
To hire new workers, at any time t each firm creates jtv  vacancies. In particular, the 
objective of each firm at any t s  is to choose the optimal number of vacancies jt sv   and 
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employees jt sn  , which maximise its present discounted value of real expected profit 
    
0
1 1L T Vjt t t s jt s jt s jt s t s t s t s j
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

        
  ,    (29) 
where xT and xV are per capita worker training cost training cost (e.g. Ljungqvist & Sargent, 
2016; Pissarides, 2009; Stähler & Thomas, 2012) and vacancy creation/posting costs incurred 
by the firm, which are assumed to be time-invariant. Firms are further assumed to receive 
subsidies from the government, Tt  and 
V
t , for each worker it hires (a per capita training 
subsidy) and each vacancy it creates.14 Also, we have assumed that job destruction is costly and 
denote by tf  the associated per capita firing cost. In maximising (29), the firm treats t s , jt sw 
, t sw  , jt sh  , t s
T  , t s
V   and x
T and xV as given and takes account of (7), (23) and the path in (28)
. Denoting by jtJ  the Lagrange multiplier associated with the constraint (28), the first order 
conditions with respect to jtv  and jtn , for 0s  , respectively yield
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and 
    11 1  T Tjt jt jt jt tt t t t s jtJ w h xw h f E J           .     (31) 
Equation (30) shows that the marginal cost of creating a vacancy must be equal to the 
value of the corresponding contribution resulting from hiring an additional worker to the firm, 
which is in turn defined by the right-hand-side of (31). Combining both (30) and (31) yields
 
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 
      ,     (32) 
which represents the usual vacancy creation condition consistent with that proposed in the 
literature – see Pissarides (2000) for an example. Equation (32) simply states that, at any given 
time period, each firm creates vacancies up to a point where the marginal contribution of an 
additional worker to the firm (right-hand-side) equals the marginal hiring or vacancy creation 
costs (left-hand-side). 
From the perspective of the household, the marginal value of having one of its members 
hired at firm j is given by value equation 
                                                             
14 These forms of subsidies were granted during the last recession by some countries. For instance, in order to 
combat the effects of the last (2007/2008) recession on unemployment, the UK government provided £350 million 
to small and medium scale businesses to enable them train employees (Heyes, 2013). According to Heyes (2013), 
in Ireland, the government also introduced employment subsidy per hired worker and subsidies which enable firms 
to hire up to certain number of workers.  
15 See Appendix 4 for the derivation. 
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.     (33) 
Equation (33) shows that the return from being employed at each hiring firm consists of 
the real wage income 
jt jtw h  less the value of his outside option – the term in the squared brackets 
on the right-hand-side which is increasing in the value of unemployment benefit and the worker’s 
disutility of supplying labour hours – and the continuation value of employment if the match 
remains unseparated with a probability  1  . 
Letting  0,1  denote the relative bargaining power of a worker, the solutions to the 
bargaining problem are given by the real hourly wage rate and hours of work which maximises 
the weighted product of the interested parties’ surplus shares,  
1
jt jtJ W
 
. The first order condition 
of this maximisation problem with respect to jtw  yields 
 1jt jtJ W   .     (34) 
 Using equations (31) and (33), we eliminate jtJ  and jtW from equation (34) to obtain the 
solution for the bargained real wage  
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    (35) 
As shown by equation (35), the real wage income of a worker at firm j is given by the 
weighted sum of the match productivity net of the per capita training and firing costs and the 
replacement cost of the worker, and the outside option of the worker, where the weights are 
respectively given by   and  1 . Note that in the absence of training and firing costs and 
employment subsidies, i.e.,  ,, 0,VT Tx f    , equation (35) collapses to the standard wage 
equation commonly found in the literature. However, as can be seen, the training and training 
and vacancy creation subsidies, ζT and ζV, have some interesting implications for the labour 
market dynamics through the wage equation. A higher training cost leads to lower real wage 
because, by increasing the cost of match, it reduces the value of a filled vacancy J. Intuitively, 
because a lower J implies that only a limited number of vacancies are created by firms, which in 
turn leads to higher aggregate unemployment, unemployed workers are inclined to accepting 
lower wage in order to become trained and employed. However, if the government provides 
training subsidy to the firm towards the worker’s training, the overall labour cost reduces, and 
so the real wage rises. The impact of vacancy creation subsidy, ζV, on the real wage depends on 
its affects job creation rate and, in turn, the market tightness, θ. In particular, given that the hiring 
need of a firm reduces when a given match survives exogenous separation at a rate,  1  , by 
raising θ, an expected increase in ζV will lead to a rise in the savings associated with the 
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replacement costs of a worker. All else equal, the bargained real wage will increase as workers 
share from this savings (see Pissarises, 2000) 
Finally, the first order condition of the bargaining process with respect to jth  can be 
shown satisfy 
 1
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h
fjt
t
t
jtte h
Ah
w

 
 .    (36) 
This equation implies the optimal hours of work is determined such that the marginal 
product of hours is equal to the marginal rate of substitution between consumption and leisure.16 
4.2.6 The Government 
As already noted, the government supports unemployed workers through the provision of benefit 
insurance, and provides employment enhancing subsidies towards vacancy creation and training 
costs for the hiring sector. These are in turn financed by revenues accrued from the hiring sector’s 
operation, lump-sum and firing taxes. Thus, per period budget constrain of the government 
satisfies17 
   1T Vt tt t t t t ttT N w h x x Vw h N b      .    (37) 
The government is assumed to run a balanced budget each period, where lump-sum tax 
T is allowed to adjust at all times to ensure that this holds. 
4.3 Market Clearing Conditions and General Equilibrium 
We consider a symmetric equilibrium where firms behave identically. Therefore, we drop the 
firm indices i and j, and express the equilibrium conditions in terms of the values pertaining to 
the representative firm/variety.  
Equilibrium in the labour market requires that aggregate effective labour man-hours 
supplied at any given time must be equal to its demand, 
1
0 0
jt
M
j tt it tt tn dj dh l N hi M l    .     (38) 
Also, the good market clearing condition requires that  
T V
t t t t tY C I x N x V    .     (39) 
Thus, as in Christoffel et al. (2008), Y also covers labour training and vacancy creation costs, in 
addition to its use for household consumption and investment purpose 
In the equilibrium, the balance of payment – which must be satisfied when all the market 
clearing conditions and budget constraints hold – is determined by 
                                                             
16 For details, see Trigari (2006). 
17 The per period profit from the hiring sector is accrued to the government since this sector acts as government 
subsidiary. Christoffel et al. (2008) for instance assumes that it goes to the household. In general, either of these 
assumptions is required to ensures that the goods market clearing condition holds.  
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Equation (40) shows that trade balance (or net export) must be equal to return on net 
capital flow to ensure that a zero balance of payment holds in equilibrium. Finally, the gross 
domestic product (GDP) can be shown to be equal to total domestic demand (39) plus net export: 
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 .    (41) 
The equation system characterising model economy, together with their steady state and 
linearized versions, are given in Appendix 4. 
4.4 Model Calibration 
As already indicated in the introduction the parameters of this model are calibrated so that the 
steady state solution replicates the structural features of the UK economy in the recent years.  In 
doing this we use long-run data averages as well as empirical evidence, and the frequency of 
calibration is quarterly. In the absence of data or empirical evidence, we use the parameter and 
steady state values commonly used in the literature; where possible, those that focus on the EU. 
Table 4.1 in Appendix 4 provides the details of the model calibration.  
Consistent with the literature (for instance, Harrison & Oomen, 2010), we set the 
depreciation rate of capital, δ, to 0.025, which implies an average annual capital depreciation 
rate of 10 percent. The actual estimate of the coefficient of relative risk aversion, 𝛼𝑐 , that 
determines the utility of consumption, is still contested in the literature. As documented by 
Gandelman and Hernández-Murillo (2014) the estimated value of 𝛼𝑐 typically ranges from 0.2 
to 10. In our baseline calibration we set αc to 0.8, which is close to the 0.73 estimated by Faccini 
et al. (2013), and falls between 0.143 and 1.03 estimated by Harrison and Oomen (2010) and 
Gandelman and Hernandez-Murillo (2015), respectively, for the UK. The baseline value of αh 
is set to 2, an approximate value chosen by Faccini et al. (2013) for the UK and Christoffel et al. 
(2008) in a study relating to the EURO Area. The steady state values of the measure of foreign 
expenditure on exported varieties, F*and foreign price index, P*, are normalised to unity. The 
preference shock is assumed to be zero in the steady state, and hence c  too is set to unity. We 
further assume that, in the steady state, aggregate domestic demand for capital equals its supply, 
𝑀𝑘 = 𝐾, which is consistent with r = r*; hence, we set r = r* = 0.035. The measure of the 
importance of varieties in the production of final good, 𝜆, is set to zero  hence assuming away 
any ‘variety externality’ from the benchmark calibration. We follow Ghironi and Melitz, (2005) 
and set the initial value of the ice-berg trade cost, 𝜏 to 1.3.  
As already noted, the steady state gross domestic product is given by 
* * *d xMp y M p y
GDP Y
P P
 
   . As is common in the literature, e.g. Christoffel and Kuester 
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(2008), we normalise the GDP to unity. Since international flow of capital is zero in the initial 
steady state, trade balance too is zero, by virtue of equation (40). It follows that 𝐺𝐷𝑃 = 𝑌. The 
standard calibrated value of the elasticity of demand for differentiated varieties, 𝜎 , in the 
literature typically varies from 6 to 11 – for instance, Villa and Yang (2011) and Faccini et al. 
(2013) for the case of the UK. In our calibration we set the value of 𝜎 so that the share of total 
profit income in output in our baseline solution matches the long run data average, which is 
approximately 20 percent based on the UK quarterly data from 2000: Q1 to 2014: Q3 (ONS 
Statistics database). From the steady state version of our model, it can be shown that the ratio of 
total profit to aggregate domestic product is given by Mπ/GDP=1/σ. We therefore set 𝜎 to 6 – 
which also implies a monopolistic price mark-up of 20 percent. 
As documented by Hobijn and Sahin (2009), in an empirical study which covers 27 
OECD countries, the average (quarterly) value of 𝑞𝑤 is 0.3381 in the UK. (We use this estimate 
to derive job destruction rate 𝜂  below.) As noted previously, the size of the labour force is 
normalised to one. Using the harmonised quarterly unemployment rate data from 1986: Q2 to 
2014: Q4, provided by the OECD, we obtain the employment rate, N, which equals 0.93 for the 
UK. Given the calibrated values of 𝑁  and 𝑞𝑤 , the steady state job destruction rate can be 
obtained using      1 1w wq N q N     as approximately equal to 0.038. Furthermore, we 
set the initial value of vacancy filling rate 𝑞𝑓 is set to 0.7, the EU average as documented by 
Christoffel and Kuester (2008), and then allow vacancy creation cost 𝑥𝑉  and per capita job 
training cost 𝑥𝑇  to be residually derived from the steady state of the model to ensure that the 
targeted values of the labour market variables are achieved. 
The presence of matching friction as well as the assumption of wage bargain in the model 
implies that the contribution of labour in the Cobb-Douglas input basket is not equal to the share 
of labour Nwh/GDP in the model. The data obtained from the ONS reveals that the average 
quarterly labour share between 1980: Q1 and 2014: Q4 in the UK equals 0.57. To capture this 
fact, we calibrate 𝛾 so that it produces Nwh/GDP observed in the data. This requires setting 𝛾 to 
approximately 0.7144. We use the OECD data on the total hours of work supplied per employed 
worker per year to obtain the calibration consistent with ℎ in our model. The data shows that, on 
the average, the total number of work hours supplied per worker between 1990 and 2014 is 1,695 
per year in the UK. By rescaling these values, we obtain our baseline calibration for hours, ℎ, 
supply per worker which equals 0.424, per quarter. We therefore allow the measure of disutility 
of work, 𝐴, to freely adjust in order to target the value of ℎ in our baseline calibration. The 
measure of production elasticity of working hours 𝛼𝑓 in the conversion technology used in the 
hiring sector is set to 0.995, close to the value chosen by Christoffel and Kuester (2008). 
As is common in the literature, we define unemployment benefit replacement ratio as 
ρ
b
= b/wh, which allows us to express the measure of unemployment benefit, 𝑏, in terms of the 
model’s steady state per capita wage income, wh. In our baseline solution ρ
b
 is calibrate to 0.38 
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in line Faccini, Millard, and Zanetti (2011). Empirical evidence suggests that collective 
bargaining plays a key role in determining the structure of wage in an economy – see Nickell 
and Layard (1999) and Cardoso and Portugal (2005), among others. In particular, Cardoso and 
Portugal find that high collective bargaining is associated with high bargained wage, in an 
empirical study which focuses on Portugal. In Portugal, collective bargaining takes place mainly 
at the sectorial level and has a total (workforce) coverage level of 62 percent – Venn (2009). In 
the UK collective bargaining is much more decentralised (operates at the company level) with a 
coverage level of 35 percent. As pointed out by Dabusinskas et al. (2016), converting these 
percentages into bargaining power as used in this model is not so straightforward. Thus, we 
assume that the measure of a worker’s bargaining power, Φ, is symmetric, i.e., Φ = 0.5 in line 
with Pissarides (2000) and Zanetti (2011). To satisfy the efficiency condition as outlined in 
Hosios (1990), we set the matching elasticity, 𝜇, to equal (1 – Φ). 
The calibration of firing cost often poses a challenge, since the estimates of its magnitude 
are seldom available. In order to circumvent this challenge, we follow Thomas and Zanetti 
(2009) and define the steady state firing cost ratio as 𝜌𝑓 = 𝑓/𝑤ℎ. In the baseline calibration we 
set 𝜌𝑓  to 0.063 per quarter based on the estimates provided by Bentolila and Bertola (1990) for 
the UK. We further assume that subsidies are not active in the steady state under our initial 
calibration, we therefore let 0
V T   . 
As indicated by the Standard & Poor’s credit rating of 2015, the UK is classified as 
reliable and stable with a triple ‘A’ rating, which reflects, to some extent, the relative ease with 
which it can borrow and lend to the rest of the world. We use this credit rating as basis (or proxy) 
to calibrate the parameter, 𝜅, which measures the degree of capital mobility in our model. In 
particular, we set the initial value of 𝜅 to approximately 0.00088 to reflect a high degree of 
capital mobility. The choice of this value also enables us to target the share of aggregate 
investment in GDP of approximately 17 percent as given by the data average from 2000: Q1 to 
2014: Q3 (ONS Statistics). To conclude our calibration exercise, we set the initial values of the 
measures of available varieties M and M* to 1 and 10 and allow the price of imported varieties, 
p*, to be determined from the steady state solution. The total factor productivity, 𝜑, is set to 
ensure that the GDP equals unity in the baseline result. 
The steady -state solution from the above calibration yield, approximately, the following 
shares: 𝑀𝜋/GDP  = 0.2, 𝐼/𝐺𝐷𝑃  = 0.17, 𝐾/GDP  = 6.8 and Nwh/GDP  = 0.57, which are 
consistent with the UK data average over the last two decades, based on the ONS Statistics. Note 
that the share of private consumption turns out to be high, i.e., 𝐶/GDP = 0.808, since we do not 
consider government consumption expenditure. On average, 𝐶/GDP in the UK equals 0.61 
between 2000: Q1 and 2014: Q3 based on ONS Statistics, while the share of government final 
consumption expenditure to the aggregate output for the same period is roughly 20 percent.  
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4.5 Steady State Properties and Economic Openness 
The second column of Table 4.2 summarises the numerical solutions of the baseline calibration. 
In what follows we simulate the steady state version of the model which we have calibrated as 
described above in order to understand the long-run effects of: (i) a change in degree of economic 
openness and (ii) interacting measures of economic openness and labour market policies. The 
resulting comparative statics will shed light on the robustness and sensitivity of the benchmark 
steady state equilibrium as well as provide some policy insight regarding the role of these 
measures on the labour market. 
4.5.1 Long-run Effects of Economic Openness 
In investigating how changes in the degrees of openness affect the labour market, in particular 
unemployment, we consider two main measures of economic openness commonly referred to in 
the literature, namely: (i) the degree of capital mobility captured by 𝜅, where a high (low) value 
of 𝜅 represents a low (high) openness to capital flow (Rodrik, 1998), and (ii) trade cost measured 
by 𝜏, where also a high (low) value of 𝜏 captures low (high) trade openness (Ghironi & Melitz, 
2005; Molana & Montagna, 2015). For clarity, we classify our exercise into scenarios, where: 
(i) 𝜅 and 𝜏 are both high, which we call the pre-liberalisation period (the baseline solution); (ii) 
𝜅 is lowered, but 𝜏 remains at its calibrated value (partial-liberalisation in capital or partial-
capital-liberalisation); (iii) 𝜅 remains at its original value, but 𝜏 is reduced (partial-liberalisation 
in trade or partial-trade-liberalisation); and finally, (iv) where both κ  and τ  are reduced 
(absolute-liberalisation). 
Partial-liberalisation in capital: A decrease in the coefficient of capital mobility, 𝜅, 
raises domestic capital, consumption, final output, and GDP. Vacancy creation rises, while 
unemployment falls.18 The intuition for these results is that, everything else equal, a lower 𝜅 
serves as incentive for investment opportunities, since it implies lower transaction cost of capital 
movement. This induces the household to raise domestic investment, 𝐼, which in turn increases 
aggregate capital 𝐾. For a given level of aggregate domestic demand for capital, 𝑀𝑘, the rise in 
𝐾 puts downward pressure on domestic return rate on capital, so r falls.19 Also as 𝐾 rises, the 
demand for 𝑌 and 𝑧 rise too, leading to a higher marginal product of labour, and consequently, 
a higher vacancy creation and lower unemployment. The real marginal cost production, 𝑝𝑎, rises 
due to higher ?̃?, but – given the ensuing decrease in 𝑟 required to maintain the capital mobility 
condition (4), as 𝐾 rises – the increase in 𝑝𝑎 is moderated by lower 𝑟. The observed rise in 𝑝𝑎, 
however, raises pd and reduces exported varieties, yx, thus resulting in trade deficit (which is 
further worsened by the fact the y* also rises) and capital outflow. The interest receipt on net 
                                                             
18 Table 4.2 reports the numerical results of the simulation exercises which considers different values of measures 
of economic openness. 
19 Note that in the initial steady state, we assume that there is no capital flow, which implies that the domestic 
demand for capital equals its supply 𝐾 = 𝑀𝑘. Using the steady state version of the Euler equation (6) we obtain 
𝐼 =
𝛿
𝜅
[(1 + 𝑟∗) − 𝛿 −
1
𝛽
]. Thus, keeping all else equal, a decrease in κ leads to higher I. 
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capital outflow leads to an improvement in the household disposable income, resulting in a 
higher consumption and capital accumulation. 
This result is quite instructive and offers new insights theoretically. Contrary to 
conventional view (e.g., as suggested by Azariadis & Pissarides, 2007), the outflow of domestic 
capital may not necessarily result in higher unemployment. Our result shows that if capital is 
accumulated using domestic resources before being exported abroad in search of higher returns, 
capital outflow can be beneficial. There are two main driving forces here: we refer to the first as 
the domestic demand effect and the second, a wealth effect, through household disposable 
income. In the first, provided the rise in 𝑦𝑑  resulting from the increase in investments is 
sufficiently large to not only offset the decrease in 𝑦𝑥, but also raise the aggregate intermediate 
productivity 𝑧, capital outflow will result in lower unemployment. Second, for the household, 
the outflow of capital means an increase in their financial wealth due to foreign return on capital 
flow. All else equal, the increase in income will further encourage investment and consumption, 
leading to more demand for labour service.  
Partial-liberalisation in trade: Lower trade cost, in contrast, increases 𝑧 by reducing the 
effective price of intermediate varieties, which makes the demand for export 𝑦𝑥 higher. The 
increase in z translates into higher marginal product of labour and capital, and consequently, the 
real marginal cost, 𝑝𝑎. The price of intermediate varieties 𝑝
𝑑 rises by more in this case compared 
to the partial-capital-liberalisation, where lower r moderates its increase. This induces 
expenditure switching effect in the final goods sector, causing imported varieties, 𝑦∗  to rise, 
while the demand for domestic product 𝑦𝑑 drops. However, as suggested by our results, the 
decline in 𝑦𝑑 is more than compensated by the increase in 𝑦𝑥, so labour demand rises, thus 
prompting more hiring activities, which then reduces unemployment. 
Absolute-liberalisation: Compared to the individual cases above, our results show that a 
joint increase in the degree of trade openness and capital mobility delivers higher GDP and 
vacancy creation, leading to a much lower unemployment. Intuitively, while trade liberalisation 
tends to crowd out domestic demand as a result of cheaper imported varieties, the incentive to 
invest as a result of lower barriers to capital mobility raises domestic demand. Also, there is a 
significant increase in exported varieties when an increase in openness to capital mobility is 
accompanied by trade liberalisation. This joint effect provides a further boost to labour 
productivity that leads to greater employment.  
4.5.2 Long-run Effects of Labour Market Reforms and Economic Openness 
To this point, we have focused on the long-run effects of capital mobility and trade liberalisation 
on unemployment. However, as economies continue to witness increasing economic integration, 
most governments, undertake various labour market reforms at the same time. This is often 
justified on the grounds that such reforms enhance firms’ ability to adjust to the forces of 
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openness and to minimise job losses.20 An growing number of literature has emphasized the role 
of labour market reforms on the effects of openness (Cosar et al., 2016; Kim, 2011; Helpman & 
Itskhoki, 2010; Head & Smits, 2004). As revealed in the introduction, the exact effects of labour 
market rigidity on unemployment in the presence of increased openness remain inconclusive. 
Here, we examine how the interaction of labour market reforms and openness measures (which 
we refer to as joint reform) affects unemployment, in line with Cosar et al. Before doing so, 
however, it is useful to first highlight the baseline effects of labour market reforms. 
As reported in Table 4.3, for a constant rate of job destruction, 𝜂, unemployment falls 
following reforms which reduce benefits replacement and firing cost ratios, 𝜌𝑏  and 𝜌𝑓 , job 
creation and the per capita training costs, xV and xT, or introduce vacancy creation and training 
subsidies, 𝜁𝑉 and 𝜁𝑇. A decrease in 𝜌𝑏  primarily reduces the relative value of the unemployment 
of workers, which translates into lower real wage rate 𝑤 – see equation (35). The fall in the real 
wage raises the marginal gain from hiring, 𝐽, inducing firms to create more vacancies which, by 
increasing market tightness and thus, the job finding rate of workers, leads to lower 
unemployment. Given the inter-sectoral linkage which characterises our model’s economy, the 
effects of a reduction in 𝜌𝑏  goes beyond the hiring sector. As 𝜌𝑏  reduces, the eventual decrease 
in the real wage causes the price of effective labour service ?̃? to fall as well. The decrease in ?̃? 
will then induce further demand for labour services which means further reduction in 
unemployment.  
Lower training cost and firing ratio, 𝑥𝑇 and 𝜌𝑓 , also raise the gain associated with a filled 
vacancy, J, making vacancy creation more attractive, and so 𝑉 rises. As 𝑉 increases, the job 
finding rate rises too, which then leads to lower unemployment. A lower 𝑥𝑉 directly lowers the 
cost of creating vacancies relative to the gains associated with the vacancies when filled, as can 
be observed from condition (32). To restore the equilibrium condition (32), in which both the 
cost of and the gain from posting vacancies are equal, 𝑉 must increase to lower the duration of 
vacancies, (𝑞𝑓)−1 . This requires that market tightness rises, which then causes aggregate 
unemployment to fall. In addition to labour market reforms, the government can use ALMPs by 
subsidising either the training or vacancy creation costs of hiring firms. As suggested by the 
simulation results – reported in columns 7 and 8 of Table 4.3 – both subsidies enhance the 
performance of the labour market by raising market tightness, which then results in lower 
unemployment.  
We now turn to the results of joint reform effects on unemployment. We consider 20 
percent simultaneous reductions in the measures of openness and labour market reform 
instruments, with the exception of ALMPs where we assume 0.1 percentage point subsidy grants. 
Table 4.4 in Appendix 4 summarises the results of this simulation exercise. Interestingly, in all 
                                                             
20 Cosar et al. (2016) document evidence of this in the Latin American Countries. Another evidence of this can be 
seen in the recent labour market reforms in favour a more flexible labour market in the face of increasing economic 
integration (European Commission, 2010). 
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instances where liberalisation in capital mobility or trade is accompanied by labour market 
reform, unemployment falls by much more compared to individual reforms/liberalisation. For 
instance, unemployment falls by 0.38 (from 10.46 to 10.08 percent) and 1.09 (from 10.46 to 9.37 
percent) percentage points after a reduction in the measure of capital mobility and benefit, 
respectively, whereas it falls by approximately 1.43 percentage point following a joint capital-
benefit reform. These results suggest that an economy can benefit from long-run capital 
liberalisation in terms of lower unemployment if accompanied by labour market reforms. 
To appreciate this result, recall that capital liberalisation leads to a significant decrease 
in export 𝑦𝑥  due to higher 𝑝𝑑 , caused by increased marginal cost, 𝑝𝑎 . This implies that the 
decrease in unemployment witnessed after capital liberalisation is driven only by the increase in 
domestic demand 𝑦𝑑. However, by attenuating the increase in w and, consequently, 𝑝𝑎, benefits 
reform helps moderate price 𝑝𝑑  increase when a joint capital-benefit reform is undertaken 
compared to capital liberalisation in isolation. This consequently leads to a smaller decrease in 
𝑦𝑥 and, at the same time, further increase in 𝑦𝑑 in the case of joint reform compared to individual 
capital liberalisation. A similar argument holds for joint trade-benefit reform: unemployment 
drops by 1.55 percentage points (from 10.46 to 8.91 percent), whereas trade liberalisation, in 
isolation, reduces unemployment by 0.51 percentage point (from 10.46 to 9.95 percent).  
A reduction in firing cost together with capital (trade) liberalisation has a similar effect 
on unemployment as in joint capital-benefit (trade-benefit) reforms. However, unlike benefit 
reform alone, the impact of firing cost reform in isolation is quantitatively small. This is because, 
while benefit reform reduces the real wage by reducing workers’ outside options, firing cost 
reform increases it. The reason is that, a lower firing cost raises the gain from hiring, 𝐽. As wages 
are negotiated, workers share from high 𝐽, resulting in higher real wage, which somewhat offsets 
the benefit from hiring more workers. Training subsidy has a similar mechanism as firing cost 
and the impact is also small quantitatively. Recruitment subsidy enhances the unemployment-
reducing effect of capital (trade) liberalisation, and the mechanism operates in a similar way as 
benefit reform.  
4.6 Dynamic Responses to Shocks 
In this section, we explore the dynamic properties of the model by examining the impulse 
responses of variables to shocks. It is useful to start by examining the baseline results to highlight 
the behaviour of the economy to different shocks. We focus on shocks to productivity (TFP), 
foreign demand (FD) and the measures of openness. This is followed by assessing the how the 
degree of openness to international trade and capital mobility (discussed in the preceding section) 
drive the response of unemployment to TFP and FD shocks. We conclude this section by looking 
at how a more comprehensive form of labour market reforms and ALMPs shape the outcomes 
of short run trade and capital liberalisation. Note that the dynamic solution for the model is 
obtained by log-linearising the equation system describing the model economy around the 
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stationary steady state using first order Taylor series approximation. The log-linearised equation 
system, thus, contains variables which are expressed as percentage deviations from respective 
steady state values.21 Section 4B in Appendix 4 contains a summary of the equation system.  
4.6.1 Baseline Results 
Figures 4.1 and 4.2 display the impulse response function (IRFs) of selected variables to TFP 
and FD shocks, respectively. Qualitatively, the shapes of the IRFs following positive TFP and 
FD shocks are the same for most variables, especially those characterizing the labour market. In 
both instances, the productivity of labour and capital rise, intensifying their use as inputs for 
production. The cost of creating vacancies relative to labour productivity decreases, thereby 
inducing the hiring sector to step up recruitment activities and leading to a higher market 
tightness and job finding rate, and lower unemployment. Consistently, both shocks lead to 
increased household consumption and investment due to increase in household disposable 
income (HDI), driven mainly by labour income and profit distributed from the intermediate 
sector. 
Quantitatively, however, the magnitude of impacts differs for both shocks: 
unemployment drops by approximately 0.5 and 0.013 at its lowest level below the steady state 
in response to TFP and FD shocks, respectively. This difference in magnitude of impact lies in 
the mechanisms through which the shocks affect the economy. Whilst a positive shock to FD 
raises the demand for intermediate varieties, 𝑧, by increasing exported varieties, 𝑦𝑥, the shock 
to TFP produces a rise in the quantity of intermediate varieties, 𝑧, by enhancing the productivity 
per unit of factor input (labour and capital), thus generating a stronger response in 𝑧 on impact. 
Moreover, a rise in FD results in higher terms of trade (𝑇𝑜𝑇) – defined as the relative price of 
export and import (𝑝𝑑 𝑝∗⁄ ) – as the real marginal cost of production increases, thus inducing the 
final good producing sector to shift demand for intermediate input towards imported varieties 𝑦∗ 
– consistent with Faia (2011). Hence, in the case of a positive FD shock, while 𝑧 rises as a result 
of increased 𝑦𝑥, this increase is abated by the reduction in 𝑦𝑑. In contrast to FD, TFP shock 
lowers intermediate prices, hence the 𝑇𝑜𝑇 , which further encourages the demand for 
intermediate varieties both in the domestic economy and abroad, leading to greater gains from 
hiring and lower unemployment. 
Figures 4.3 and 4.4 respectively plot the dynamics (IRFs) of the same set of variables 
following shocks which reduce barriers to international capital mobility (𝜅)  and trade (𝜏) . 
Clearly, both shocks result in lower unemployment as expected, which explains why there is 
                                                             
21 The analyses of the short run dynamics of the model are carried out using Dynare version 4.4.3 for Matlab, 
Adjemian et al. (2014). Dynare is a toolbox for Matlab that is increasingly used for solving economic models –  for 
instance see, Cahuc and Barbanchon (2010), Gorodnichenko and Weber (2016), Mandelman and Zanetti (2008), 
Sophocles, Plagborg-Møller, and Stock (2014), and Weber (2015). More information about Dynare are available at 
http://www.dynare.org/. Another software that can be used to solve DSGE model is the Perturbation AIM, 
developed by Swanson, Anderson, and Levin (2006), which is implementable in Mathematica; see, 
http://www.ericswanson.us/perturbation.html for more information. 
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long-run lower unemployment in the aftermath of liberalisation, with a lower 𝜏 producing greater 
impact on unemployment than lower 𝜅. As shown in Figure 4.4, a reduction in 𝜏 raises the 
demand for exported varieties, 𝑦𝑥, due to lower effective price of export at the point of delivery. 
However, given that the effective price of imports also reduces, lower trade cost induces 
expenditure switching effect, shifting demand towards imported varieties 𝑦∗ and causing 𝑦𝑑 to 
fall. However, the increase in exports – which more than compensates for the drop in 𝑦𝑑 – causes 
𝑧  to rise, thus resulting in higher labour productivity, which then generates higher vacancy 
creation and lower unemployment. In the case of reduction in barriers to capital mobility (Figure 
4.3), labour productivity also rises, but unlike the effect of trade cost, the rise in labour 
productivity is driven by the increase in domestic demand for intermediate goods, 𝑦𝑑. Exported 
varieties increase initially, but drop as the price of intermediate goods rises, which is expected 
based on the result from the previous section. Despite the decrease exported varieties, the rise in 
domestic demand induces increase in vacancy creation, leading to lower unemployment. 
4.6.2 Economic Openness and Shock Propagation 
How does the degree of economic openness shape the dynamic response of unemployment to 
aggregate shocks? As already highlighted in the introduction, the prediction of a model with a 
higher capital mobility is that, in response to a positive productivity shock, unemployment 
responds faster with greater amplitude relative to an economy with lower capital mobility 
(Azariadis & Pissarides, 2007). This result is supported by Vallanti (2015), who empirically 
examined the role of capital mobility on unemployment response to TFP shock, using a panel of 
OECD countries over a 30-year period. Note that both Azariadis and Pissarides (2007) and 
Vallanti (2015) consider extreme cases of economic openness, where an economy is either open 
or closed to international capital mobility. Instead, a key feature of this paper is that we allow 
for varying degrees of openness to international capital mobility in addition to international trade 
openness, then explore how they shape the response of the economy to shocks. (This is because 
most economies – including the UK in which our calibration is based on – are open to the rest 
of the world and what matters is the extent to which control is exerted on capital and trade flows 
in and out of the economy.) We therefore consider our exercise under the steady state scenarios 
outlined in Section 4.5, where the long-run measures of openness, κ and τ, are varied. Here, we 
focus on TFP and FD shocks. While the former allows us to compare our results to the above 
studies, the latter enables us to examine how global economic developments affect the domestic 
economy as adduced by Chowla et al. (2014). 
Figure 4.5 displays the impulse response of unemployment to positive one percent TFP 
and FD shocks. As suggested by the impulse response functions, the qualitative effect of TFP 
shock on unemployment remains unchanged, but the responses are enhanced as a consequence 
of increased openness: adjustment of unemployment to TFP shock becomes faster and the trough 
effects (i.e., the reduction in unemployment) are larger in all scenarios. The response of 
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unemployment under scenario (ii) confirms the prediction of Azariadis and Pissarides (2007). 
As we will further explain below, the key to this result hinges on the extent to which agents have 
access to international lending and borrowing facilities – i.e., the degree of capital mobility 
which has been largely ignored in the literature. In the presence of increased access to 
international capital facility, agents are able to borrow and lend as necessary to smooth out the 
effects of shocks on the economy, which then enhances the effects of TFP shock on 
unemployment. In scenario (i), the pre-liberalisation period, unemployment falls by less due to 
higher barriers to capital mobility, together with high trade cost in the steady state. In scenarios 
(ii) and (iii), with partial liberalisation in capital and trade, the positive effects of TFP shock on 
unemployment becomes larger (and much larger under scenario (iv)) relative to scenario (i). 
As is clear from Figure 4.5, in the partial capital liberalisation period with a decreased 𝜅 
(scenario (ii)) the response of 𝐾 to TFP shock is muted – intuitively, 𝐾 becomes less sensitive 
and able to absorb more shocks. This is because lower transaction cost of capital, implied by the 
reduction 𝜅, means that private agents can quickly access international facilities to deal with 
domestic capital requirements in response to TFP shock. To see how this affects the response of 
unemployment, recall that a positive TFP shock intensifies the demand for capital. With less 
barriers to capital mobility, there is inflow of foreign capital, which results in current account 
deficit 𝑟∗(𝑀𝑘 − 𝐾) > 0 and produces negative wealth effect, since interest payment must be 
made on net capital flow. The household disposable income therefore drops, dampening the 
response of consumption to TFP shock. From the hiring sector, the weakening in the response 
of consumption level lessens the continuation value of vacancy (see the vacancy creation 
condition (32)). However, given that a positive trade balance is required to offset this deficit 
(thus, to ensure that a zero balance of payment (BoP) is maintained), export rises more strongly 
while the response of import weakens. The former therefore boosts labour productivity, which 
abates the negative effect induced by the reduction in the continuation value of a job. This in 
turn leads to further vacancy creation and employment, prompting further decline in 
unemployment below its pre-liberalisation level. 
In the benchmark economy and partial trade liberalisation period (scenario (iii)), with 
low trade cost (𝜏) and high barriers to capital mobility (𝜅), 𝐾 becomes very sensitive and unable 
to absorb shock. The impact of a positive TFP shock is therefore partly transmitted to the rest of 
the economy through rapid adjustment in domestic investment and capital accumulation required 
to meet the capital needs of domestic firms. The intuition is that, by reducing access to 
international capital facilities, a higher barrier to capital mobility (high 𝜅) forces private agents 
to articulate an investment plan. Under this condition, the way 𝐾 responds depends on whether 
or not trade is liberalised. As in scenario (iii), with lower trade cost, 𝐾 rises significantly – 
intuitively, in anticipation of higher capital demand resulting from increase in export induced by 
partial trade liberalisation. This can be seen by comparing the impulse response of 𝑦𝑥 under the 
two scenarios (i and iii) with high 𝜅. As can be seen in Figure 4.6, though the response of 𝑦𝑥 is 
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initially stronger in scenario (i), this is not sustained as the impact of shock dies out, whereas in 
scenario (iii), the response becomes more resilient. In general, unemployment drops more 
significantly in scenario (iii) than in (i), even with high 𝜅 , due to increased 𝑦𝑑  required to 
increase investment, and export whose response becomes stronger than the benchmark impulse.  
Under absolute liberalisation, scenario (iv), both with lower 𝜏 and 𝜅, there is stronger 
response in exported variety, 𝑦𝑥 – compared to scenario (iii) – due to inflow of capital. But 
compared to scenario (ii), capital inflow is much less under scenario (iv), pointing to the fact that 
private agents are able to invest to some extent to meet the domestic needs of capital. 
Consequently, there is strong in domestic demand for intermediate goods, 𝑦𝑑, which together 
with 𝑦𝑥, explains why scenario (iv) produces the greatest drop in unemployment in response to 
TFP shock of equal size.  
As with TFP shock, the degree of openness to capital mobility and international trade 
also play crucial roles in shaping the response of unemployment to FD shock, as shown by the 
second panel of Figure 4.5. Surprisingly, however, while a higher degree of openness to capital 
mobility amplifies the response of unemployment to TFP shock, it dampens its response to FD 
shock. By contrast, the magnitude of adjustments in unemployment following both shocks are 
much larger in the two scenarios associated with lower trade cost (scenarios iii and iv). These 
differences are attributable to the way both shocks affect the economy, in particular the response 
of 𝑇𝑜𝑇. As already noted from the baseline results discussed above, a positive FD shock raises 
yx on impact and translates into lower unemployment due to higher demand for labour. However, 
the ensuing 𝑇𝑜𝑇 appreciation causes 𝑦∗ to rise and 𝑦𝑑 to fall, thus reducing the aggregate impact 
of FD on 𝑧 and, consequently, on unemployment. In scenario (ii) with a low 𝜅, the response of 
𝑦𝑥  is much stronger as private agents are able to import foreign capital required to support 
domestic production. There is, however, a dampening effect on consumption as a result of 
interest payment on capital inflow which, together with a decrease in 𝑦𝑑, weakens the response 
of unemployment. In scenario (iii), with limited access to foreign capital, as before, the 
household investment savings drive rises, thereby leading to a surge in capital accumulation in 
response to FD shock. Domestic return rate initially rises to attract capital inflow, as illustrated 
in Figure 4.7. However, as capital rises, the ensuing decline in the return rate induces capital 
outflow. Since this implies that agents must receive interest on net capital flow, there is positive 
wealth effect which translates into increase in consumption and in the continuation value of 
vacancies. Consequently, vacancy creation rises significantly, thus generating stronger response 
in unemployment than in scenario (ii). Under absolute liberalisation in trade and capital (scenario 
(iv)), the extent to which agents build up domestic capital in response to FD shock reduces as 
lower barriers to capital mobility induces inflow of foreign capital. The negative wealth effect 
generated by payment of net capital inflow therefore dampens consumption and, consequently, 
unemployment.  
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4.6.3 Labour Market Reform (Structure) and Unemployment Dynamics 
In Section 4.5, we evaluated the implications of individual labour market reforms and ALMPs, 
then showed how their interaction with openness determined the response of unemployment. 
However, the recent drive towards a more comprehensive (flexible) labour market reform (the 
so-called flexicurity system) among the EU member states is justified by the threats posed by 
globalisation (Eurofound, 2007; European Commission, 2010). In this subsection, we try to 
mimic the features of the flexicurity welfare system, then compare the results thereof with the 
other types of welfare systems presently operated elsewhere within the EU. 
The concept of flexicurity rests on two principles: flexibility and social security 
(Andersen, 2012). While flexibility relates to hiring and firing regulations which enhance 
domestic firms’ ability to adjust to shocks, thus reducing consequent impact on unemployment, 
social security aims at providing protection for workers who are unemployed through the 
provision of, e.g., unemployment benefits insurance. In the context of our model, the flexicurity 
system can be captured by a low cost of vacancy creation, low firing cost ratio, and high 
unemployment benefit replacement rate.22 Recent theoretical studies within this line of research 
have attempted to investigate the effects of labour market structure on unemployment in response 
to increased economic openness. However, most of these typically focus on static analysis and 
do not consider interactions of policy instruments (Du et al., 2015; Head & Smits, 2004; 
Helpman & Itskhoki, 2010; Kim, 2011). However, as pointed out by Blanchard and Giavazzi 
(2003), the real-world labour markets reflect a tight link in the use of different policies measure. 
The benefits of policy combination has also been stressed by Blanchard and Tirole (2008) in 
their paper, which studies the joint effects of employment protection legislations and 
unemployment benefits. 
Generally, in the EU, besides the flexicurity system, there currently exists other forms of 
welfare systems such as the liberal and the Mediterranean welfare systems. Spain is a notable 
example of the Mediterranean welfare system, one characterised by high unemployment benefit, 
job creation and firing cost structures, while the UK features a liberal system. The liberal system 
typically features low unemployment benefit and firing cost, and a moderate cost of vacancy 
creation. Given the current effort to achieve a more flexible labour market within the EU, a 
natural question is – how does the flexicurity compare with other existing welfare systems? To 
answer this question, we recalibrate benefit replacement ratio, 𝜌𝑏 , firing cost ratio, 𝜌𝑏 , (which 
we refer to employment protection legislation – EPL – in the literature) and vacancy creation 
cost, 𝑥𝑉 , given that they reflect the distinctive labour market features of the various welfare 
systems. We retain the baseline calibration as the liberal (UK) system and use Denmark (DK) 
and Spain (ES) to capture the flexicurity and Mediterranean systems respectively, keeping all 
other exogenous parameters constant at their baseline values.  
                                                             
22 As recently stressed by Montagna et al. (2016), the concept of flexicurity is complex and its implementation takes 
different forms. The authors however show that it is possible to have a combination of reforms which enhances 
firms’ flexibility and at the same time provide benefit support to the unemployed. 
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Based on the evidence provided in Nickell et al. (2005), we set benefit replacement ratio 
𝜌𝑏  for ES and DK to 0.58 and 0.53, respectively. In order to obtain a consistent calibration for 
𝜌𝑓 , we apply a similar method as Brown et al. (2015): letting 𝜌𝑓
𝑗
 and 𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗  represent the 
magnitude of the estimate of 𝜌𝑓  and the employment protection index for j = ES, DK, set 𝜌𝑓
𝑗
=
𝜌𝑓
𝑈𝐾 (
𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑗
𝐸𝑃𝐿𝑈𝐾
). Nickell et al. (2005) provide evidence of EPL indices for ES and DK, using which 
we obtain the value of 𝜌𝑓= 0.43 and 0.22 respectively. Finally, we use vacancy creation cost 𝑥
𝑉 
to target the average long-run unemployment rate of 6 percent and 17 percent for DK and ES. 
This requires setting 𝑥𝑉 to 0.13 and 0.43, respectively. In what follows, we consider the impact 
of 1 percent standard deviation increase in capital and trade liberalisation as well as TFP and FD 
shocks. 
Figure 4.8 markedly reveals key differences in the adjustment of unemployment to 
shocks under different welfare systems. In more flexible liberal and flexicurity welfare systems, 
the impulse of unemployment is more enhanced compared to the more rigid Mediterranean 
system. Since the shape of the impulse of unemployment is approximately the same for TFP, FD 
and trade liberalisation shocks, we use trade liberalisation as a basis for our analysis. 
Quantitatively, for trade liberalisation, unemployment drops more significantly by 
approximately 0.08 and 0.07 percentage points in the liberal and flexicurity systems, 
respectively, compared to the 0.052 percentage points reduction in the Mediterranean system. 
These results are driven by the effects of our welfare state configuration on the value of a job 
match, which in turn determine the average cost of creating vacancies (see equation (32)). Given 
the inter-sectoral linkage in our economy, the feedback effect from the labour market determines 
the extent to which labour service is demanded by the intermediate sector. In the flexicurity and 
liberal systems, with a relatively low cost of vacancy creation, a positive trade shock leads to 
higher labour demand, which in turn enhances the response of unemployment. 
In the Mediterranean welfare system, the rigidity in the labour market structure limits the 
benefit of trade liberalisation: the response of unemployment is much slower and protracted than 
in the other welfare systems. This gradual adjustment is explained by the existence of high 
vacancies creation cost, combined with high expected cost of firing. In fact, depending on the 
magnitude of impact of a shock on the value of job, unemployment could rise temporarily as the 
result of more rigid labour market, as with capital liberalisation shock. As already noted, capital 
liberalisation raises productivity by increasing domestic demand. With a flexible labour market, 
domestic intermediate price initially drops, thus encouraging export. With a more rigid labour 
market, the cost of labour to the hiring firm is higher. The feedback effect from the labour market 
therefore translates into higher marginal cost of production, leading to higher domestic 
intermediate prices. Thus, unlike the flexible labour market, this increase in price reduces export, 
while import demand rises against domestic demand. This composite effect, hence, causes a 
temporal rise in unemployment on impact, before falling below, then adjusting back to its long-
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run steady state.  
4.6.4 Active Labour Market Policies and Unemployment Dynamics 
Another important aspect of the labour market policies which has drawn the attention of 
researchers is the use of ALMPs – these include programmes aimed at enhancing the 
qualification and boosting the prospects of the unemployed (Andersen & Svarer, 2007). Here we 
first investigate the responses of selected variables to vacancy and training subsidies, then assess 
how permanent changes in these subsidies drive the response of unemployment to shocks to 
international trade and capital mobility. Note that, in our model, ALMPs are captured by training 
and vacancy creation subsidies.  
Figure 4.9 plots the adjustment dynamics (IRFs) of selected quantities following positive 
vacancy and training subsidy shocks. The right- and left-hand side of y-axis respectively 
represent percentage deviation from the steady state of each variable in response to training and 
vacancy creation subsidies, while the x-axis represents quarters after shock. Qualitatively, both 
subsidies have similar impact on quantities, but these impacts differ in terms of the magnitude: 
the shock to vacancy creation subsidy results in stronger response with respect to the peak effects 
compared to training subsidy. Generally, a rise in either vacancy or training subsidies clearly 
generates a significant increase in employment through a higher vacancy creation, accompanied 
by a rise in the market tightness, on impact. Higher market tightness in turn increases in the job 
finding rate, and so unemployment drops below its steady state, reaching its lowest level around 
6th and 5th quarters after vacancy creation and training shocks respectively. With more people in 
employment, aggregate output and consumption level go up too, with the former reaching its 
highest level around the same time that employment peaks. Since both subsidies reduce the 
marginal cost of production, by lowering the price of labour service to the intermediate sector, 
intermediate price level drops, which then triggers increase in the domestic and foreign demand 
for intermediate varieties.  
As suggested by the impulse response of labour market variables, vacancy creation 
subsidies appear to be more effective in lowering unemployment and in fostering increase in 
GDP compared to training subsidies. On one hand, and on impact, a positive one percent standard 
deviation vacancy creation subsidy shock raises the number of vacancies by approximately 0.2 
percent, at the peak, while unemployment falls by almost 0.07 percentage points below its steady 
state level. On the other hand, a positive shock to training subsidy of equal magnitude, raises 
vacancy creation marginally by 0.004 percent, while unemployment drops to its lowest level of 
approximately 0.003 percent. A plausible explanation for the difference in the magnitude of 
impact is that training subsidy is not necessarily a major constraint to the hiring firms since the 
calibrated benchmark cost incurred for training each worker is generally small compared to the 
cost of recruiting workers. In the steady state, the implied cost of recruiting each worker or 
creating each vacancy and training each worker are respectively 0.32 and 0.007, which are 
approximately 1.6 and 0.7 percent of the economy’s GDP. Figure 4.10 in Appendix 4 shows the 
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impulse response of unemployment to capital and trade liberalisation in the presence of long-run 
ALMPs. As suggested by the impulses, the effects of training subsidy on the dynamic adjustment 
of unemployment is muted, whereas vacancy subsidy enhances the speed of adjustment both in 
terms of the impact effects and adjustment back to the steady state. 
4.7 Conclusion 
Empirical and theoretical evidence suggest that links between nations – globalisation – can serve 
as important channels through which economic crisis can be propagated. Consequently, many 
countries, especially within the EU, have resorted to labour market reforms as a means to 
increase the market’s flexibility in adjusting to aggregate shocks. This chapter developed a small 
open economy DSGE model with search and matching frictions in the labour market to study 
the effects of economic openness on unemployment dynamics. A novel feature of this chapter is 
that it explicitly considers an economy that is linked to the rest of the world through international 
trade and capital movement, which has in the past been studied separately in the literature, with 
the interaction of both providing a deeper understanding of the dynamics of unemployment. 
 We found that a reduction in barriers to international capital mobility, by opening up 
investment opportunities, can result in higher labour productivity, output and lower 
unemployment. A lower impediment to international trade is also found to have a similar 
unemployment-reducing effect via an increase in foreign demand for domestic goods; but when 
jointly implemented with a higher capital mobility, the effect on unemployment is larger. Our 
model predicts that the impact of shocks on the dynamics of unemployment differs depending on the 
initial degree of exposure to international trade and capital mobility. Specifically, we found that a 
higher degree of openness to international capital mobility can result in unemployment volatility 
in response to domestic productivity shock. While this result is by no means novel (e.g. as 
demonstrated by Azariadis and Pissarides, 2007), we show, however, that when accompanied by 
an increase in openness to trade, a higher degree of capital mobility can result in a much larger 
unemployment fluctuation in response to the same shock. Strikingly, our model indicates that 
shocks with different origins are likely to have contrasting effect on the adjustment of 
unemployment, depending on the degree of barrier to international capital mobility.  
 Finally, our model indicates that taken as a package, trade openness and labour market 
reforms, or capital mobility and labour market reforms can deliver more benefit to an economy 
in terms of improved employment rate than individual reforms. Furthermore, given the emphasis 
on labour market flexibility, we calibrate the model to replicate the labour market features of 
three welfare systems (the flexicurity, liberal and the Mediterranean welfare systems) in the EU 
and investigate the response of unemployment under each system. Our results show that the 
flexicurity and liberal welfare systems with more flexibility in hiring and firing regulations 
produce larger volatility in unemployment in response to shocks. The Mediterranean system with 
more rigid employment rules, on the other hand, dampens the peak effects of unemployment, 
with slower reversion to the steady state. 
136 
The model we developed in this chapter did not consider skill heterogeneity – such as the 
low- and high-skilled workers. However, there is increasing concern that globalisation may have 
different effects on workers with different skill types in terms of income inequality and work 
displacement (Brecher & Chen, 2010; Feenstra & Hanson, 2001; Helpman, Itskhoki, & Redding, 
2010). The introduction of skill heterogeneity into the model – which we leave for future research 
– to study how the interaction of openness in capital and trade can affect workers with different 
skills will be an interesting departure from this work. 
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Appendix 4 
4A Mathematical Derivations 
4A.1 Household’s Optimisation Problem 
The present discounted lifetime utility of the household is given by  
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The budget constraint, evolution of capital and the condition for capital mobility are as 
follows: 
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The household maximises (A1) subject to the constraints (A2), (A3) and (A4). The Lagrangian of 
the household optimisation problem can be written as23 
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The first order conditions with respect to   t sC  and  1 t sK    are given by 
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Setting 0s   in (A6) and (A7) and then rearranging, we obtain the following equations: 
 cctt tC
   ,   (A6‘) 
 *1 1 1 1 1Λ 1 Λ  t tt t t t tr M kE           ,   (A7‘) 
which yield equations (5) and (6) in the text.  
                                                             
23 We drop the firm index 𝑗 since we consider a symmetric equilibrium where all firms make similar decision and 
workers supply the same number of hours to work. 
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4A.2 Final Good Sector’s Optimisation Problem 
The profit of the representative firm in the final good producing sector is given by  
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which is maximised subject to production function, 
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The Lagrangian formulation of the firm’s maximisation problem can be expressed as  
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where t  is the Lagrange multiplier associated with (A9). Differentiating (A10) w.r.t Yt,  
d
ity , 
* ity  
and t  and setting the results equal to zero we have  
0Y t
t
t
L
P
Y

  

.   (A11) 
   
 
*
1
11 1
1 1/ 1 1/
* *
1
1/
1
1
0.
t t
d dY
t it t it t itd
it i M i M
d
t t it
t
L
M p M y di M y di
y
M M y
 
 
 







 
 
 


 
    
            
 
 
 
 
 
  (A12) 
     
*
* *
*
1
11 1 1
*1 1/ 1 1/ 1/
* * * *
1
1
0.
t t
Y
t t it
it
d
t it t it t t it
i M i M
t
L
M p
y
M y di M y di M M y
  
  
  





  
  
 
  
    
  
 
    
         
 
 
 (A13)
   
*
1
1 1/1 1
1 1/ 1 1/
* * 0
t t
dY
t it t it t
i M i M
L
M y di M y di Y
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
    
 
 
  .   (A14) 
Evaluating (A12) and (A13) using tt P  and   
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the demand functions for domestic and imported intermediate varieties as, 
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The domestic price index can be obtained by substituting (A15) and (A16) into (A8) – 
noting that under the perfect competition assumption we require 0Yt  . The resulting price 
index satisfies, 
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4A.3 Hiring Sector’s Optimisation Problem 
Each firm  0,1j  maximises the present discounted value of expected profit given by 
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motion of employment, 
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Let jtJ  denote the Lagrange multiplier associated with (A18), the Lagrangian for each 
firm can be written as 
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The FOCs w.r.t.    and   jt s jt sv n   are summarised, for s = 0, as follows 
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which respectively represent equations (30) and (31) in the text. 
4A.4 Wage Determination 
From the first order condition with respect to jtw  we have  1jt jtJ W   , i.e., equation (34)
. Substituting equations (31) and (33) into the FOC for jtw , and rearranging, we obtaining 
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After rearranging the above we obtain the real wage equation 
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4A.5 Optimal Hours of Work 
The first order condition with respect to jth yields 
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(A23) and solving using equation (34) in the text yields the solution for optimal hours per worker 
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4B Summary of Equilibrium System 
The summary of the equilibrium system is presented here according each equation (Eq), the 
steady state (SS) and log-linearised (LL) versions. In the absence of shocks, the economy 
converges to a steady state where all variables are constant; hence, 0   . In the log-linearised 
version, variables with ‘hat’ denote log-deviation from their steady state, while variables without 
time subscript denote steady state value. 
Household budget constrain: 
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Law of motion for capital: 
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Capital mobility condition: 
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Euler equation: 
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Final good: 
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Firm level profit: 
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Demand for domestic intermediate varieties: 
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Demand for foreign intermediate varieties: 
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Export: 
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Labour demand and supply: 
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Labour demand and supply: 
Eq:  .
SS:   .
ˆˆ ˆLL:  .
t t t t
tt t t
N h M l
Nh Ml
N h M l


  
 
Aggregate intermediate goods: 
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Marginal Cost: 
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Intermediate output: 
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Marginal Product of labour: 
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Marginal product of capital: 
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Optimal real price: 
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Aggregate matches: 
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Market tightness: 
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Labour market transition probabilities: 
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Aggregate employment (extensive margin): 
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Aggregate unemployment: 
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Vacancy creation condition: 
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Wage bill: 
     
 
 
1 1
1 1Eq:  1 1  1
1  .
1
c
c
T T V Vct t
t t t t t t t t t
ct t
f t t
t
h
C
w h w h x f E x
C
w h
b



     




 
 
  
         
  
 
   
  
 
       
 
    
 
 
 
 
 
1
1 1 1
SS:   1 1  1 1 .
1
ˆˆ ˆˆ ˆˆLL:  
ˆ
ˆ
ˆˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ ˆ 1
1
ˆ
 
1
fT T V V
h
T T T
t t t t t t
V V f t
t
ct ct c t t t tV
h
t
wh
wh wh x f x b
wh w h wh w h x ff
h h
C C bb
w w

     

  

 
   
 

  
 
                
     
    
           
   


.



 
where    1 1 V Vx       . 
Optimal hours per worker: 
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Government budget: 
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Trade balance: 
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Gross Domestic Product: 
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Other exogenous variables take the form 
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Additional Variables 
Trade deficit/surplus: 
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Match Value: 
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4C Tables and Figures 
Table 4.1: Baseline calibration 
Parameter Description Value 
αc relative risk aversion 0.8 
αf production elasticity of working hours 0.995 
αh frisch elasticity 2 
β subjective discount factor 0.996 
δ depreciation rate 0.025 
λ importance of variety measure 0 
F* = P* = ξc normalisation (see text) 1 
τ iceberg trade cost 1.3 
σ demand elasticity: set to target Mπ/GDP = 0.2 6 
r = r*  interest rate 0.05 
κ capital mobility coefficient: set to target I/GDP = 0.17 0.00088 
Φ bargaining power/trade union 0.5 
μ matching elasticity (Hosios condition) 1 – Φ  
η job separation rate 0.038 
γ elasticity of output to labour input: targets Nwh/GDP = 0.57 0.7144 
xV vacancy creation cost (implied from the steady state) 0.3225 
xT training cost (implied from the steady state) 0.006 
χ Matching efficiency (implied from the steady state) 0.4865 
M, M* number of domestic and foreign varieties 1, 10 
A disutility of work measure: set to target h = 0.424 10 
φ TFP parameter: set to target GDP = 1  0.751 
b  UI replacement rate 0.38 
f  firing cost ratio 0.063 
ζT = ζV  subsidies 0 
e measure of effort 0.7 
p* Price of imported varieties (derived from the steady state) 1.009 
Note: the sources of the parameter values are discussed in the text, section 4.4. 
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Table 4.2: Effects of liberalisation on the steady state economy 
Variable 
Scenario (i) Scenario (ii) Scenario (iii) Scenario (iv) 
Pre-Lib 
(Baseline) 
Partial Lib 
(Capital, κ ↓) 
Partial Lib 
(Trade, τ ↓) 
Absolute Lib 
(κ ↓ &τ ↓) 
GDP 1.0000 1.0821 1.1119 1.1903 
C 0.8073 0.9129 0.8736 0.9770 
K 6.8000 15.1769 2.3503 10.8738 
J 0.9146 0.9536 0.9674 1.0028 
θ 0.4830 0.5251 0.5403 0.5806 
N 0.9308 0.9348 0.9361 0.9394 
U 0.1046 0.1008 0.0995 0.0963 
w 1.4433 1.5704 1.5799 1.7020 
pd 1.0336 1.1053 1.0651 1.0810 
yd 0.7274 0.8604 0.3977 0.5054 
y* 0.0174 0.0308 0.0435 0.0604 
yx 0.1699 0.1136 0.5413 0.4952 
π 0.1667 0.1804 0.1853 0.1984 
 
Table 4.3: Steady state solution and policy comparative statics 
Var. Baseline 
LM-Reforms ALMPs 
𝜌𝑏 ↓ 𝜌𝑓 ↓ x
T ↓ xV ↓ ζT ↑ ζV ↑ 
GDP 1.00000 1.00611 1.00003 0.99983 1.00508 1.00007 1.00287 
C 0.80727 0.80855 0.80728 0.80843 0.81170 0.80729 0.80793 
K 6.80000 6.55694 6.79888 6.80675 6.59791 6.79732 6.68599 
J 0.91462 1.03324 0.91511 0.91684 0.82324 0.91580 0.87053 
θ 0.48300 0.61641 0.48352 0.48534 0.61142 0.48425 0.54019 
N 0.93076 0.94207 0.93081 0.93099 0.94171 0.93088 0.93609 
U 0.10461 0.09373 0.10456 0.10438 0.09407 0.10449 0.09948 
w 1.44334 1.43197 1.44398 1.44667 1.44317 1.44488 1.44291 
w  2.13511 2.12747 2.13507 2.13532 2.12875 2.13502 2.13151 
pa 0.65997 0.65943 0.65997 0.65998 0.65952 0.65996 0.65971 
pd 1.03358 1.02992 1.03356 1.03368 1.03053 1.03353 1.03186 
yd 0.72742 0.72926 0.72743 0.72737 0.72895 0.72744 0.72829 
y* 0.01741 0.01708 0.01741 0.01742 0.01714 0.01740 0.01725 
yx 0.16994 0.17359 0.16995 0.16984 0.17297 0.16998 0.17164 
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Table 4.4: Economic openness and labour market reforms 
 Var. 
 
Equilibrium 
after lib. 
(but before 
LM reform) 
Labour Market Reform ALMPs 
Equilibrium 
with benefit 
(𝝆𝒃) reform 
Equilibrium 
with firing 
cost (𝝆𝒇)reform 
Equilibrium 
with vacancy 
subsidy (ζV) 
Equilibrium 
with training 
subsidy (ζT) 
C
ap
it
al
 l
ib
er
al
is
at
io
n
 
GDP 1.08212 1.08822 1.08215 1.08498 1.08428 
C 0.91287 0.91405 0.91288 0.91349 0.91413 
K 15.17692 14.93446 15.17581 15.06317 15.09128 
θ 0.52505 0.66962 0.52562 0.58702 0.52738 
N 0.93476 0.94567 0.93481 0.93989 0.93496 
U 0.10076 0.09027 0.10072 0.09582 0.10056 
w 1.57041 1.55818 1.57111 1.56983 1.57451 
w  2.31873 2.31027 2.31869 2.31475 2.32232 
pa 0.67179 0.67111 0.67179 0.67147 0.67291 
pd 1.10528 1.10152 1.10526 1.10352 1.11143 
yd 0.86044 0.86410 0.86046 0.86216 0.85131 
y* 0.03079 0.03030 0.03079 0.03056 0.03150 
yx 0.11363 0.11598 0.11364 0.11473 0.12090 
T
ra
d
e 
li
b
er
al
is
at
io
n
 
GDP 1.11188 1.11825 1.11191 1.11487 1.11943 
C 0.87358 0.87490 0.87359 0.87426 0.87804 
K 2.35033 2.09668 2.34916 2.23134 2.04971 
θ 0.54031 0.68911 0.54089 0.60408 0.54541 
N 0.93610 0.94688 0.93615 0.94118 0.93653 
U 0.09947 0.08910 0.09943 0.09459 0.09905 
w 1.57987 1.56800 1.58057 1.57943 1.59050 
w  2.33151 2.32351 2.33147 2.32775 2.34453 
pa 0.72440 0.72381 0.72440 0.72412 0.72870 
pd 1.06511 1.06342 1.06511 1.06432 1.07716 
yd 0.39771 0.39863 0.39772 0.39815 0.38266 
y* 0.04348 0.04317 0.04348 0.04333 0.04475 
yx 0.54129 0.54646 0.54131 0.54371 0.55655 
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Figure 4.1: Baseline (positive) TFP shock 
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Figure 4.2: Baseline (positive) foreign demand shock 
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Figure 4.3: Partial liberalisation in capital (reduction in κ) 
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Figure 4.4: Partial liberalisation in trade (reduction in τ) 
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Figure 4.5: Economic openness and the adjustment of unemployment  
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Figure 4.6: Effects of economic openness on the IRFs following a (positive) TFP shock 
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Figure 4.7: Effects of economic openness on the IRFs following a (positive) FD shock 
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Figure 4.8: Welfare system and the response of unemployment 
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Figure 4.9: Positive training (ζT) and vacancy creation (ζV) subsidies 
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Figure 4.10: Effects of ALMPs on the adjustment of unemployment to trade and capital mobility shocks 
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Chapter 5. Conclusion 
5.1 Summary and Conclusion 
The thesis is composed of three main chapters that are broadly motivated by the labour market 
effects of the recent global economic crisis, and the role of active and passive labour market 
policies in shaping these effects. A key feature in each chapter is the presence of search and 
matching frictions in the labour market. The search and matching model allows for an easy 
characterisation of the labour market which enabled us to examine a wide range of issues 
addressed in this thesis. We contribute to the growing literature attempting to provide an 
understanding of the functioning of the labour market and the dynamics of unemployment. 
In Chapter 2, we examined the effects of specific employment policies (consisting of 
targeted severance compensation and, a common, fixed firing cost and recruitment subsidy) on 
labour market outcomes. In particular, we studied how these policies drive firms’ vacancy 
creation and allocation decisions and, consequently, the unemployment rates of skilled and 
unskilled workers. To achieve this, we modified the Albrecht and Vroman (2002) version of the 
search model with cross-skill matching equilibrium and jobs minimum skill requirement. This 
framework features heterogeneous skilled and unskilled workers and high- and low-tech jobs. 
Whilst workers’ skills are exogenously distributed, vacancy creation and their allocation into job 
types are endogenously driven. A fundamental assumption is that skilled workers are suitable 
for any of the two job types, whereas unskilled workers are only suitable for low-tech jobs. This 
assumption, thus, gives the skilled in the labour force some leverage over their unskilled 
counterparts, reflecting existing labour market stylised facts. Our analysis is divided into two 
parts. In the first part, we assumed that a job match is established between a job-searching worker 
and a firm with a vacancy when they both meet and agree to a wage rate determined via Nash 
bargaining solution. In the second part, wages are assumed to be predetermined and are, 
therefore, taken as given when establishing job matches.  
Using this framework, we show that labour market policies have different equilibrium 
effects depending on whether they are targeted or common to all job types. In particular, our 
results revealed that when directed towards low-tech jobs, an increase in severance compensation 
leads to lower vacancy creation and reduces the fraction of vacancies allocated towards low-tech 
job type. Unskilled workers are therefore worse off: our simulations showed that in all cases, the 
percentage increase in the unemployment rate of the unskilled is at least three times higher than 
the increase of skilled workers’. On the contrary, when directed toward high-tech jobs, severance 
compensation leaves vacancy creation decision unaffected but alters the allocation of vacant jobs 
in favour of low-tech job type, leading to lower unemployment rate of the unskilled. However, 
given that skilled workers are suitable for low-tech jobs also, their unemployment rate remains 
stable, suggesting labour crowding out effects. Fixed firing cost, assumed to be common to both 
job types, reduces vacancy creation activities and shifts allocation away from low-tech jobs and 
towards high-tech ones. This also leaves the unskilled worse off, but unlike targeted low-tech 
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severance policy, the effect is minimal. Vacancy creation subsidy, also considered to be common 
to all firms, is found to improve labour market outcomes by making vacancies more available 
vis-a-vis lower job creation cost. While such a subsidy does shift the allocation of vacancies 
towards high-tech jobs, the ensuing reduction in the competition for low-tech jobs leads to 
improvement in the employment outcome of unskilled workers. Comparing these results with 
those obtained fixed wage framework, we observed similar qualitative effects. However, we 
found that the sensitivity of firms to changes in labour market policies are generally greater when 
wages are predetermined. Finally, this chapter offers new insight into how the effects of 
severance compensation on the labour market can be assessed theoretically. We show, against 
conventional wisdom, that as long as there is strict enforcement, severance compensation will 
have deep consequences on job creation and unemployment. 
Chapter 3 of this thesis contributes to the literature exploring the labour market effects 
of fiscal policies. We studied the effects of labour market institutions on the structure of the 
economy and the way this alters the propagation of fiscal policy shocks. Thus, we developed a 
closed economy real business cycle DSGE model with two vertically integrated production 
sectors, a household and a government. An intermediate sector, consisting of a mass of 
monopolistically competitive firms, is assumed to produce intermediate goods, using labour and 
capital as input factors. Each of these firms creates vacancies at a fixed sunk cost in order to hire 
workers per period. Once employment relationships are established, wages and hours of work 
are negotiated between the firms and the employees. Thus, we capture employment both at 
extensive (number of workers) and intensive (hours per worker) margins. Job matches are 
assumed to be dissolved at a constant exogenous rate. A homogenous final output (used for 
government and household consumptions and for capital formation) is produced in a competitive 
final good sector, using intermediate goods as input. The representative household consumes 
final goods, saves its wealth in capital and supplies labour. The government operates a balanced 
budget and finances its expenditure using revenues generated through taxes on firms and the 
household and labour income. It spends on own consumption, which is assumed to be utility-
enhancing as against wasteful expenditure, as well as on the provision of unemployment 
insurance benefits and active labour market policies (that consists of vacancy creation and 
employment tax subsidies).  
We found that the labour market institutions matters for aggregate economic 
performance. Particularly, when associated with higher rigidity, labour market institutions 
(captured by a firing penalty, which in turn consists of severance compensation and a fixed firing 
cost, unemployment benefits and distortionary labour tax) amplify the effects of government 
consumption expenditure on vacancy creation, employment and hours of work. The initial sizes 
of the household budget and surplus of a job match are identified to play a major role in 
determining these effects. By raising the cost of labour to the firing firms, higher rigidity shrinks 
the size of match surplus and, consequently, the size of the household budget, making both firms 
and the household more sensitive shocks. The impact of government demand shock is therefore 
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transmitted to the rest of the economy through a more rapid adjustment in vacancy creation 
activities, which amplifies the response of employment at extensive margin. Additionally, since 
government spending reduces household budget size via taxes required to satisfy a balanced 
budget, the anticipation of higher tax obligation leads to increased downward adjustment in 
investment and consumption, when the initial household budget is small. This, in turn, amplifies 
the response of hours supply. Hence, whilst investment is lowered as a result of negative wealth 
effect, the increase in aggregate hours of work sustains output level. Our results indicated that 
strict unemployment insurance benefits and distortionary labour tax policies play a key role in 
raising the sensitivity of firms and households compared to fixed firing tax and severance 
compensation. 
Furthermore, we showed that while an expansion in government consumption spending 
does lead to a higher employment via its aggregate demand effect, the extent to which this occurs 
also depends on the degree of substitutability between public and private consumption. 
Specifically, we found that when associated with a higher weight in private utility, the magnitude 
of the impact of government consumption demand stimulus on employment drops. We then 
compare the effects of government consumption spending and labour market-oriented fiscal 
stimulus. Our model consistently indicates that only labour market-oriented policies (subsidies) 
could be more effective in fostering employment. In particular, we found that in the presence of 
labour market rigidities and regardless of the financing option, only a subsidy directed towards 
job creation can generate output and employment multipliers effects that are much larger than 
unity. 
The final chapter (Chapter 4) contributes to the literature examining the labour market 
effects of globalisation. Here, we developed a small open economy DSGE framework with 
vertical linkages in the production sector and labour market intermediation. The economy is 
linked to the rest of the world through trade in intermediate goods and capital mobility, but small 
in the sense that the total aggregate demand for its exports, the price of the varieties it imports, 
and the world rate of return on capital cannot be influenced by the activities of domestic agents. 
We assumed a non-traded final good is produced using domestic and imported varieties by a 
perfectly competitive sector. The domestic varieties of the input, which are also exported, are 
produced by an intermediate sector characterised by monopolistic competition in the product 
market. This sector uses labour man-hours and capital as factor input in the production process. 
We modelled a hiring sector set up by the government to act as intermediary between the 
household (that supply labour) and the intermediate sector. The role of this sector is to hire and 
train unemployed members of the household whose services are subsequently sold competitively 
as labour man-hours. A representative household is assumed to have access to international 
capital market which it uses to deal with residual capital requirements in the domestic economy. 
Using this framework, we examined the influence of changes in the degree of openness to 
international trade (measured by iceberg trade cost) and capital mobility (modelled as the line 
proposed by Rodrik, 1998) on labour market outcomes, with emphasis on unemployment. 
163 
Using numerical examples, we showed that a reduction in the impediments to 
international capital mobility can lead to higher labour productivity, GDP and lower 
unemployment. We identified two key channels through which this impacts unemployment; 
namely, domestic demand effect and wealth effect. First, we argued that as long as capital is 
accumulated in the domestic economy, an increase in international capital mobility, by 
expanding investment opportunities, will result in a higher demand for domestic varieties, 
consequently leading to higher labour productivity and lower unemployment. Second, as 
domestic investment rises, the ensuing negative interest rate differential induces capital outflow 
which in turn creates positive wealth effect via a higher foreign return. This consequently leads 
to further domestic consumption and investment; thus, positively impacting labour productivity 
that results in lower unemployment. Regarding the effect of trade liberalisation, we found that 
by raising foreign demand for exported varieties, a lower trade impediment can also result in 
lower unemployment. In particular, we establish that when jointly implemented, higher openness 
to international trade and capital mobility will lead to a much more reduction in unemployment. 
We went further to investigate how changes in the degree of economic openness alter the 
dynamics of unemployment in response to domestic productivity and foreign demand shocks. 
We found that a reduction in barriers to international capital mobility leads to higher volatility 
in unemployment in response to domestic productivity shock. Our model further reveals that this 
effect is greater the more open the economy is to international trade, thus adding to the literature 
which has so far concentrated on the individual effects of trade and capital mobility. In particular, 
it is shown that shocks originating from different sources will have different effects on the 
adjustment of unemployment, depending crucially on the degree of openness to international 
capital mobility. We found that whilst a higher degree of openness to capital mobility increases 
the responsiveness of unemployment to domestic productivity shock, it dampens the adjustment 
effect to foreign demand shock. By contrast, a lower international trade impediment magnifies 
the effects of both shocks on the dynamics of unemployment. 
Finally, we examined how labour market structure shapes the behaviour of 
unemployment in response to shock. This was driven by the fact that the recent reform drive 
towards improving labour market flexibility, especially in the EU, have been justified on the 
grounds that a well-functioning market is required to mitigate the negative consequences of 
globalisation on job creation. We found that the heterogeneity in the labour market structure, as 
reflected in the differences in welfare systems, can have important implications on labour 
market’s adjustments to shocks. In particular, using stylised calibrations, which can be thought 
as reflecting the liberal, flexicurity and the Mediterranean welfare state systems in the EU, we 
found that the ones characterised by higher flexibility (corresponding to flexicurity and liberal 
systems) exhibit greater volatility in unemployment in response to domestic and external shocks. 
By contrast, the Mediterranean system with high labour market rigidity produces a much slower 
and persistent response in unemployment.  
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5.2 Closing Remark 
This thesis attempted to answer several pressing questions about labour market outcomes using 
different equilibrium set-ups. The results produced should, however, be treated with caution. 
This is, in part, due to the assumptions we made. While these are potentially desirable 
assumptions so as to keep our analysis manageable and tractable, the conclusions reached are 
likely to change (although this cannot be determined ex-ante) if some assumptions are relaxed. 
For example, throughout this thesis, we have assumed that job destruction rate is exogenously 
determined, with Chapters 3 and 4 further assuming that workers and firms are identical. Fujita 
and Ramey (2012) show that endogenous and exogenous job separation are likely to have 
different implications for the dynamics of unemployment in the models with search and 
matching frictions. For example, throughout our theoretical formulations, we have assumed that 
firms adjust to changes in labour market policies (such as fixed firing cost) by altering their 
vacancy creation activities. Zanetti (2011a) however shows that a higher fixed firing cost can 
induce firms to reduce both job creation and productivity threshold, which influences job 
destruction rate. The former yields the usual results found in this thesis: an increase in firing cost 
reduces the number of vacancies and increases unemployment. However, by lowering 
productivity threshold, the rate of job separation reduces as well. These results show that an 
increase in firing cost is thus likely to have an ambiguous effect on unemployment depending on 
its net effect on job creation and job destruction rates. Progress in this area, therefore, requires 
endogenising the job destruction rate.  
Additionally, as we have already identified in Chapter 2, the unemployment rates for 
different categories of workers react differently to policy shocks. Another useful, extension in 
both Chapters 3 and 4 will be to introduce skill heterogeneity. In particular, in Chapter 4, there 
are concerns that globalisation may have asymmetric effects on workers with differences in skills 
in the area of work displacement (Brecher & Chen, 2010). Using heterogeneous firms’ 
framework with varying productivities, Melitz (2003) shows that an increase in trade openness 
induces the larger and more productive firms to select into exporting, whereas the least 
productive ones contract or drop out of the market. While unemployment is ignored in that paper, 
the implication of that model is that higher openness to trade is likely to lead to uneven effects 
for workers with varying skills due to the expansion and contractions of firms with high and low 
productivity levels. Another interesting way of improving the models could be to introduce 
labour force participation. Brückner and Pappa (2012) show that this can have implications on 
the behaviour of unemployment. 
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